Indonesia is about to resume full military cooperation with the US under the comprehensive partnership that will commence during Obama’s visit this March. The cooperation even includes the training of Kopassus (Army’s special force) — the Indonesian army unit notoriously alleged by civil rights groups of committing human rights violations with almost impunity under Soeharto’s regime.
While this is basically good news for the defense ministry and the Indonesian Military (TNI), one cautionary note is that Indonesia proved to be a controversial partner for the US in military cooperation.
Under the strongman Soeharto and Cold War realpolitik pragmatism, Indonesia received large scale US military support that leapfrogged its defense capability among its Southeast Asian neighbors, despite widespread criticism from international civil rights groups.
However, in 1991, the cooperation was entirely suspended after the Nov. 11, 1991 massacre in Dili, East Timor, which was under Indonesian occupation at that time.
As a result, in following years, Indonesia’s defense system was utterly crippled. The embargo was partially lifted in 2000, and limited to a “non-lethal” military spare part.
However, as Indonesia becomes the world’s third largest democracy after India and the US, as well as the largest — moderate — Muslim nation, Washington began to think that it was timely to resume ties, especially after 9/11. Washington regards Indonesia as a potential bulwark in its counterterrorism strategy.
This is one, if not the most, primary US raison d’être in taking the initiative to resume cooperation as testified by State Secretary Hillary Clinton before a US Senate committee. Jakarta sees this as a golden opportunity. Nonetheless, contrary to recent euphoria by defense policy-makers, we should instead cautiously note this initiative.
First, US assistance, including military, always comes with ‘strings’ attached — conditionals that must be met by the receiving states, particularly in terms of human rights record.
Although the State Department 2008 Human Rights Report stated that Indonesia “generally respected the human rights of its citizens and upheld civil liberties,” there were still “problems,” such as “killing by security forces.” Even though Indonesia has vigorously tried to maintain clean rights record, it is still too early to tell that it will stay this way in the long-run, especially concerning problems of territorial integrity. Any “mishap” relating to the resolution of these problems can potentially freeze the cooperation as in 1991.
Second, we have to remember that the US initiative is based on realpolitik consideration. While the US sees Indonesia in light of temporary self-interest, that is, war on terrorism; Jakarta expects to establish long-term comprehensive military ties well beyond counterterrorism.
However, due to the dynamic nature of the strategic environment, it is well-expected that the US raison d’être is subject to change. Therefore, the long-term sustainability of such cooperation is questionable, if not doubtful.
Third, Jakarta is deemed a relatively reluctant partner by Washington. In fact, the US seems to prefer to cooperate with more “like-minded” states in the region, for example, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines or Australia.
For instance, these countries participate in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), while Jakarta strongly denounces the idea. Such action by Jakarta serves as an impediment for closer relations with Washington.
Fourth, closer military relations with Washington mainly for technical reasons (e.g. arms maintenance and modernization) can potentially discourage works towards defense self-reliance, as well as efforts to reduce bias on defense suppliers. One study found that for the Navy alone, Indonesia has a high concentration of weapons from countries that imposed arms embargoes (Andi Widjajanto, 2008).
Therefore, unless the US can guarantee access to technology transfer, or “know how” in order to ensure Indonesia’s shift into defense self-reliance, we should rethink the feasibility of such cooperation.
The US is currently the world’s strongest military power, yet we should avoid the bias that perceives Washington as the only partner we can cooperate and deal with. And, we have to acknowledge that military cooperation with the US is also as risky as with other partners. The US embargo should be a lesson learned as well as a caveat that a similar situation is not impossible to reoccur in the future.
The writer is a teaching assistant at the Department of International Relations, FISIP, University of Indonesia.
