Jakarta, ID
Tuesday, May 29 2012, 05:49 AM

Opinion

India’s role in Indonesia’s revolution (Part 2 of 2)

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Although the attack of July 20, 1947, was not a complete surprise, Nehru’s outrage was genuine. “The sudden attack by the Dutch in Indonesia is an astounding thing which the new spirit of Asia will not tolerate,” he thundered… “No European country...has any business to use its army in Asia…if other members of the United Nations tolerate this or remain inactive, then the United Nations Organization  ceases to be…”

For Jawaharlal Nehru, the Dutch action was an insult to Asia and a danger to world peace. On July 22, 1947, he said, India would “in all probability” take the matter to the UN if Britain was unable to do so.”

However, far from being provoked by Nehru to condemn the attack, HMG (His Majesty’s Government)’s government (and the US) only offered their “good offices” to both sides!

The Dutch coolly “took note” of their offers but said it would depend on developments, “whether and if so when” they availed of them!

On July 25, Nehru cabled Krishna Menon, Nehru’s representative in London, “No one in India or elsewhere in Asia,” he said, “Believes that if governments of UK or US really desired to bring this conflict to an end, they could not do it immediately without military intervention. …The time for formal
offers of mediation is passed...if HMG are unable to take effective action to end hostilities.. We shall have no option but to take the matter before the United Nations Security Council.”

By July 28, no new ideas had come from UK and US and Indian domestic opinion was mounting. Nehru announced India’s decision to approach the Security Council on July 29.

Britain’s foreign minister Ernest Bevin suddenly requested postponement of India’s approach by “at least 24 hours, while Britain makes a final appeal to the Dutch”. Although deeply skeptical, Nehru gave in.

On July 30, when our case had already gone to New York, there was a flurry of messages from the British Foreign Office!

In one, India was advised to go to the UN General Assembly (which was not due to meet for six weeks!) where “the volume of sympathy with Indonesia would be greater and the motion would probably be carried before the end of the session, while at the Security Council it could get prolonged especially if the Americans wished it”! Nehru scorned this advice.

In another, India was asked to act under Chapter VI and not Chapter VII, which she had done anyway.

Thus it was that on July 30, the Security Council received two notices, India’s under Chapter VI — and Australia’s under Chapter VII! Professor George Kahin, Cornell University’s well known authority on Indonesia, says Australia’s intervention took precedence over India’s as it was based on the contention of a breach of peace (Article 39) while India’s said that international peace and security was endangered (Article 34). Following Kahin’s lead, recorded history highlights Australia’s intervention while India’s gets a passing reference.

Was there prior understanding between Britain and Australia that if the Indians could not be kept from the Security Council, Australia should approach it too and on a “higher” platform? More importantly, was India asked to delay her intervention by a day while Australia prepared hers? Without records, one can only speculate!

But regardless of its priority, the fact remains that Indonesia’s dispute with the Netherlands became internationalized primarily because of Nehru’s dogged persistence.

When Maguwo Airport (now Adi Sutjipto), near the Republic’s emergency capital, Yogyakarta, was attacked on July 20, 1947, Patnaik miraculously managed to escape with Sutan Sjahrir aboard his Dakota plane. Sjahrir had by then resigned as prime minister and was appointed by president Sukarno as his special envoy.


“Indonesia’s dispute with the Netherlands became internationalized primarily because of Nehru’s dogged persistence.”

They flew to Singapore on the way to New Delhi. A young Indonesian diplomat, Darusman, working at the recently opened Indonesia Office in Singapore was present at the airport when Patnaik’s Dakota arrived. He remembered Sjahrir descended with no personal luggage and had only the clothing he was wearing: A simple pair of trousers and short sleeved shirt. Darusman rushed him to a tailor.

In New Delhi, Sjahrir was welcomed by the Indonesian Representative Dr. Soedarsono who arranged the intensive consultations between Sjahrir and Nehru. A synchronized diplomatic strategy was forged by the two Asian leaders.

Sjahrir left New Delhi and flew to New York City with a stop over in Cairo to be joined by Foreign Minister Agus Salim. The fluently Arab speaking Agus Salim had lobbied for the support of the Arab League member countries.

It so happened that the UN Security Council Chairman for the month of August 1947 was Syria’s permanent representative Faris Elkhouri. Syria was an active member of the Arab League.

On Aug. 14, 1947, Sjahrir delivered a remarkably eloquent presentation to the Security Council meeting at the temporary UN Headquarters in Lake Success, Long Island, New York. India’s Representative was seated by his side.

The next morning, in the Aug. 15 edition, the influential New York Herald Tribune newspaper commented on Sjahrir’s speech: “...One of the most moving statement ever heard here in Lake Success.”

By 1948/1949 the Cold War was settling in and, when a communist revolt that broke out in September 1948 was suppressed in Madiun, East Java, Indonesia’s importance to the West increased manifold.

With the US now firmly in the lead, it was only a matter of time before The Netherlands was forced to free her colony of 300 years.

Therefore, another Nehruvian initiative, the convening of the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia in January 1949 to protest the Second Dutch attack on Dec. 19, 1948, while rather better known, is possibly less significant in strategic terms than the two events highlighted here.  

But it was important enough to alert the Dutch against undertaking any serious negotiations with Indonesia in India’s proximity. When the Round  Table Conference for a settlement of the Dutch-Indonesia conflict was held from mid-August to early November 1949,  the Dutch ensured they took place in the Netherlands, thousands of miles away from Nehru’s watchful eye!



The writer has served as India’s ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. She is completing a book on India-Indonesia bilateral relations.