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ey high-level meetings such as the one taking place in Kota Kinabalu today between Indonesia and Malaysia are often burdened with high expectations and undue anticipation. The eyes of Southeast Asia will certainly be on this tourist town north of the Kalimantan border. However, it is naive and unproductive to expect the delicate nuances of diplomacy to be a one-shot cure-all to the travails that have led to rhetorical war chants and over-active animosity between the two neighbors.

Today’s meeting will have two overriding objectives: Foremost, officials need to return the established status quo in disputed territories — a “status quo ante”. Even before the two sides can talk about the modalities of negotiations, order and a spirit of non-provocation must be returned.

Negotiations cannot be conducted under a cloud of suspicion. Both sides must, and will, agree to refrain from actions that would balk a peaceful legal solution in the long term.

The second will be ensuring an “exit strategy” that allows both governments to ease tensions in the face of strong domestic pressure to take action.

The prevailing circumstances make it impossible for either capital to make gestures needed in the complicated process of diplomatic negotiations. Neither government can afford to put themselves in a corner.

Diplomacy is a subtle nuanced process that cannot be subject to mob pressure.

The history of 20th century crises has taught us that restraint is more important than military strength.

Those warmongers in the streets forget that the blade dulls quickly, because a kris is sharpest when left in its sheath.

One of the most dangerous and most studied crises of the past 50 years, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, presented key lessons not to be neglected in the present dispute.

At the peak of the 13-day crisis, neither Washington nor Moscow set a requisite of “absolute victory” or “unconditional surrender” on the other. With every diplomatic chess move, both sought a political way out, allowing each other the opportunity to respond with equal restraint.

It should never be a zero-sum game.

The dire consequence of failure in 1962 could have been nuclear holocaust. In 2010 it is instability in Southeast Asia, detrimental to growth for all countries in the region.

Regional stability is as high on the priority list of Indonesia’s national interest as the territorial integrity of its borders.

A toning down in Kinabalu will further talks. Solidify the already 16 maritime border agreements with Malaysia. Also at stake are the many other maritime disputes other than the waters north of Batam-Bintan, such as the ones in the Sulawesi Sea, South China Sea and Malacca Strait.

While steady composure will be an asset during today’s meeting, steely determination must also be part of the language. Talks at Kota Kinabalu should not just be an “icebreaker meeting”.

Too often the Indonesia/ASEAN way of resolving disputes is not to resolve disputes. At this juncture, Jakarta cannot afford to extend negotiations indefinitely. Its must set a timetable for resolution or arbitration.

Indonesia can strategically act tough, enhancing support from regional neighbors by seeking to implement established dispute resolution mechanisms that Malaysia continues to reject.

Malaysia has territorial disputes with most Southeast Asian countries, a diplomatic weakness that Jakarta can exploit by forging coalitions with other claimants to force Kuala Lumpur into some deadline for settlement.

Forging alliances to play diplomatic hardball is a perfectly legitimate and effective option. Too often it is a strategy rarely employed by the Foreign Ministry.

But in the present circumstance it should always be antipodal to the military option.

Either way, it is a better alternative than banging war drums, hurling excrement or shouting insults at our neighbor