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Noor Huda Ismail , Jakarta | Tue, 07/08/2008 10:21 AM | Opinion
In early 2007 in a dusty Semarang prison, Central Java, clad in a glowing white robe, Subur Sugiarto candidly said the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, Noordin M. Top, doesn't need to seek soldiers for his jihadi operations. "Passionate and dedicated mujahid (Muslim fighters) who understand the importance of jihad will eagerly come to him and are ready to die for the cause," he said.
Subur Sugiarto was sentenced to life in prison on Nov. 22, 2006. He was charged with sheltering Noordin and was also convicted of illegal arms possession and recruiting people to launch the Bali triple suicide attacks in 2005. He is now in Nusakambangan Prison together with three main actors of the first Bali bombing in 2002.
Until recently, I was doubtful and skeptical with regard to Subur's chilling message for two reasons.
First, there is a model of involvement and engagement in terrorism that considers it as a process. There are three distinct phases in the making of a terrorist: becoming involved, remaining involved and leaving terrorism behind. Thus, I believe it is nearly impossible for a normal individual with no history of physiological pathology and no systematic process of indoctrination into violent jihad to actually embark on terrorist activities, which, according to many physiologists, is the peak of crimes against humanity.
Second, since the first Bali bombing in 2002 the Indonesian police have arrested more than 200 jihadists including senior members and seized a large number of explosive materials from the group. Logically, such a development should have drastically weakened the group's lethal ability.
Also, internally, there have been serious discussions among the jihadists themselves, some of whom condemn the use of violence by a fringe member of the group who regards Noordin as an icon for their struggle. One can observe an example of this kind of dynamic in the translation of the book written by a Middle Eastern writer, Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi.
The book, which was published by a Solo-based publisher, Jazera, in December 2007, is called Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah (They are Muslim fighters, but chose the Wrong Path). In it, for instance, it is written that to consider the general public takfir (to consider those who are not members of the group as infidels) is ghulu (an exaggeration) and the use of bombs will kill many innocent Muslims and, ironically, fail to kill any of the enemies of God (p. 13).
Remarks like this serve to create the awareness that in reality what the terrorists have been doing is to ironically bring about the killing of Muslims by Muslims.
The recent arrests made by the police's anti-terror squad, Detachment 88, which apparently prevented a terror plot by 10 of Noordin's deadly new squad in Palembang (a city that is working very hard to promote its tourism), South Sumatra, is possibly an example of what Subur has described above.
The discovery of ammunition and firearms in that raid may also indicate that the group may have switched from vehicle and backpack bombs to the use of firearms.
Looking at the individual profiles of those newly arrested, such as the 35-year-old English teacher who is linked to the fugitive Mas Slamet Kastari (who escaped from detention in Singapore earlier this year), one can learn that a number of individuals led a relatively normal life in public, but was privately engaged in training local hardliners in bomb making. This is what makes the individuals of a cell so hard to detect. One may say they live undercover and are always ready to be activated.
The actions are lone acts by small groups and individuals, reflecting a general mood of anger and deprivation, which is boosted by perceived global injustices as evident in the targets of these operations that focus on the United States and its allies as the major enemy.
In the most recent case, the South Sumatra jihadists reportedly planned to bomb Bedudel Cafe in the Chinatown area of Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, which is said to be popular among foreign tourists (mostly backpackers and surfers).
To understand this group, one first must be aware that they are not really an "organization" at all in the common, Western connotation of the term. They are do not have a solid, rigid structure. On the contrary, the group is fluid and liquid, if not actually volatile.
Once hierarchical, disciplined and centralized the group's structure can now more accurately be depicted as a broken thermometer whose mercury has spilled into a multitude of small blobs, all highly toxic, but not specifically related to one another.
The group's movement has now turned into a grassroots phenomenon -- a patchwork of homegrown, self-radicalizing terror groups and freelance jihadists, each going their own way without a central command, unified only a common view of the world.
Just before I left the prison, Subur tapped on my shoulder and whispered gently: "You don't have to be a JI member to be a mujahid."
The writer is the director of The Institute of International Peace Building. He can be reached at noorhudaismail@yahoo.com