Muhammad T (not verified) — Tue, 12/09/2008 - 9:02am

Lessons Learned from The Mumbai Terrorist Attack

The international community was shocked by the Mumbai terrorist attack last week. Almost 200 people were killed and more than 300 wounded. Many came away traumatized by the events they witnessed. The devastating attack crippled the city for three days. Now, what can we, Indonesia, learn from this attack?

The Times of India reported that one of the terrorists said to a surviving hostage that they killed and held people hostage at the Trident-Oberoi Hotel as pay back for the 2002 massacre of Muslims in Gujarat. It is clear that bloody communal conflict between the Hindus and Muslims in India was a significant factor, though not the only one, in motivating the attack. To prevent this from happening in Indonesia, the Indonesian government needs to prevent and peacefully solve any primordial and parochial conflicts as quickly as possible. Conflicts in Poso and Papua need to be resolved through dialogue involving local elites fueling the conflict. Preventing these conflicts from growing is to prevent reoccurrence of the Ambon conflicts and the 2000 Christmas bombings. Indonesia deserves commendation for resolving the communal violence in Maluku, but needs to be wary of the danger of radicalization that may not necessarily be marked by violence.

In mid-October, US intelligence officials tipped off Indian intelligence and warned authorities about the coming attack. One even mentioned that the Taj Mahal Hotel would be targeted. US intelligence was proven right. This only emphasizes the obvious: that in combating terrorism we need to work with foreign intelligence agencies. Indonesian intelligence agencies, especially the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), have well-established relations with CIA. BIN should use this relationship to gather intelligence on terror threats against Indonesia posted by foreign groups or individuals. The information can then be passed on to Detachment 88.

Current investigations have revealed that all the terrorists came from and were trained in Pakistan. This case has some parallels with the Indonesian experience. Several masterminds of terrorist attacks in Indonesia have been Malaysian—Azhari and Nurdin M Top. The Indonesian government needs to strengthen intelligence gathering in those countries whose citizens support terrorism in Indonesia by providing training grounds, financial support, equipment and even leadership. Indonesia should specifically target countries including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan, Yeman, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. By doing so, Indonesia can better anticipate plans to attack Indonesian interests. At the same time, Indonesian agencies should perfect their infiltration of local radical groups. It is very important that intelligence agencies protect their agents’ confidentiality in the field so that these agents can maintain their positions in radical groups and continue to supply important information. As experience shows, agents from Indonesian intelligence agencies are frequently made known to radical groups due to leaks from within the agencies themselves or because of the agent’s own sloppiness. Infiltration of local radical groups should not be underestimated as some members have both virtual and physical connections with global terror networks.

One of the Mumbai terrorists had worked at the Taj Mahal Hotel for eight months. During this time he gathered information on the hotel’s activities and layout. Infiltration of potential targets is clearly a necessity for a successful attack. Human resource managers at government institutions, multinational companies, international hotels, or any other likely terrorist targets in Indonesia must do thorough background checks on employees. Although expensive, investing money for the safety of these businesses, their employees and patrons is more than worth the cost.

On November 19, the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s foreign intelligence agency), intercepted a call between India and Lahore indicating a sea borne strike was being planned. Unfortunately, although the information was passed on to the Indian navy, coast guard and relevant local governments, they did not follow up on it in a manner befitting the seriousness of the information. This reminds us of the September 11, 2001 attack and the 2002 Bali bombing. Both the American and Indonesian governments knew of an impending attach. Yet somehow the information got lost in the murky web of bureaucracy. Today, Indonesian police, particularly Detachment 88 (Densus 88), have clear orders to head counter-terrorism initiatives in Indonesia. However, Densus 88 cannot possibly expect to succeed on their own. They need to maintain good relations and coordinate with vital institutions such as the military, customs, immigration and the State Intelligence Agency. In the future, to better manage this coordination the Indonesian government needs to establish an agency similar to the American NSC (National Security Council). The agency will orchestrate intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination, and will appoint certain institutions to handle specific terror threats. This will avoid confusion and improve efficiency within intelligence communities in handling information and responding to threats.

In Mumbai, terrorist held innocent people hostage at two hotels. Local police failed to handle the situation and India’s elite ‘Black Cat’ commandos took over. It took three days for Black Cat to free the hostages and stop the terror. It is unlikely that the Indonesian Special Forces would have taken so long to rescue the hostages due their skills and experience in dealing with hostage situations. The Indonesian military has several anti-terror units including Sat 81 Gultor Kopassus (from Army Special Forces), Denjaka (from the Indonesian Navy) and Bravo Detachment (from the Air Force). These units have proven their skills in freeing hostages in the 1981 Woyla Hijacking case in Don Muang Airport, Thailand and in the Free Papua Movement’s taking of hostages in 1996. Now, with the handling of terrorism being shifted largely to Densus 88, for the sake of national security it is vital that Densus 88 learns from these experienced units and upgrades their relatively poor ability in handling hostage situations. Both Densus 88 and the Indonesian Special Forces need to put aside their political power plays and egoism. It is time for them to work together to maintain national security (rather than their personal interests). In addition, Densus 88 should learn from any foreign anti-terror squads that have had significant experience in freeing hostages.

Indonesia seems safe now. The police and Densus 88 have done remarkable jobs in dismantling terrorist groups and disrupting potential attacks. However, they can not afford the luxury of taking a break. To keep preventing terrorism successfully, we need to learn from the Mumbai terror. The question is, can we, and are we willing to learn?

Siva (not verified) — Thu, 12/04/2008 - 3:20pm

Cooperation in the fight against terror can happen only when the citizens of Pakistan stop being ambivalent about terrorists. With decades old political culture of supporting terrorists as freedom fighters, they are finding it difficult to adjust themselves to whole heartedly condemning terrorism even when they themselves are the victims,some of the times.