Completing Indonesian reform in civil-military relations

Ali Abdullah Wibisono ,  Jakarta   |  Thu, 05/15/2008 12:20 PM  |  Opinion

Is Indonesia ready to completely discharge the military from all walks of political life? The answer to this question might differ between civilian and military perspectives.

The Indonesian Military (TNI) has already shown a progressive effort over the last 10 years to distance itself from civilian politics. On the other hand, civilian politicians have been showing a worrying degree of unreadiness in avoiding military participation in politics.

This is particularly shown by our politicians in the Parliament who seem clumsy, indecisive and unconfident in undertaking Indonesian military reform. This is probably because of their low understanding and lack of experience in undertaking the issue of TNI reform.

How should we view the military reform which has already been conducted for 10 years in Indonesia? What achievements have we made on military reform and how do we avoid the problematic civil-military relations from ruining those achievements and forcing us to go backward?

Ten years of military reform in Indonesia has decapitated TNI members' ability to legally participate in civilian politics as has been suggested by state regulations in the 2002 and 2004 laws on state defense and the TNI, respectively, which have clearly shown the military's unwillingness to participate in civilian politics. The TNI has already shown its unwillingness to even use voting rights in the 2009 general elections.

As we all already know, a right to vote is one of most basic rights any citizens should have, including soldiers. The reason for this reluctance from the military to vote in the next general elections is quite sincere: They have not yet devised standard procedures in enough detail, down to the field commanders, to maintain TNI neutrality as an institution and supervise TNI members to avoid them from helping civilian politicians in political campaigns. Yet the TNI has already devised a procedure to vote in general elections, which is far more comprehensive than any civilian politicians have ever come up with.

The TNI's ability to run a legally beneficial business among civilians has also been decapitated. The recently released presidential decree on the TNI's business takeover, however unsatisfying in terms of the extent to which the regulation will comprehensively solve TNI business problems, has clearly put forward the institutional platform of the TNI's business termination.

The limited yet encouraging success in military reform has not been responded to in kind by the civilian politicians, who are hampered by their own lack of willingness to exclude the TNI from political participation.

This is especially true in the politics at the local level, in which civilian politicians are still eager to join hand-in-hand with former military figures to pursue local leadership candidacy. Moreover, civilian politicians are all mired in their unsuccessful effort to undertake internal consolidation on their political parties, which in the long run would deem civilian politicians incapable of pursuing state governance vis-a-vis a military actor.

Another worrying sign would be the eagerness of local governments to procure military equipment for local military command, which can be detrimental to the TNI's loyalty that should solely be toward the central government.

In order to consolidate our achievement in civil-military relations, our political regulations on state defense must be sufficient for upholding an effective civilian control of the armed forces.

First, regulations on the authorities of the Defense Ministry should be established. Up until now, the ministry's position vis-a-vis TNI headquarters, or the Defense Ministry and the TNI commander for that matter, is still problematic. While the TNI is merely "under the coordination" of the Defense Ministry, which implies that the TNI commander does not follow directions from or is responsible to the minister of defense, the TNI is also under direct order of the President, which means the role of the ministry of defense can be subdued.

Hence, clear authorities and obligations of the Defense Ministry vis-a-vis the TNI should be made clear, in which the TNI should be "inside" or "part of" the Defense Ministry. The minister of defense thus becomes the bearer of political responsibility in defense management answerable to the President, while serving as defense councilor to the President. It should follow that the TNI commander should be relieved of his duty to hold any political responsibilities and focusing on formulating doctrines for TNI forces' mobilization and management.

Second, the Parliament should be focusing on establishing a performance-based budgeting mechanism for defense in order to guarantee the fulfillment of TNI requirements. Along with the government, the Parliament should uphold an accountable and transparent defense budget management and oversight.

Moreover, it should not be in Parliament's interest to interfere in TNI commander selection. The TNI commander, as stated above, should be free of political responsibility. Continuation of the current habit of TNI commander candidacy in Parliament would only create the notion that the TNI commander is equal to Cabinet ministers, thus should not be governed by the minister of defense.

Finally, the government should finalize institutional instruments of national security policy with the establishment of a National Security Council comprising Cabinet ministers, the TNI commander and intelligence coordinator. The first task of this council should be advising the president in formulating an Indonesian grand defense strategy.

The writer is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations, the University of Indonesia.

Copyright © 2008 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved.