INSIGHT: Should we fear China’s growing naval power?
Rizal Sukma, Jakarta | Sat, 08/13/2011 8:00 AM
China’s Navy is surely on the path toward building a modern fleet with forward projection capability. Last month, China announced that the refitting of an aircraft carrier bought from Ukraine in 1998 — to be used for training and research purposes — was approaching its final phase.
While the ex-Soviet Varyag — renamed Shilang — would be the first of China’s operational aircraft carriers, the production of two indigenous aircraft carriers is reportedly also underway at the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. And last week, Shilang was launched in Liaoning province to undertake its first maiden sail.
The Shilang is not yet a full-fledged aircraft carrier. Military analysts agree that the vessel is still not fully operational and needs further tests and work. As of today, the significance of the launch lies is symbolic. The Shilang, however, certainly marks the beginning of China’s road toward becoming a great naval power — a status any great power would like to acquire.
Despite immense challenges at home, it is beyond doubt that China is rapidly becoming a daguo (great power). As its economy continues to grow, the influence of China — which has already been felt across the globe and particularly in East Asia — can only grow further. It is also natural and logical that China’s military power will also grow. Indeed, military modernization itself has always been part of the si xian dai hua (the four modernizations) initiated by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978. The rapid transformation of its naval capability over the last ten years constitutes part and parcel of that process.
Since the adoption of a new strategy of active defense (jiji fangyu) in December 1985, China has consistently developed its naval capability from a costal defense force to a blue water navy. While still lagging behind the US, the Chinese Navy is now one of the most modern fleets in Asia Pacific, and the ongoing developments suggest the aim to become a force for the future, with the intent to boost global power projection capability by the 2020s. With a steady increase in its military spending, which would rise 12.7 percent to US$91.7 billion in 2012, such a plan is not without grounds.
The question for East Asia now is, should we then fear China’s naval power? The answer to this question would vary from one capital to the other. The US, for example, has long been curious about the nature of China’s military growth. Tokyo has also expressed its concerns and the recently released defense white paper warned that China’s Navy would increase its activities around its waters, an assessment criticized by Beijing as an exaggeration of China’s threat.
For Southeast Asian countries, the most important question is not what China has in its arsenal, but what it is going to do with it. There is no reason to fear China’s growing military power if it will be used for the benefit of regional public good. In this regard, China’s growing naval power — including the aircraft carrier — would boost China’s ability to participate in regional efforts to address non-traditional security threats such as combating piracy and conducting disaster relief operations. This is the area where many Southeast Asian countries would welcome China’s greater role.
The problem would arise if China’s growing naval power was used to challenge the US military presence in Asia Pacific. That would surely invite a US reaction. If this is the case, a rivalry between China and the US would not benefit anyone, and Southeast Asian countries would be the first to suffer. To prevent this scenario, it is absolutely necessary for China and the US to intensify strategic dialogue to alleviate any misperceptions of both sides’ intentions.
It would be a disaster also if China’s growing naval power was used to impose and assert its claims in the South China Sea. This area has also been described as a flashpoint in Southeast Asia and could become a source of friction between China and its neighbors. Fortunately, at the recent ASEAN meeting in Bali last month, China and ASEAN agreed the guidelines on the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
The agreement is a significant step toward designing a more legally binding conflict prevention mechanism, the Code of Conduct (CoC). China and ASEAN should soon start discussions on elements of the CoC. Once the CoC is firmly in place, there would be less to fear from China’s growing naval power.
The writer is the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta