Assessing the police’s independence

On Oct. 4, 2010 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono nominated Comr. Gen. Timur Pradopo as the single candidate for the National Police chief post. Scrutinizing Timur’s nomination is interesting for several reasons.

First, this constitutes the end of an episode of SBY’s political soap opera surrounding succession within the police force.

Second, although Timur was among the eight candidates proposed by the National Police Commission, he had previously failed to attract much attention compared to the other seven.

Third, during the screening of all candidates by the National Human Rights Commission, Timur came up lowest in terms of acceptability because of his alleged role in several human rights violation cases during his career.

The commission even wrote his score in red ink for his refusal to provide an explanation into alleged human rights violations in the 1998 Semanggi I and 1999 Semanggi II incidents.

Fourth, in accordance with its mandate, duty and responsibilities, the police will always be directly connected to the public.

Fifth, the police is literally a bridge between the state’s interests and need for stability in security, and the public’s interest and need to “feel secure” (read: not threatened).

The police’s duty and responsibility in the community is so strongly embedded that it cannot be severed just for the sake of addressing the interests of those who give them a political mandate. The balancing scale should in fact tip more heavily on the side of public interest and less on the circle of money, politics and power.

Thus, it is even more important for the President to demonstrate his political stance as the head of the government, by being clear, strict and tough in preserving the Police independency. The same goes for the leadership of the police. The bottom line is that there should never be dual positions or hanging issues out to dry.

Periodical regeneration to rotate or promote the ranks and positions is normal in professional institutions. Regeneration should be accompanied by a performance evaluation mechanism as a basis to determine future strategic programs and policies. This process is important as a tool to assess the development of an organization and the performance of its personnel, as well as to make sure that the institutional system, mechanism and procedure are working and functioning properly.

When the whole institutional system is functioning well, efforts by external parties to politicize the institution can be avoided or at least mitigated, because the police corps’ ethical reputation is in its own hands.

This is the essence and the spirit of MPR Decree No. 6/2000 and MPR Decree No. 7/2000 and the 2002 Law on the National Police.

These political regulations are aimed at liberating the National Police from a military structure and command (read: Indonesian Military) so that it can transform into a democratic civilian police force that is focused on community services, protection and just law enforcement.

The police’s independence is not a blank check. A democratic system also requires the existence and functioning of the control system, mechanism and procedure. To be effective, the controls must be carried out simultaneously from both internal and external perspectives.

Simultaneously, external controls must also be managed by the House of Representatives; the National Police Commission; relevant state institutions such as the National Commission on Human Rights, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK) and the Ombudsman Commission; NGOs; and the media.

In principle, reforms require that transparency and accountability become an integral part of the police institutional process, including leadership succession — From the initial selection and assessment by the Police Rank and Promotion Council (Wanjakti), to the selection of candidates by the police chief and/or National Police Commission; the evaluation of the candidates’ track records by relevant government institutions; the appointment of candidate(s) by the President; and the “fit-and-proper” test by the House.

During the fit-and-proper test, the House must maker sure that the candidate police chief has the capability, capacity and willingness to carry forward the police’s strategic and crucial programs.

At least, first, to implement democratic policing in alignment with the National Police Grand Strategy 2005–2025; second, to periodically conduct an evaluation of the National Police policy and performance through consultation with various key stakeholders; third, to redesign the correction and accountability mechanism to regain public trust and confidence toward the police institution; fourth, to strengthen police members’ compliance with the principles of the rule of law; fifth, to ensure the accountability (of the police institution) from a human rights perspective (effective remedies).

Regardless the final result of the fit-and-proper test process, Indonesia definitely needs a capable police chief with no corruption or human rights violation blemishes to his name, who has the capacity to make accurate, appropriate and timely decisions.

The writer is the executive director of the ProPatria Institute, Jakarta.