After what might seem to be a hit-and-miss undertaking along the way, the probe into Bank Century scandal initiated by the House of Representatives’ special committee seems to have reached a critical juncture.
As things are taking a more definitive shape, with the initially sprawling areas of investigation narrowing down to some clearly-defined issues and specific options for further actions becoming increasingly clear, the special committee is appearing to falter amid the seemingly contradictory scenarios.
Now, it is not easy to decide unanimously on which path it has to go to bring the case one step closer to the much sought-after conclusion.
There has been an uneasy feeling that the special committee may get bogged down in another tug-of-war between the different vested interests of the parties involved and lose sight of the cause it has to defend.
The potential rift among the special committee members hangs on two contradictory points: one, whether the bailout policy which accounted for the disbursing of the bailout funds of Rp 6.7 trillion should serve as evidence for charging the policy makers concerned with any wrongdoing, and two, that the policy making for the bailout is not to blame and the investigation of the alleged violations should start with the rampant fraud following the decision to bail out the failed Bank Century.
There are strong arguments believing that the making of the bailout policy per se should not be a reason for the special committee to establish an opinion against the policy makers.
The primary reason behind this contention is that there is no universally accepted gauge by which we can measure with certainty whether or not there would have been the so-called systemic impact following the hypothetical closure of Bank Century.
At best, the pro and con arguments still leave ample room for debate and controversy and no conviction could be made under such circumstances. The special committee would risk presenting a farcical picture of the Century probe if it stubbornly focuses on one side of the picture and turns a blind eye to the other.
Granted that we come down on the side of those who reject the notion of the systemic impact of Bank Century for their seemingly infallible arguments, still it cannot make up for its unredeemable shortcoming: a grievous lack of empirical verification.
For sure, one cannot be subjected to any form of a legally binding penalty based on such a hypothetical argumentation without empirical justification. No matter how sound a hypothesis may be, we cannot infer some certainty from it without experimental verification.
It runs afoul of the bedrock principle of justice that one is innocent until proved guilty, whereas in this case there has never been any proof at all.
This is a treacherous area from which the special committee should do its best to stay away and resist the temptation to gamble on.
Once the special committee is drawn into this area, which resembles more of an academic discussion, it may be stuck with unending debate that defies a conclusive judgment.
And if it persists in pursuing this course, there is always a danger that this debatable situation will play into the hands of those who are now on the defensive following the revelation of the Bank Century scandal. It could upstage some of the alleged flagrant violations that are now coming into much sharper focus with the unrelenting probe by the special committee, thereby shifting public scrutiny away from these violations.
While the decision on the bailout policy may not be to blame, in fact there are some issues surrounding the bailout that thus far can be proved beyond any doubt by the special committee.
No one can deny by now that there has been woefully reckless management of the bailout and there must be some people accountable for this oversight that led to the alleged fraud and criminal action.
From the hearings that have taken place, no one would argue against the fact that there has been some painfully poor coordination among the high-ranking finance officials responsible for the bailout policy.
The acknowledgement by Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati that she felt she had been taken in during the bailout process seems to demonstrate explicitly that some ultimate decision regarding the bailout has been made on the basis of insufficient data and patchy information.
It seems that the exchange of crucial information and transparent communication among those high-ranking officials, that should serve as the cornerstone for all policy making, have not worked out as expected.
Undeniably, this glaring oversight was the prelude to the catastrophic misappropriation of the bailout funds.
The special committee has now arrived at another defining moment in the tortuous process of unraveling the scandal. At this stage, all committee members need to close ranks and overlook their petty differences in support of their common cause. Choosing the right course among the available options it is now facing is surely half the battle for the special committee.
Any measured, rational approach to this case that is in line with the public sense of justice and proportion will no doubt win public approval.
Even the skittish foreign investors, peculiarly known for their sensitivity to economic and political outbursts, would have no justifiable reason to shun this country as the special committee’s efforts could be perceived as the necessary remedy to a system notoriously vulnerable to corrupt practices.
The ball is in the special committee’s court now and options are available for the committee members to make a sensible decision as to which path to take in pursuing the case to its conclusion.
The writer, a former information assistant at the US Embassy in Jakarta, holds degrees from Gadjah Mada University and the University of Indonesia.
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