Crux of problem remains after visit by Bush

The Jakarta Post ,  Jakarta   |  Sat, 11/25/2006 12:34 PM  |  Opinion

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

U.S. President George W. Bush has left Indonesia with a number of different and conflicting impressions.

First, his six-hour meeting with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono seemed to have saved face for Indonesia as a regional power in Southeast Asia.

No matter how short the trip was and what achievements resulted from the visit, there would have been a political embarrassment for Indonesia had Bush only gone to Singapore without visiting Indonesia, whose population is 55 times as large as that of the city state's.

Therefore, for the Indonesian government, Bush's recent visit could be used to convey a message to the world that Indonesia continues to play a significant role in U.S. strategic considerations.

Second, the U.S. President's visit does not mean that the U.S. considers Indonesia to be more important than Singapore or the other way around. Policy makers in Jakarta may need to realize that although the Bogor talk has helped Indonesia maintain its image as a regional power, Singapore has indirectly taken a strategic advantage from the visit without having to spend as much as Indonesia did.

Bush's visit to Indonesia also provides Singapore with a solid argument to counter criticism that the country is merely a pawn in the hands of the United States.

Of course, there is a major difference between Singapore and Indonesia. While most Singaporeans have always had a complex because they are a small country encircled by larger nations, most Indonesians have the strong belief that they are a regional power.

While Singaporeans generally seem to think that they need more than simply a regional power-base to provide them with a security blanket, Indonesians, in contrast, have harbored misgivings about this. That is one of the reasons why many in the Indonesian government traditionally see a desire to project power further than the Southeast Asian region with concern.

Third, the visit of Bush showcased the crucial role of the mass media in judging the relevance and irrelevance of the meeting to the public's daily lives.

It is through the coverage of the mass media, working under the new freedom of expression available in the post Suharto-era, that the public can express candidly and openly all of their excitement, confusion, disappointment and anger. However, democracy in the public sphere could also be put in great danger if it is being based on baseless arguments, irrational hatred and anger.

A statement, such as ""the blood of Bush is halal"" not only tarnishes the image of Indonesia as a civilized nation, but it could also erect a sort of mental block among certain sections of society, stopping them from grasping a number of factual (and particularly, economic) realities regarding the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia.

Factual realities show that Indonesia needs the U.S. more than the other way around. It is estimated that 20 percent of Indonesia's exports go to the American market annually. Similarly, American enterprises have played a major role in running the lucrative natural resource sector in Indonesia and will continue doing so in the years to come.

It is also worth mentioning that almost 80 percent of weapon systems used by the Indonesian Military (TNI) are products of the American defense industry.

Fourth, keeping the above facts in mind, Indonesia is not in a position to patronize the U.S. as suggested by a number of groups here. As Indonesia has been placed in an unequal position with the U.S., not much can be done in the near future unless Indonesian policy makers have a long-term policy to take serious measures to diversify the destinations for Indonesian exports and the sources of our defense weapons systems and military equipment, and substantially change the management of the Indonesian mining sector.

It has become evident, as was clearly shown by the outcome of the recent visit, that both Indonesia and the U.S. do not have a serious intention to remedy the long-standing structural imbalances in their bilateral relationship. In brief, the purpose of Bush's recent visit and his talk with Yudhoyono was primarily to maintain, if not to strengthen, the existing realities.

Fifth, a wide gap in perception exists between the government and the people in managing Indonesia's relationship with the U.S. The Indonesian government remains pragmatic in exercising its diplomacy. Although, policy makers may have become aware that Americans do not have a strong emotional sentiment towards Indonesians, compared to what they feel about the Vietnamese, Japanese and Filipinos.

The absence of such a close historical affinity between the two nations seems to have created an inconvenient situation for Indonesia. The underlying framework of Indonesian foreign policy seems to have been; make extraordinary efforts to attract U.S. attention.

As the U.S., particularly after the break up of the Soviet Union, has emerged as the sole superpower in military, financial, political and cultural terms, the policy makers in Jakarta have always considered it a must to improve its relationship with Washington.

In fact, when each of the Indonesian presidents after the fall of the New Order regime took the opportunity to officially visit Washington shortly after they came to power, very few questioned why they did so.

On the other hand, some elements of Indonesian society have seen the U.S. as a threatening giant. Those who believe in this view argue that an imminent threat to world peace emanates from the unilateral acts taken by the U.S. post-Sept. 11.

They of course admit that the Sept. 11 tragedy had a catastrophic impact on America's national security. However they argue that preemptive strikes by the U.S. against Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the superpower has become a source of international instability rather than stability.

They also fear that no one can be sure that similar acts will not happen again in the future, including to Indonesia. How to manage this widespread view among ordinary Indonesians seems to be far more delicate, compared to the problems at the governmental level.

In this regard, diplomacy has a limited capacity to resolve the problem, no matter how clever Indonesian diplomats are. In short, the crux of the problem in the U.S.-Indonesia relationship actually lies at the social level, not at the governmental level. And the public response to the recent visit of Bush has clearly illustrated it.

The writer is the Executive Director of the Center for East Asia Cooperation Studies (CEACoS) at the University of Indonesia.

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