Political parties have submitted their candidate lists for the 2009 legislative general elections. Submission of these lists has caused conflicts within the political parties just as it did in previous general elections. Potential candidates want to challenge central party board decisions about the eligibility of those on the list.
Angry party members have even ransacked their own party offices. Lack of well-defined criteria for selection, restricted party member participation and limited transparency in the decision-making process are the roots of the problem. Internal party democracy continues to be a serious problem in Indonesia's party system for both new and old parties.
The 2009 candidate lists accommodate wives, sons and daughters of party bosses. The wife of Gen. Wiranto of Hanura, the son of Amin Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN), the son of Agung Laksono of Golkar, the son of the late Dr. Sjahrir of the New Indonesia Alliance Party (PIB), the son of Hamzah Haz of the United Development Party (PPP) and the daughter of Megawati Soekarnoputri of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) are all on the party lists. The grounds for placing these names on the lists is incomprehensible, except that they are relatives of party leaders. While hundreds of dedicated party faithful struggle in every possible way to be included in the party lists, these relatives make the list with ease.
Indonesia may not be as fortunate as India, Malaysia or even Singapore where political parties have been up and running for decades. The Indian National Congress Party in India was set up in 1885; the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 1946; and the People's Action Party of Singapore, 1954. Since their founding, these parties have assumed a pole position with respect to national political developments. As a result, they have developed their internal capacity, defined their ideology and program and managed their internal problems. The institutionalization process within these parties is already well established. Such capacities are not yet to be found in Indonesian parties.
Nowhere can one find examples of problematic political institutionalization better than in the regions. Political parties here are not managed well. Central party leadership is not providing capacity-building programs -- to develop speech-making and debate, campaign management and platform drafting, constituents relations -- to their regional branches. Career tracks are almost nonexistent in the parties, with the possible exception of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Because there is no connection between successful regional leadership and opportunities to move into party leadership ranks in Jakarta, incentives to adhere to central party directives is also lacking.
The problem of how to raise money for party operations is the most difficult challenge for leadership. Party headquarters are not generous enough to provide regional branches with financial support. Fund raising is a challenges which each party branch has to figure out for themselves. In a country where people are not accustomed to contributing money to the party, party operational budgets are a serious problem. Party leaders understand well that people do not see their activities except during a couple of months before elections, so political parties lack the confidence to look for people's support. What most parties can do to raise money is to oblige party activists who become members of regional representative councils (DPRD) to contribute some percentage of their income to the party treasury. But herein lies another problem.
Obligatory contributions to the party makes it difficult for DPRD members to meet their own needs. Their campaign supporters are used to demanding cash or gifts from the politicians once they assume office. Rejecting this quid pro quo is tantamount to losing credibility before their constituents. Desperate members of DPRD seeking additional income use their authority to influence local government budget plans submitted by the executive in their favor.
It is common knowledge among civil society organizations in the regions that DPRD budget approval is predicated on the executive conceding to DPRD members' demands. In some cases, DPRD members' interests align with the needs of rent-seeking local government bureaucrats eager to siphon off some portion of the local government budget for their own benefit. It explains why very few councils open their doors to the public during negotiations on local government budgets with the executive branch.
Political parties exercise practically no control over their members who gain DPRD positions. With rare exceptions, parties have no mechanism for building constructive engagement between party leadership and council members. Majority members of DPRDs are at the same time key party functionaries. Oftentimes party business after general elections is conducted in the DPRD building. It is not surprising to find party offices in most districts, and provinces, in Indonesia quiet and unattended.
It is difficult to see how decentralization will deliver its promise of bringing services to the people, thus paving the way for better living standards, if political parties who play a dominant role in setting the agenda in the region continue to be archaic and internally undemocratic. No wonder ordinary Indonesians still think an authoritarian regime may serve their needs and interest better than this democratic one.
The writer is senior national advisor for German Technical Cooperation Advisory Support Services for Decentralization (GTZ-ASSD) in the Home Ministry. He has participated in drafting numerous laws and regulations since 2002. This is his personal opinion. He can be contacted at cecep.effendi@gtz.de
