The Attorney General's Office (AGO) scandal will likely continue, and it is not impossible that it will reach the highest level at the office -- that is, Attorney General Hendarman Supandji himself.
One thing is certain: The AGO has been in an almost total downspin concerning public trust and sympathy. If the prosecutor community used to be able to claim that suspected corruption at the office was "peanuts" compared to other forms of corruption, the Artalyta case changed everything.
Another "standard" defense from the prosecutor community is that corruption is only practiced by lower-level prosecutors.
However, that defense is totally rejected by this case since it involves several top persons at the AGO.
This article will argue other possible solutions to the endemic problem at the AGO. Instead of producing fragmented and incomprehensive policies, this article argues that liquidation of the prosecutorial career may be a good start to clean up corruption at the AGO.
Indonesian public prosecutors enjoy a unique position, because the office head, the attorney general, has a Cabinet-level position.
A career prosecutor naturally has the ambition to reach the highest level at the AGO. In other countries the position of prosecutors and attorney general is separate.
One example relates to a situation in the United States since being prosecutor is like a one-off assignment given by the system to an individual lawyer.
A lawyer who is eligible to represent the state will then be called the prosecuting lawyer. Once that lawyer finishes his job, he will be back to being an ordinary counsel of law and, theoretically, waiting to be nominated once again as prosecuting lawyer for another case. This same lawyer also has independence to become a defense lawyer if there is a suspect or defendant asking him to do so.
The Indonesian prosecutor here is granted a secure position for undertaking a very specific job to take cases initiated and prepared by the police to the court.
This is "secure" because once becoming civil servant, this prosecutor will always be prosecutor even if his performance is poor. Only when they commit a very serious crime is their career as prosecutor finished.
The Criminal Code has even provided the AGO community with an easy job. This law enables the prosecutor to ask the police to prepare the dossier as well as possible, one of them by supplying the prosecutor as strong as possible evidence.
Otherwise, the prosecutor is in the position to reject the case. Since the case which is eventually received by the AGO from the police is so strong, no wonder the high success rate of the AGO in convicting suspects.
Amid all the corruption practices at the AGO, this prosecutor may exploit his authority for personal benefit by asking for money in return for reducing a charge or even dismissing a case.
A career prosecutor may smoothen his skill, creating a network of learning from others in order to exploit defendants. When in the early days of a prosecutor's career exploitation goes undisclosed, as time goes on the same prosecutor may ask money of a suspect or his lawyer blatantly and shamelessly.
Furthermore, since the same prosecutor has become senior in that institution, bribery expectations tend to be increased as well.
When there is a consensus to reform the Indonesian criminal justice system by liquidating prosecutorial career, problems relating to corruption in the AGO may be diminished significantly. How far is it possible?
It has been suggested above that such overlap involving function, career and position of the prosecutor creates a bad working environment to cultivate good integrity and ethics among young prosecutors.
Whether or not somebody has a strong commitment to stay clean, it is likely he will conform to what his peers say.
Ending the system of prosecutorial careers means the state should not employ a specific group of people to become career prosecutors. It should instead create a new system where a nominating lawyer could be asked to function as prosecutorial lawyer representing the state.
Another benefit of this system relates to the economics of employing prosecutors. Getting rid of the prosecutorial career will save the state budget very much.
If this happens, the AGO may consist of only a small group of people who function as politically appointed AGO and deputies or district attorney (similar to the U.S. system) as well as other prosecutors hired on a contract basis for specific assignments.
The state budget which is previously spent for salary as well as other fringe benefits may be diverted to contract lawyers on a performance basis.
There may be a counter argument for this. There is the possibility that this may still allow corruption since family or relatives of a suspect may also approach a lawyer assigned to prosecute the case.
However, if exposed, that lawyer will be harshly rejected by the court system and never appointed again to represent either the state or a client. This may dissuade the prosecutorial lawyer from taking bribes.
Also, the impact of a lawyer getting bribed will be minimum as it will not contaminate other lawyers as currently prevails within the AGO.
The writer is a professor and criminologist of FISIP at the University of Indonesia. He can be reached at adrianus@ui.edu
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