Conflict in the Philippines, security in RI

Noor Huda Ismail , Jakarta | Fri, 02/22/2008 5:00 PM | Opinion

At Camp Aguinaldo last week, Philippine military Chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. said that the Philippine's most vicious jihadist outfit, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and elements of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) from Indonesia were out to assassinate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

The intelligence emerged amid mounting pressure from the Philippines public to oust the president from power due to what was described as rampant and deep corruption within her administration.

One could conclude that raising the specter of terrorism now may be a ruse to win international funding at this sensitive time.

This is a common perception in Indonesia. You can check it by asking ordinary Indonesian about the whereabouts of the Malaysian citizen Noordin M. Top, Indonesia's most wanted terrorist.

Many will give a surprising answer, like "terrorism is a government project!" or "It's a police and a military project".

Another common answer, "Is it that the police can't arrest him -- or more a case of them not wanting to?"

Such candid responses reflect the skeptical attitude that has now taken root among the general public concerning Indonesia's war on terror.

If this mind-set is not carefully addressed, it could lead to a situation in which Indonesia's three year hiatus from attacks by Noordin's deadly squad comes to an end.

Therefore, it is important for the Indonesian government and others to respond to public skepticism in the following way:

First, it is essential to make the public aware that Indonesia's two most wanted jihadis -- Dulmatin, an electronics specialist known for his bomb-making expertise, and Umar Patek, who has focused on recruitment and training -- are still alive.

It is important to contradict the rumor they are heavily wounded or even dead.

In fact, their presence within the ASG has increased the lethal potential of the group because both Patek and Dulmatin are well-trained, operate in diverse countries and have little connection with their homelands.

Thus, the question of how elements of JI and members of the ASG have communicated and built their alliances in recent years is critical.

The key to answering this question is in identifying the individual who acted as a bridge between the two organizations.

One of those individuals is Abdullah Sunata, a member of KOMPAK who prepared and sent Indonesia's jihadis to the Philippines. KOMPAK is a charity group that was hijacked its function by JI to finance their jihadi activities in the region.

"Jihad must be waged in a proper place and what has happening in the Southern Philippines is really our battle field," Sunata said in a recent interview.

Sunata was arrested by the State Intelligence Body of Indonesia on June 20, 2005 in East Jakarta for his alleged involvement with JI and his close association with Dulmatin and Umar Patek.

When they were in the Philippines, Sunata maintained regular communications with Umar Patek through the exchange of text messages, e-mails and via couriers beginning in May 2003.

Only by understanding the nature of Sunata's reasoning, motivations, pattern of movement and the regions in which he operated, can one prevent the recruitment of new members eager to participate in jihadi activities in conflict zones (such as the Philippines) and who may come back to Indonesia to continue their cause.

Secondly, it is crucial for the regional community and beyond to address the root causes of the existing protracted conflict in the Philippines and understand how JI, in the persons of Dulmatin and Umar Patek, were able to forge their relationship with the ASG.

In this context, one must also remember that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's said in a sermon given in East Java in November 2006: "If you want to go on jihad, do not do it here (in Indonesia), but in the southern Philippines or even in Iraq".

With that justification, any conflict that involves the Muslim community could be a potential magnet for jihadis.

Conflicts serve as important arenas for terrorists. Conflict allows them to put into practice their ideology of jihad and provides an opportunity for members to meet and train with other jihadis in the region and beyond.

They transform themselves, through participation in violent conflicts, from a collection of motivated activists into a cohesive terror organization.

The saga of the Moro veterans in the Philippines highlights the importance of the tightly-knit kin and friendship networks that have proved in many cases to be much more important than conventional top-down recruitment.

The prolonged conflict in the Philippines and its porous borders provide the perfect environment for these isolated kin and friendship networks to form and coalesce.

There is no choice but for the Indonesian government and others to embark on a new pattern of cooperation in intelligence.

The writer is the director of The Institute of International Peace Building. He can be reached at noorhudaismail@yahoo.com.

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