In December 2005, China’s White Paper introduced the policy of the “Peaceful Development Road” to replace the previously enunciated policy of the “Peaceful Rise” policy in 2002. The change in nomenclature was deliberate, as Beijing’s leadership wanted to assure China’s neighbors and other Pacific powers that its fast-paced economic growth would not lead to a drastic change in the security environment. China’s stress on “harmonious relations” with its neighbors underlined the importance of concentrating on domestic social and political issues arising from inequities in its globalized economy.
For decades, the rough shape of Pacific security rested on the balance of forces between the world’s three most powerful economies: the United States (GDP US$14.5 trillion, defense budget $660 billion), Japan (GDP $5.1 trillion, defense budget $65 billion) and China (GDP $4.8 trillion, defense $100 billion).
Americans’ “full spectrum dominance” (space-based, cyber-capable, strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional forces) stretches from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Southeast Asia (through ASEAN since 1967) and to Australia and New Zealand (through ANZUS until the mid-1990s). That dominance helped secure major trade, communication and maritime sea lines linking East Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
American military forces and bases became the security provider enabling trade and investment as well allowing financial hubs to flourish. It effectively made it possible for the high-performing industries and economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong to take off from the 1970s through 1990s. China’s annual double-digit growth since the early 1980s was similarly guaranteed by the American strategic presence in Northeast and Southeast Asia.
In the past decade, third and fourth generation post-1945 Japanese and Chinese leaders have sought to redefine and rewrite the terms and conditions of the security architecture throughout East Asia and beyond. Japan seeks to become a more “normal” country, seeking strategic space within a less prominent American security presence.
China’s “peaceful development” in turn aims at enhancing its sovereign space and asserting Chinese sovereignty in “core interest” areas encompassing the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and the broader Northeast Asia region. Navies of both countries have actively engaged in the burden of sharing international anti-piracy efforts off the coast of East Africa.
With the recent Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement reached with Taiwan, the core issue of China’s political sovereignty over the island has been effectively sidelined in favor of increased bilateral trade and investments. With Russia and the Central Asia states, China has long promoted security cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), linking security issues to separatism, extremism and terrorism.
Through the Six-Party Talks (US, Japan, China, Russia and the two Koreas), China has agreed to mitigate tensions related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. With individual states as well as the overall ASEAN-wide structure, China actively supports confidence building measures through attendance at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), despite ongoing diplomatic disputes over territorial sea boundaries and traditional fishing rights in the South China Sea.
Overall, there should be no concern over China’s future security policy in the Pacific. President Hu Jintao on many occasions has underlined the fact that China does not wish to disrupt the global international security system. Harmonizing China’s international environment serves to secure its no less important issues of peacefully harmonizing the country’s severe social and economic problems at home.
With current GDP per capita of $3,000 but with vast tracts of geographical extant to cover militarily, China has only 350 million of its 1.3 billion population currently enjoying middle class living standards of an industrialized country. Somewhat similarly, only 48 million out of Indonesia’s current 237 million enjoy middle-class standards of living. As with Indonesia’s emphasis on collaborative security, China’s peaceful development clearly puts strong emphasis on internal stability than on military assertiveness abroad.
The writer is professor of political science from the University of Indonesia. He served as Indonesia’s Ambassador at the Court of St. James’s in London and as Defense Minister in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first Cabinet (2004-2009). He received a doctorate in International Relations from the London School for Economics and Political Science.
