In his second term’s inaugural address last month, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) stated that his top priority would be “prosperity, democracy and justice”. As in his first 2004-2009 term, Yudhoyono prioritizes welfare over security.
Or, to take the classical “gun versus butter” dilemma, he chose the latter. Apart from terrorism, which is Indonesia’s most likely threat, he made no explicit mention of the importance of national security by means of defence.
But let us look at the situation in Asia-Pacific. Many states in this region are currently modernizing and building up their militaries For instance, take an assessment of military expenditure and capabilities across the region.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2009 report estimates that the total Asia-Pacific military expenditure in 2008 has increased by 52 percent since 1999, with China and India being the world’s second and tenth top military spenders, respectively.
In Southeast Asia, military expenditure has risen since the 1997 financial crisis to more than US$17 billion in 2007 from approximately $12 billion, with Singapore and Malaysia respectively spending more than $8 and $4 billion.
The trend is followed by significant improvement in capabilities. Take China and India for example.
Buttressed by economic prowess, both are aspiring to be global powers by enhancing air and maritime capabilities through the acquisitions of nuclear submarines; fourth or fifth generation fighters; and introducing new doctrines commensurate with the latest trend in warfare.
Similar to that, Singapore has acquired six new frigates, two submarines, and 14 F-15SG Eagle fighters to protect an area no wider than Jakarta.
While Malaysia has its two new Scorpene-class submarines, 18 Flanker Su-30MKM fighters, and six frigates delivered with a mere five-year period since 2005. These states are undoubtedly investing more than required for a secure strategic environment.
Yet these trends are not beyond comprehension. Economy is one, but not the only, logical explanation. What is paramount to acknowledge is the fact that those states are not preparing solely for the most likely threats, like terrorism, illegal migration and global warming.
Instead, they are focusing on the most consequential ones; worst-case scenarios, such as armed attacks by other states, however dismal the probability might be. Those strategic trends are adequate evidence that nations are now hedging against future uncertainties; that their interests will someday intersect and collide.
Unfortunately, Indonesia is not yet up to this. Having been preoccupied with the threat of internal unrest and turmoil, Indonesia seems to dismiss the likelihood of inter-state conflicts short of an all-out war. Our naval skirmishes with Malaysia over Ambalat and Chinese claims over the Natuna Sea are still fresh in our minds and remind us how vulnerable we are.
With an average budget of a mere $3 billion annually, and with largely redundant weapon systems to secure the world’s largest archipelago and longest shoreline, our capacity to meeting those threats is questionable.
The point is, that we need to balance “gun” over “butter.” This does not mean in any way to put “gun” first before “butter.” What we are investing now probably will not be felt in years, but in decades. And, postponing them now will have a consequence in 20 or 30 years. By then, it would be too late to adjust our strategic needs, and we don’t have a clear assessment on what the strategic environment would be in twenty or thirty years from now.
Nevertheless, balancing “gun” over “butter” does not mean simply increasing military expenditure or acquiring high-tech equipment. Yet, what is more important is a doctrinal adjustment by following up the latest strategic trends. By observing what others are doing and deciding what to do about it.
This means that defence planning cannot be formulated in isolation from the wider strategic environment.
However, doctrines will not change without a change in mindset, a mindset like “secure strategic environment” and “zero enemy”. Changing this kind of mindset does not mean we must have an enemy. Instead, we have to acknowledge the uncertainties.
Without this change of mindset, we will never be able to balance our strategic needs – balancing the need to defend our nation over the need to fill up our bellies.
The writer is University of Indonesia’s delegate to Harvard Project for Asia and International Relations (HPAIR) Academic Conference Security Workshop Seoul, Republic of Korea, Aug. 14-17, 2009.
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