ANTARA/Eric Ireng
Unfortunately, in 2010 we will still have to deal with the problem of transnational terror, including at least one violent faction of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and various splinter groups. In this respect, we must also recognize how the phenomenon of radicalization works. We need to constantly ask ourselves: are our actions going to result in the removal of one terrorist and the creation of ten more?
What can we do to attack the drivers of radicalization, so that the violent faction of JI and its splinter groups will be faced with a shrinking pool of potential recruits.
In the absence of major, ongoing communal conflicts in places like Ambon in Maluku and Poso in Central Sulawesi, it is unlikely that militant groups will be able to mobilize the masses. However, they will still be able to galvanize enough of a fringe element in our society, encouraging them to take to violence and to pose a continuing and powerful threat.
The involvement of Soni Jayadi, Fajar, and Afham, two students and a graduate from the renowned UIN (Islamic State University) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta as couriers for Syaefudin Zuhri’s terrorist group serve as a good example of the militants’ ability to keep going.
Their involvement proves that universities as intellectual forums cannot guarantee an absence of or protection from the dissemination of radical-extreme ideology. UIN is well-known as a liberal Islamic university that provides no space for radical-extreme groups. Soni Jayadi, Fajar, and Afham were known as active members of UIN’s Islamic propagation group (LDK). Such groups exist in UIN, in universities all over Jakarta and in virtually every university in Indonesia.
In Palembang, South Sumatra, one terrorist, Sugiarto, had also been a student at the State Institute Islamic Teaching institution in (IAIN) Palembang. One group in particular was better known as “Jamaah Palembang”, led by Abdurahman Taib, an activist from the Anti-Proselytizing Movement Forum (Fakta). This group was responsible for the murder of Dago Simamora, a teacher at SMAN (Public High School) 11, Palembang.
Dago became a target for assassination by the group because he had allegedly banned female Islam students from wearing their hijabs (veils). Sugiarto, a student of IAIN Palembang in the 7th semester of his Arabic Language Studies major, was involved in the murder. He also assembled bombs intended to be used in the group’s acts of terror in several cities in Sumatra.
The above facts should not lead us to the rushed or ill-judged conclusion that every Islamic student organization is radical-extreme, fundamentalist, or harbors terrorist aims. That is far from the case.
But these occurrences do indicate signs that radicalization is taking place and has taken root in university campuses. Having understood, this, the most important question to pose is “how do we get from the propagation of Islam on university campuses to involvement in terrorism?”
Another important aspect in understanding the process of radicalization is the implications of the funerals of named terrorists such as Bagus Budi Pranato (a.k.a Urwah). His funeral was attended by at least 500 supporters from Kudus, Jakarta, Pekalongan and Solo. They come in buses, cars, and on motorcycles. The police warned them sternly not to put up any posters or conduct sermons. However, some of Urwah’s hard-core supporters from Solo repeatedly screamed “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) and the funeral was closed to journalists.
The funeral provided an opportunity for jihadists, who came from many different cities, to cement friendships. Such friendships have proved strategic in the process of radicalization. A classic example of this can be seen in the case of Ma’had Ali at the Universitas Islam An Nur in Solo, Central Java.
At this school there were two students who had grown to be very close friends: Gempur Budi Angkoro a.k.a Jabir who died during a counter-terror raid in Wonosobo in 2005, and Bagus Budi Pranoto himself, who died together with Noordin M. Top in a more recent raid by the police counter-terror unit, Detachment 88 following the 17 July hotel bombings in Jakarta.
Their friendship was founded on a common understanding of jihad. They supported each other and were continuously involved in learning about and practicing jihad. The nature of their friendship means that jihad was the most prominent topic of their conversations.
In addition, each supported the other’s jihadi activities. Interestingly, these two friends did not gain their knowledge of jihad from their religious teachers.
Their thoughts on jihad were mostly shaped by the numerous books and jihad websites that they read and shared between them.
Therefore, as 2010 approaches and throughout this new year and the next, the role and prospects of the new counter-terrorism coordinating agency, Muslim leaders and Detachment 88 and ordinary citizens must confront the political, social and economic conditions that the militant groups’ exploit for their own ends, as they work to win over new recruits and funders. We must also work to understand the psychology of those whose tacit support enables the militants to carry their plans forward.
The writer, the executive director of an international institute for peace building, with a master’s degree in international security at St. Andrews University, Scotland.
