The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is already a major source of concern in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the post-9/11 world. Recent nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, the latest of which was in May 2009, have strained the fault lines of regional security that have remained unresolved since the end of the World War II. Not to mention the West's suspicion of Iran and Syria, who have the same intentions as Pyongyang.
At the same time, the advent of the so-called "global jihadist network" and other terrorist groups has complicated the challenges states have to overcome in order to ensure national security. These challenges have put pressure on states to strengthen their controls over the means of violence, especially WMD. The failure of states to control and regulate WMDs would have grave consequences for international security; Indonesia is no exception.
As it fights terrorism on its own soil, Indonesia should consider signing on to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by the US in 2002 in response to gaps in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As more states look to acquire the nuclear, biological and chemical materials that can be used in WMDs, the US initiated tougher policy in order to encourage and assist the interdiction of parts and materials needed for WMD programs (mostly at sea as it is the primary route for the transportation of heavy cargo) and their means of delivery (e.g. missile systems).
The PSI, which has 95 participants so far, is primarily directed towards "rogue states" - namely, North Korea, Syria, and Iran. However, it is also aimed at preventing non-state actors, terrorist organizations in particular, from acquiring WMD. Given the already sheer level of destruction that terrorist caused on 9/11 and in the Bali bombings, for instance, one can imagine how large the scale of destruction would be had they acquired WMDs, even smaller ones.
The so-called "dirty bombs"- explosives that use a relatively small amount of nuclear material (small enough to be carried in a backpack) - means non-proliferation treaties must be strengthened. Halting the transfer of these materials will require cooperation to be enhanced among concerned countries, including those who are currently dealing with terrorist attacks on their own soil - like Indonesia.
Therefore, it is time for Jakarta to consider making the PSI part of its policy as a way of contributing to world peace and security. Many experts argue that in its current form the PSI has many shortcomings that make states reluctant to sign on.
First, many of its operations are still classified for security reasons, especially those that involve US authorities. This means that whilst Washington wants many states to join, it gives little, if any, information about its own operations.
Second, states are concerned that the implementation of the PSI would be in breach of Article 27 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which prohibits littoral states from interdicting commercial ships passing through their waters, except on the suspicion of criminal offence.
Third, the US, as initiator, refused to ratify the UNCLOS that made many of its signatories, including Indonesia, suspicious it was disrespecting international maritime jurisdiction.
Fourth, and something this is very much in the case in Indonesia, joining the US-led PSI would be vindication for those who accuse and denounce Jakarta as being too lenient towards Washington's pressures and demands. This would be rather counterproductive for Jakarta with its "free and active" foreign policy.
Fifth, though exaggerated to some extent, there is lingering concern that PSI would impede regional trade and somehow undermine the remarkable economic progress Jakarta has achieved.
Nevertheless, it would be wise for Indonesia to consider signing on to the PSI.
Indonesia has a vast, open territory and shares maritime boundaries with a dozen countries. It is also home to four out the world's seven maritime choke points.
By joining the PSI, Indonesia could strengthen its already established security cooperation with other PSI adherents in the region, including Singapore, Australia and the Philippines. Whilst committed to the PSI, Indonesia can also counter threats other than the proliferation of WMDs. The illicit transfer of small and light arms, which is widely prevalent in Southeast Asia, for example, as well as other transnational security threats.
It is very clear that despite its shortcomings, Indonesia needs to consider joining the PSI club.
The writer is member of the social and politic science faculty (FISIP) of the University of Indonesia and was a delegate member to the Harvard Project for Asia and International Relations (HPAIR) Academic Conference Security Workshop in Seoul on Aug. 14-17, 2009.
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