Tom Critchley: Defender of Indonesia’s independence

Then ambassador Sabam P. Siagian, on behalf of the Indonesian government, presents Tom Critchley with the “Bintang Dharma Putra” in Sydney in 1992. Courtesy of Embassy of Indonesia, Australia

Friends of the late Tom Critchley, the outstanding Australian diplomat who played a historical role during the late 1940s at the height of the Dutch–Indonesia conflict, are invited to attend a get-together in Sydney on Aug. 24, “Celebrating the Life of Tom Critchley”.

Indeed, there is so much to celebrate in Critchley’s life, remembering his remarkable achievements as Australia’s ambassador in several capitals in Southeast Asia in the decade when post-1945 Asia was experiencing geopolitical seismic shifts.

Thomas Kingston Critchley was born in Melbourne in 1916. He was 93 years old when he died peacefully in Sydney on July 14. His wife, Susan, born American, and daughters Laurie, Sam, Liz and Vicky survive him, with their families, including five grandchildren. Critchley was an avid golfer and until last year played a round of 9-hole.

Tony Stephens writing in The Sydney Morning Herald referred to Critchley as a “Trailblazer in South East Asia … the vanguard of Australian diplomats who recognized after World War II that Australia’s future must lie in South-East Asia and Pacific. … Critchley laid the ground for the establishment of friendly relations with Australia’s neighbours.”

Of all Critchley’s postings as Australia’s ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Port Moresby and Jakarta (1978–1981), it was his assignment as member of the United Nations Security Council Good Offices Committee tasked with finding a final solution to the Dutch–Indonesia conflict that became the defining moment in his long and distinguished diplomatic career.

President Sukarno receives Tom Critchley in Jakarta, Dec. 7, 1948. Courtesy of National Library of Australia

This conflict should be placed in a historical context. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945. When the British arrived in Java in late September 1945, representing the victorious Allied Powers, the Netherlands East Indies government-in-exile (residing outside Brisbane when the Japanese military power occupied Indonesia) returned to “Batavia” — Jakarta — as if life could be continued as it was before they fled in 1942. Confrontation and conflict with the infant Republic of Indonesia could not be prevented.

British diplomacy succeeded in brokering the first Dutch–Indonesia agreement, the so-called Linggajati Agreement, which was initialed in November 1946 and signed at the Rijswijk Palace (now the President’s Istana Negara) in March 1947. Article One states: “The Netherlands Government recognizes the government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra…”. Article Two stipulates that both parties “shall cooperate in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic State on a federal basic to be called the United States of Indonesia”.

Perhaps it was out of instinctive farsightedness that the chairman of the Indonesia delegation, then prime minister Sutan Sjahrir, proposed successfully an arbitration clause as the last article, Article 17.

It stipulated that both parties “shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this Agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation in conference between those delegations”.

With opposing interpretations on how the Linggajati Agreement should be implemented, and with the Dutch shouldering a financial burden in maintaining a modern military force while the lucrative economic areas were still controlled by the Indonesian Republic (which had shifted its capital to Yogyakarta), Lieutenant-General Simon Spoor, the Dutch military commander in Batavia was inspired — with the consent of Dutch politicians and senior officials — to launch an all-out military offensive in July 1947. The code name tells the story: “Operation Product”. To occupy plantations (tobacco, rubber, sugar cane, coffee and tea) and mining areas was the main objective.

At the insistence of India and Australia, which considered the Dutch military offensive “a threat to international peace”, an emergency Security Council session was convened at the then United Nations Headquarters in Lake Success, Long Island, US.

After lengthy debates, a compromise was agreed upon to set up the Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question. It was tasked with assisting the conflicting parties in reaching a political solution.

Each conflicting party designated a member-country as its representative; the Netherlands chose Belgium and the Republic of Indonesia requested the services of Australia. Both member countries decided to ask the United States to be the third committee member. Australia appointed a distinguished representative, Justice Richard Kirby, who served on the Australia Commonwealth Court of Arbitration.

Tom Critchley with his wife Susan and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda Courtesy of Ravotti Asikin Natanegara

A young, handsome diplomat from the Department of External Affairs, the 31-year-old Critchley also arrived in then Batavia assigned as Judge Kirby’s deputy.

After a new agreement was reached — dubbed the Renville Agreement because the negotiations took place on board the USS Renville, a United States military transport ship anchored off territorial waters in the Java Sea — Judge Kirby returned to Australia, and Tom Critchley became the Good
Offices Committee (GOC) member.


“
It was the Australian diplomat Tom Critchley who effectively defied Dutch propaganda and unceasingly pushed for the Indonesian right to independence.
”

The Renville Agreement reflected the Republic of Indonesia’s weakened military position. The Dutch claimed major parts of Java and Republican forces must be evacuated from West Java. What was then
the territory of the Republic of Indonesia was reduced considerably.

Negotiations toward reaching an overall political solution, assisted by the GOC, to set up a sovereign United States of Indonesia remained sluggish.

Although Judge Kirby was officially still a GOC member with Tom Critchley acting in his absence, one can see from the cables that he sent from “Batavia” how skeptical he was about the Dutch seriousness to implement the Renville Agreement. His telegram to Department of External Affairs dated Batavia, Feb. 9, 1948, classified as Secret, opened with a blunt statement: “Ever since the Committee of Good Offices came to Java it has been pinpricked by the Dutch who have sought delay by excessive legalism.”

Barely a week later, he sent another cable to Canberra reflecting his increased skepticism toward the Dutch: “The Netherlands are skillfully delaying discussions on topics other than procedure. These tactics may be connected with the present Security Council discussions or with a continuation of the policy of establishing independent states such as West Java (“to counterbalance the Republic of Indonesia, Ssg”).”

The year 1948 was very difficult for the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch imposed a tight economic blockade. There was shortage of food supplies, pharmaceutical items and textiles in the beleaguered Republic territories. By applying delaying tactics, the Dutch apparently intended to weaken the Republic.

The three-volume collection of documents published by the Australian Government Publishing Service under the title Australia & Indonesia’s Independence revealed Critchley’s active role in assisting the Indonesian Republic. He proposed a number of draft political solutions to prevent a deadlock or military confrontation.

Since the Republic’s capital, Yogyakarta, was virtually isolated, on a number of occasions Critchley offered the use of a Royal Australian Air Force plane at his disposal to transport Indonesian senior officials to Bukittinggi, Sumatra, for consultations with their counterparts as large portions of Sumatra were still under Republican control.

The climax of this uncertain period took place at the end of that year, on Sunday Dec. 19, 1948. The GOC was meeting with then prime minister Mohammad Hatta and the Indonesian delegation in Kaliurang, a mountain resort north of Yogyakarta. However, the US member, the ambassador Merle Cochran, was in “Batavia” delivering to the Dutch Hatta’s letter containing a proposal to overcome an existing deadlock in the negotiations.

The Netherlands Queen’s Representative in Batavia, the former prime minister L.J.M. Beel who bore the fancy title of “Representative of the Crown” and the Dutch top military commander General Simon Spoor decided to deliver the final blow, once and for all, to eliminate the Republic of Indonesia. An all-out military offensive was launched in Java and Sumatra. Paratroops were dropped at Maguwo, the airport outside Yogyakarta (since renamed Adi Sucipto), who swiftly moved toward President Sukarno’s palace.

On that Sunday morning, Critchley was having breakfast with Hatta when they heard bombs exploding and machinegun fire from the direction of the Republic’s capital. They knew immediately that the Dutch had opted for a military solution. Hatta rushed to Yogyakarta to chair a Cabinet meeting. The Cabinet decided to stay put and almost the entire top echelon of the Republic was detained by the Dutch. General Sudirman and the Army leadership, however, left town and waged a guerilla war according to plans.

Thomas Kingston Critchley AO CBE--Courtesy of the artist

The timing was awful. As then Australian prime minister Ben Chifley once remarked to a Dutch diplomat, “the Dutch December offensive was a colossal blunder”. Apparently, the Hague calculated that the Security Council convened in Paris would enter a prolonged Christmas recess. On the contrary, the US permanent representative Philips Jessup requested that an emergency session be immediately convened. Obviously, Washington felt betrayed by the Dutch military action as a senior American diplomat was still engaged in last-minute efforts to opt for a political solution.

However, the Dutch were in a triumphal mode. With Sukarno, Hatta and many ministers detained, the capital city Yogyakarta occupied and the Republican forces seemingly in disarray, Dr. Beel and General Spoor declared that the Republic of Indonesia had ceased to exist.

But the GOC — especially Critchley — worked very hard to prove otherwise. A steady flow of reports were cabled to the Security Council. As Dr. Alastair Taylor, who served at the secretariat of the UN Commission of Indonesia (the GOC was transformed into the UNCI with enlarged powers), wrote in his book Indonesian Independence and the United Nations “… the Australian delegation maintained a hard-hitting pro-Indonesian attitude [in the Security Council]”. He added: “Briefed in details — obviously as a result of field reports from Critchley, who brought to his tasks unflagging energy coupled with keen analytical powers and enthusiasm for his assignment — they were able to focus attention to crucial issues.”

Critchley, in preparing his reports that the Indonesian Republic was still alive and kicking, was effectively assisted by a team of Australian military observers who roamed all over Java and  Sumatra to monitor the increased activities of the Indonesian guerilla forces.

When the Dutch prime minister Willem Drees visited “Batavia” in mid-January 1949, a few weeks after the Dutch military offensive, to assess the overall situation, Critchley was seated on his right during a dinner at the Crown’s Representative palace (now the Istana Merdeka ). In a cable to the Cabinet in The Hague, Drees said of the young, charming Australian diplomat was seated next to him that “he was quite tactful in his conversation, but we know where his heart lies…”. The Dutch officials sometimes referred to Critchley as “the Republican High Commissioner”.

As it turned out, 1949 was a decisive year in the modern political history of Indonesia. The UN Security Council’s resolutions demanded that the leaders of the Indonesian Republic, detained on the island of Bangka, be released and the Republic of Indonesia be restored with Yogyakarta as its capital and the Yogyakarta residency as its territory.

The Dutch finally admitted the historical inevitability of the sovereignty of an independent Indonesia with the Republic of Indonesia as the basis. A Round Table Conference between all parties was convened for that purpose. The UN Commission was also present. It was a crowning event for Critchley when he co-signed the Hague Agreement.

In early July 1949, Critchley reported to Canberra with this assessment, after the government of the Indonesian Republic was restored in Yogyakarta: “… I do not believe this change of [Dutch] policy can be attributed to pressure by the United States or to the work of the [UN] Commission, though these have been important factors.

“The change of policy reflects a more realistic appreciation by the Dutch of the necessity, in their own interests, of coming to terms with the real nationalist leaders.”

These nationalist leaders have always remembered that when the Republic was virtually nonexistent and they were isolated in Dutch detention, it was the Australian diplomat Critchley who effectively defied Dutch propaganda and unceasingly pushed for the Indonesian right to independence.

That’s why “Bapak Tom Critchley” is fondly referred to by so many Indonesians as the “Defender of Indonesia’s Independence”.


The writer is senior editor of this paper, and its first chief editor (1983–1991). He served as ambassador to Australia from 1991 to 1995.