Bureaucratization of Islamic law and faith-based power politics

The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Fri, 05/05/2006 11:50 AM | Opinion

Muhamad Ali, Manoa, Hawaii

The ongoing debate over the bill of the government of Aceh, as well as regional bylaws regarding the implementation of some aspects of Islamic law in some provinces such as South Sulawesi (and within some of its regencies) is an indication of a faith-based politics, a politics based on a particular belief system.

For the advocates of bureaucratization of Islamic law, religion and politics, or faith and power, must not be separated in either values or form. For them, politics must be imbued with not only common ethics but also and more importantly with religious doctrine. Despite the recognized special status of Aceh, they believe that Islamic sharia, which they define as identical to Islamic law (fiqh), must be formalized in regulations.

The 2003 Regional Autonomy Law has been seen as an opportunity by local politicians and religious leaders to promote a particular religious worldview. Political openness contributed to this resurgence of formalized Islam in several regions on the one hand, but to the empowerment of civil, cultural, pluralistic Islam on the other hand.

In Aceh, one of the debated materials in the House of Representatives concerned the authority of the Sharia Court (Mahkamah Syariah). As reported by the media, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) fraction argued that the Sharia Court has jurisdiction over all individuals and institutions existing in Aceh, whereas the Prosperous Peace Party (the Christian-based PDS) faction maintains that the authority is only over Muslims, not all citizens in Aceh. Another option was offered by other factions, which maintains that the jurisdiction is over Muslims, but may in some cases be also for non-Muslims.

The South Sulawesi Legislative Council recently passed a bill on Koranic education and is discussing other bills such as of the obligatory giving of alms (zakat) and of the eradication of the public evils (munkarat).

Some of the reasons for promoting such bills is that the bylaws were intended to increase Koranic literacy in the province. When asked why the local government should interfere in this effort (Koranic education has been obligatory for Muslims without interference), they responded that without political support, the effort would not succeed.

They also argued that by being able to read the Koran, they would become good Muslims and thus good citizens. In Bulukumba, other bylaws concern the dress code for Muslim women, zakat and maksiat. All these were advocated for making better Muslims. In their view the teachings of Islam should be promulgated by both cultural and political means.

They believe this formalization is not against either Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution. In their view the Pancasila State allows elements in society to practice their religion. In South Sulawesi they maintain that the regional bylaws will not be enacted over non-Muslims, although in practice non-Muslims have little option but to follow the rest, such as in the dress code. When asked why not make regulations inclusive to all religious communities, they replied that religious communities have their own right to promote their own religion as long as they do this constitutionally.

Such faith-based politics is not the whole picture, however. Most Indonesians, Muslims and minorities, including people within South Sulawesi, do not endorse formalized Islamic law. Most subscribe to a substantive sharia. Within Muslim groups and individuals, there exists a diversity of views on what Islam should mean and imply in the private and public sphere. The subscribers to substantive sharia, for example, put great emphasis on education for science and technology, employment, law enforcement, corruption eradication, public service, economic reforms, and other crucial inclusive problems.

The formalization of Islamic law may limit diversity of religiosity and dissenting views guaranteed by Pancasila and the Constitution. The dissenting groups would be regarded as a threat rather than a dialog partner.

Power is everywhere and those who dominate discourse hold power, as Michel Foucault says. The dominant discourse over what sharia means and implies influences who hold power, and create and impose regulations over society at large, and vice versa. Those in power may determine discourse on sharia. In many legal cases, however, the majority remain silent. Noise comes from the vocal few often speaking on behalf of the silent majority.

Democracy needs to be both procedural and substantive. In terms of procedure, the struggle over a particular interpretation of religion in democratic ways is regarded as constitutional. Yet what can be said to be procedurally democratic may not be regarded as substantively democratic when diversity is denied.

Despite the homogenizing effort, Muslims and other religious communities have become more and more pluralized. There is distribution and diversification of religious authority in society, which could signify either the deepening or trivializing of religiosity. History will again tell which struggle proves more effective and enduring: faith-based politics or civil, cultural movements.

Muhamad Ali is a lecturer at the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He is a PhD candidate in history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and a fellow at the East-West Center. He can be reached at muhali74@hotmail.com

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