TNI's own choice: Coup d'etat or coup d'oeil?

Makmur Keliat ,  Jakarta   |  Wed, 11/05/2008 10:35 AM  |  Opinion

What could one expect from the military in a developing country whose process of democratic consolidation is still underway?

This question deserves a thorough answer because the current political and economic situation in Indonesia -- still dominated by stories of corruption implicating politicians and the worsening state of the domestic economy in the wake of the global financial crisis -- has rung alarm bells about the sustainability of the country's ongoing democratization process.

However, although there has been no consensus on how to answer the question, we can at least identify two competing hypotheses.

The first can be described as a "political hypothesis". Inspired by the work of Morris Janowitz, Lucien W. Pye and Samuel P. Huntington, adherents of this hypothesis argue that the military does have great potential to destroy democratic institutions. The actualization of such potential, however, is believed to have been driven by the inability of civilian politicians to manage political competition peacefully.

When civilians fail to formulate and implement policies effectively, the military, which has identified itself as a modern institution, will behave like "saviors" of the nation by taking over power from civilians by force.

In addition to their claim to being a modern institution, the military as an institution is said to have been educated and trained in the atmosphere of heroism and nationalism. This spirit is also believed to have encouraged the military to move to save a nation when civilians are preoccupied with efforts to protect their narrow political interests and are not concerned with measures to protect the so-called national interest.

The roots of military coups d'*tat, therefore, can be justified and attributed to the failure of civilians to handle the explosion of raising expectations through democratic political channels. It is the civilian government and not the military that should take responsibility when the democratic political process is decaying. It is no wonder then if this hypothesis tends to consider the military as the savior and the civilian government as the sinner.

Adherents of the second major view, which can be called the "military hypothesis", have taken their inspiration from the works of strategic and defense thinkers. One of the proponents of this hypothesis is Gen. Carl von Clausewitz, who lived in Prussia from 1780 to 1831.

It is worth mentioning that although he had a military background when writing his masterpiece On War, he put forward arguments that are absolutely against political intervention by the military. There are two main reasons Clausewitz opposed the idea of military coups d'*tat.

Under the first argument, the military as an institution is said to have come to exist to protect the state from possible armed attack from outside the country. If that is its main raison d'*tre, then the capacity the military should have and should be trained to have is to disarm and defeat a foreign enemy in a war.

The second argument is based on the belief that a war is launched not for the sake of the war itself but mainly for political motives. The purpose of war, therefore, should be decided not by the military but by those who hold political authority. Based on this logic, it has therefore become common for some people to say that war is too important to be left to the generals.

Rather than promoting the idea of military coups d'*tat, Clausewitz made the suggestion that generals should have the capacity for coup d'oeil -- a French term that means a sort of ability to understand quickly what is going on -- in a battlefield; then, on the basis of this understanding, a general can take swift action to win the battle.

As such capacity requires a mixture of intelligence and instinct, it is certain that only a few soldiers have it, but these skills are a very good indicator to use to differentiate the quality of soldiers who can be promoted to general. In addition to the capacity for coup d'oeil, another quality a general should have is the ability to make a resolution. This means that a general should be assertive and, having made a decision, stick with that decision.

Although these two hypotheses might seem to contradict each other, they could both be useful for projecting the future of Indonesian democracy.

First, the process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia will not regress to square one if the capacity of generals to stage a military coup d'*tat is minimized.

The strategy to minimize this capacity can only be effective if democracy, which is currently managed by civilians, does not generate political instability such as street parliaments and social violence, and if politicians can prove to the public that they are of better quality than the military.

For instance, when politicians say that the business-oriented military (watak tentara yang berniaga) should be abolished, they should also be able to convince the public that they are not the ones that have behaved theatrically -- as great hypocrites.

Second, the process of democratic consolidation will also run smoothly if the generals are given a lot of room to evolve their capacity for coup d'oeil. The strategy to maximize this capacity can be effective if career promotion to become a general is based on clear criteria: When they succeed in implementing military tasks.

For instance, a political maneuver by power holders, in either the executive or the legislative arms of government, when selecting an armed forces chief could be counterproductive to evolving the capacity for coup d'oeil. Too much intervention by politicians in the military promotion process could actually strengthen the capacity for a coup d'*tat.

Third, it is too early to say whether or not presidential candidates who have a military background have the capacity for coup d'oeil and the resolution as formulated by Clausewitz. The reason for this is obvious. Politics was so personalized during the Soeharto era and they (the presidential candidates) were promoted during the Soeharto leadership.

This does not mean to say they do not have the right to run for president. This is merely to say that the Indonesian Military does not have a strong tradition of autonomously developing the capacity for coup d'oeil among their soldiers.

The writer is a lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Indonesia.

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