This Report presents the results of the two and a half years of work by the world's first bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission. It is comprised of nine chapters.

I. Mandate and implementation

The Commission's mandate began in 2005 and was extended until 2008 to complete the three main components of its work: (l) inquiry, consisting of document review, fact-finding, and research, (2) making findings on the perpetration of gross human rights violations and institutional responsibility, and (3) arriving at recommendation and lessons learned.

II. The "Conclusive Truth"

There were multiple causes of the conflict in 1999, which are complex and interrelated. Some of these causes doubtless go back to at least 1974 and the events ensuing from the end of the Portuguese colonial presence. Others arose from the more immediate political context of the events of 1998 in Indonesia. The underlying reasons for each aspect of the conflict in 1999 requires further, specialized research in order to fully understand why the conflict happened in specific ways, and how various institutions and individuals participated.

First, the events of 1999 cannot be understood in isolation from the long period of conflict that occurred in East Timor. The nature of the violence that occurred in 1999 was shaped by previous patterns of conflict.

Second, the violence that occurred in East Timor in 1999 also grew out of the unique political circumstances that were created by Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state (Reformasi), which began in 1998.

Third, although in 1999 ABRI was intent on initiating internal reforms to transform itself by stages into a professional military force with particular focus on the external defense function, in early 1999 the political and social dynamics and security defense were still strongly influenced by the legacy of the past.

Finally, the institutional actions that led to violence in 1999 represent the culmination of the actions of those individuals taking part in the violence. However, determining individual responsibility is not the mandated task of this Commission.

Conclusions about Gross Human Rights Violations and Institutional Responsibility

1. The Commission concluded that gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity did occur in East Timor in 1999 and that these violations included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation carried out against the civilian population.

2. The Commission concluded that there was institutional responsibility for these violations.

3. The Commission concluded that pro-autonomy militia groups, TNI, the Indonesian civilian government, and Polri must all bear institutional responsibility for gross human rights violations targeted against civilians perceived as supporting the proindependence cause. These crimes included murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, illegal detention, and illegal detention, and forcible transfer and deportation.

4. The Commission concluded that because of the lack of previous systematic judicial investigations of such violations the exact nature and extent of such violations could not be conclusively determined. 5. The Commission concluded that persistent patterns of organized, institutional involvement in these gross human rights violations provide the basis for its conclusions about institutional responsibility.

How the Commission arrived at these conclusions

A. Conclusions about gross human rights violations

The Commission received a very large volume of documentary, and live, testimonial evidence that gross human rights violations occurred. All of the four major bodies of documents examined in the Document Review agreed that gross human rights violations were perpetrated in East Timor in 1999.

On the basis of its review of all of the evidence, the Commission identified specific cases of gross human rights violations, and determined that there were in fact persistent patterns of organized, systematic violations perpetrated by members or elements of pro-autonomy groups and Indonesian governmental institutions.

B. Conclusions about institutional responsibility

To find institutional responsibility the Commission analyzed whether there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the patterns of widespread and/or systematic violations manifested institutional involvement of sufficient scope and duration to justify conclusions of institutional responsibility on the part of several institutions that played a role in the violence in 1999.

On the basis of its analysis, the Commission concluded that the evidence clearly proved that pro-autonomy militias were the primary direct perpetrators of gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999.

In analyzing the extent to which Indonesian institutions also met the criteria for institutional responsibility, the Commission concluded that the evidence was sufficiently clear and abundant to justify such conclusions. More specifically, the Commission found that TNI personnel, police, and civilian authorities consistently and systematically cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of significant ways that contributed to the perpetration of the crimes enumerated above. The evidence also demonstrated that TNI personnel sometimes directly participated in the operations that led to these crimes.

The commission also found that there was abundant evidence that showed the activities of militia groups were also supported by the civilian government in a variety of ways.

III. The Commission's recommendations

The Recommendations respond to the Commission's mandate, the lessons learned, as well as to tangible problems that currently face each country as a result of the violence in 1999. Above all, they are a response to the needs of those whose lives were affected by the violence in 1999.

The mandate authorizes the Commission to make specific recommendations, inter alia, regarding amnesty and rehabilitation. The mandate also asks the Commission to make recommendations that include innovative ways to improve people-to-people relationships in the two countries that are in congruence with local religious beliefs and customs, and to solidify cooperative and reconciliatory processes at the state level.

In addressing these guidelines of its mandate, the Commission aimed to provide realistic and concrete recommendations that are inclusive, forward-looking, based on principles of restorative justice, and which would promote long term friendship, reconciliation and the prevention of future conflicts and violence.

In addition, in preparing its recommendations, the Commission took into account the institutional shortcomings and failures that it had identified as having contributed to the 1999 violence. Remedying systemic and institutional failures through institutional reform is necessary to prevent future reoccurrences of violence and to ensure the foundation for peace and friendship between the two countries.

In fulfilling its mandate the Commission followed two key principles in formulating recommendations. The Commission determined that in order to promote reconciliation recommendations must be inclusive, and must not discriminate between parties, particularly based on political affiliation. The second principle informing the recommendation is that they all take the form of collective reparations, requiring material and other forms of support from the relevant governments and institutions.

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