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Taking the Lombok pact to the next level
The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Wed, 11/22/2006 12:21 PM | Opinion
S.P. Seth, Sydney
After severe hiccups caused by the granting of asylum to 43 Papuans in Australia, Indonesia-Australia relations are now back on track with the recent signing of a pact for security cooperation in the widest sense of the word. The agreement, called the Treaty of Lombok, is not strictly a military pact but entails cooperation in virtually all security-related aspects, like defense, terrorism, border protection, drugs etc.
Any pact between two or more countries is essentially based on national self-interest. And it is equally true of this treaty between Canberra and Jakarta. And what are these interests that they seek to promote?
In the case of Indonesia, the top priority would be its territorial integrity, sharpened by the loss of East Timor. Rightly or wrongly, many Indonesians blame this on Australia. Therefore, when Canberra granted asylum to Papuans, Indonesia feared that Australia might be encouraging separatism in Papua.
It might be recalled that the treaty of cooperation, now signed between the two countries, was almost ready when the Papuan asylum issue scuttled the process. Jakarta had no use for a treaty of cooperation if Canberra encouraged Papuan separatism.
Therefore, the treaty says: ""The Parties shall not in any manner support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other party, including by those who seek to use its territory for encouraging or committing such activities, including separatism, in the territory of the other party.""
Though not spelled out, the reference here apparently is to Papua or any other restless region.
But the treaty can only go as far as it does on the separatism issue. If Papuan separatism were ever to become a major human rights issue, Canberra might not able to stem the tide of popular opinion as happened with East Timor. The government of the day might itself be swept away by domestic electoral considerations to take the high moral ground.
Therefore, Canberra's capacity to fulfill its undertaking will also depend on how well Jakarta will manage Papuan politics or any other issue that might arise in the future.
While territorial integrity is Indonesia's top priority, it is also keen on promoting its image as a well-respected and significant nation in this part of the world, especially with the United States and Europe. And here Australia can be helpful, being a close U.S. ally and with its European heritage. Australian expertise on Indonesia and Southeast Asia region in general, is well-regarded in the United States.
Indonesia has had a bad image over a period. But with the onset of democracy, especially after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election as President, Indonesia is emerging as a respectable regional power. But a cloud still lurks from the Soeharto past. Australia is in a good position, as a developed Western country in Asia, to advance Indonesia's new image.
On terrorism, for instance, Canberra has sought to buttress Indonesia's credentials, as it should. A right image is extremely important because it brings in foreign investments, creates trade opportunities, and expands political and military ties and so on. Much of the work in this regard will need to be done by Indonesia, but friends like Australia can help sell the message.
An important component of the treaty is Canberra's undertaking to help Indonesia develop its peaceful nuclear energy program. Australian imprimatur on this might help to insulate Indonesia from likely criticism on this from other sources, from the United States, for instance. And with uranium supplies from Australia assured as part of a special relationship, Indonesia might have smoother start in this direction than many other countries have managed so far.
But this is not particularly popular within Australia, as Indonesia is regarded as a potential security threat. Besides, Indonesia is considered earthquake-prone and hence dangerous with nuclear plants around. In other words, cooperation in nuclear power industry is going to be highly controversial in Australia.
On the Australian side, the most important consideration is to manage its bilateral relationship with Indonesia in a way that this potentially threatening large neighbor (as seen by many in Australia) is transformed into a friend and an ally through a web of interlocking cooperative network.
The agreement, though, has a predominantly security flavor, as far Australia is concerned. It caters to its security concerns like terrorism, border protection (from boat refugees using Indonesia as a springboard), and importation of drugs and so on. A direct security threat from Indonesia would be considered most unlikely for the foreseeable future, considering that it has so much on its plate at home and because of its weak military situation. The threats, therefore, might be indirect, and that is what Canberra seeks to address.
But there are some difficulties with this approach. First: any exercise to deal with Indonesia-Australia relationship at the top level, without grassroots support, is essentially fragile. It was evident with the first treaty signed in 1995 based on a leadership equation between then Prime Minister Paul Keating and President Soeharto. And when the East Timor crisis erupted, Canberra succumbed to popular opinion in Australia and Jakarta scrapped the treaty in 1999.
It is true that the present treaty is signed with a democratic Indonesian government and is not tainted with Soeharto's dictatorship. But its driving force has been Prime Minister Howard and President Yudhoyono, and one doesn't detect much popular input into it. Because of this weakness, it could easily become derailed over some crisis in Papua or any other popularly-charged issue. It would, therefore, need to build some popular support over an extended period, through education and a wide range of cultural exchanges between the two countries.
Another difficulty is that there is an abysmal lack of economic content in Indonesia-Australia relationship. The nuclear cooperation element of the treaty could be interpreted as economic as it seeks to tackle energy problem at some time in the future. But its controversial nature might end up exacerbating popular opinion against Indonesia in Australia. Canberra, therefore, would need to encourage Australian economic investments in Indonesia.
The Treaty of Lombok as the framework for security cooperation between Indonesia and Australia is a good start. But much more work will be needed to give some depth to their relationship.
The writer is a freelance writer based in Sydney and can be reached at SushilPSeth@aol.com.
