Indonesia has been able to withdraw its military from politics. It's finished now. But what is not, are the business activities of the military.
The 2004 Law on the Indonesian Military stipulates Oct. 16, 2009 as the deadline for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to take over all business activities that are directly or indirectly managed by and belong to the Indonesian Military (TNI). This is a must without any exception. So what will happen next?
The handover of military businesses will be very important for democratic consolidation. Unfortunately the President has not given full power to the National Team for the TNI Business Activities Handover.
The slow takeover of TNI businesses has consequences. It undermines the TNI and its mentality, thus creating space for corruption. In the end it will weaken the strength of the TNI as a whole.
The slow promulgation of the Presidential Decree No. 7/2008 has opened up opportunities for the TNI to handover its business assets to non-state enterprises, thus making article 76 of the 2004 law less effective.
On the other hand, the new presidential decree, which is soon to be promulgated, does not specifically explain the definition of TNI businesses that need to be handed over. The Business Supervision and Transformation Team (TSTB) have had a very long debate with civil society organizations about the definition of TNI businesses, which is crucial to this matter. Without a specific definition of TNI businesses, the duties to be borne by the newly formed team will be difficult.
So far, the TSTB has completed its duties although it has repeatedly complained about the difficulties of verifying TNI businesses, rather than reporting positive results of its investigations.
Thus, the work that should be continued by the National Team for the TNI Business Activities Handover is uncertain. The duties of the new team are not much different from the duties of the previous one.
With all of this sluggishness, it seems the President has not given executorial authority to the latest team to take concrete and firm action in handing over TNI businesses. The impact of this is that the handover of TNI businesses will drag on. In reality, as explained previously, the existing timeline is limited.
The management and ownership takeover can be conducted fully by attending to the two prerequisites. First, the government through the state budget is able to meet the ideal defense budget, which is committed to increasing the welfare and capability of soldiers and does not necessarily use the budget for the short-term modernization of military equipment, while considering the urgency of other sectors.
Second, the ownership takeover also means empowering the assets of ex-TNI businesses to be managed professionally so as to make a profit, not only from the TNI, but also in other sectors. The ownership takeover can be in the form of a strategic holding company, a limited public company such as a military ownership business as well as a limited partnership.
Third, business transformation can lead to further reforms of strategic state enterprises in order to develop the Indonesian defense industry.
On this basis, the President is expected to act as quick as possible or at least to be more nimble and responsive in handling the handover of TNI businesses. The President must take real action to execute the handover of all business activities in accordance with the law. If the President leaves the recommendation of the National Team for the Handover of TNI Business in ambiguity in this very limited timeline, then his commitment to the reformation of the TNI should be questioned.
The transition process of an authoritarian regime does not always end with a democratic system. There are some prerequisites that must be met.
One is about military reform. The experience of political transition in many countries shows that military reform always has the potential to fail, especially due to strong rejections from the military. Therefore, the transfer of TNI businesses will also be a test for the President.
A very important issue here is the enforcement of civilian supremacy and the professionalism of the TNI. This clearly will assist the efforts to control the military under civilian authority.
The role of civilian elites is crucial in explaining the possible success or failure of military reforms in the democratic transition period. Effort and pressure by pro-democracy movements will be at a dead-end if at the same time civilian elites take a different direction.
The writer is coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras).
