The suicide bombing of a church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, on Sunday has (re)opened our eyes to the fact that terrorism has not ended in the country.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has made it clear that the incident was associated with the Cirebon bombing.
Since the bombing of a police mosque in Cirebon in April, five people have been declared fugitives, including Ahmad Yosepa Hayat, one of the suspected perpetrators of the Solo bombing. Is it true that al-Qaeda is back in action in Indonesia?
Derwin Pereira previously discussed a document discovered in Solo titled Jihad Operation in Asia, touted as a blueprint for al-Qaeda’s military operations in Southeast Asia, intended to be run by Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).
Since Darwin’s article was published, as if by coincidence, various world media announced the arrest of Indonesian citizen Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi in the Philippines.
Fathur, an alumni of the al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, Solo, was the suspected ‘’mastermind” of terrorist training in camps in the Philippines.
He escaped from prison and was killed in a shootout with Philippine soldiers.
Thereafter, various bombs exploded in Indonesia, including the first and second bombings in Bali and at the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the Christmas Eve bombings, the Australian Embassy bombing, and other suicide bombings.
Why is terrorism a never-ending problem in this country?
Sentencing first-tier terrorists to death has not deterred the second-tier. The first-tier terrorists include Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and front men who were shot and killed by police, such as Malaysians Azahari and Noordin M. Top.
The criminal penalties levied on those convicted of terrorism are very high: the Terrorism Law stipulates that perpetrators can be sentenced to death.
The questions, therefore, are whether acts of terror in Indonesia today are a continuation of al-Qaeda sleeper cells and how they remain affected by the violent ideology of al-Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden formally proclaimed al-Qaeda in August 1988. Since then, the reputation of Bin Laden has waned in favor of new names in the world of terror.
Evidence of the ‘’courage” of al-Qaeda is evinced by the serious attention paid to the group by the US. The biggest “successes” scored by al-Qaeda before 9/11 were the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, on Aug. 8, 1998.
After that, Bin Laden was declared public enemy number one by the FBI, which placed a US$10 million price on his head.
According to Mark Jurgensmeyer, the advantage al-Qaeda holds over its competitors is its ability to transform religion into a force of resistance.
In Michael Facault’s view, terrorism’s success lies in shifting the paradigm to the radicalization of religious propriety (jihad according to the perpetrators or terrorists in the eyes of others). Ahmad Yosepa Hayat’s involvement is the most obvious examples this change.
There are many factors supporting the radicalization argument.
In the case of al-Mukmin, radicalization was caused by two things. First were excesses in the nation’s political development under the principle of the uniformity of the mass organizations under the ideology of Pancasila.
During Soeharto’s New Order, al-Mukmin became an icon of ideological resistance to the oppression of the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). As a result, “senior” al-Mukmin founders were forced to leave the country and live in Malaysia, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, now languishing in prison after he was convicted of supporting terrorism in Aceh.
Previous students of al-Mukmin, including Fathurrahman and Imam, consciously or not, were radicalized in veiled resistance to the New Order.
The principle of uniformity of mass organizations no longer exists. The second generation of al-Mukmin, mainly those who could not accept that Ba’asyir, their teacher and guru, became a victim of the Terrorism Law, grew up.
As a result, the names of the young were recorded in the book of terrorists: Maulana (Marriott bombing), M. Syarif (Cirebon ) and Ahmad Yosepa Hayat (Solo).
Islamic boarding schools, particularly traditional ones, are a most fragile and fertile field for spreading resistance (and terrorism). No wonder that in many boarding schools in Pakistan, for example, Bin Laden’s photograph is printed on the back cover of the students’ “Yellow Book”.
What is the scale of influence of al-Qaeda ideology among the second generation of terrorists? It can be divided into two categories. First is a theological influence that has become the spirit of any action in the name of religion.
At this point, after the JI leaders were arrested and shot to death, Ba’asyir is the only remaining guru who can give Islamic preaching to dampen the minor movements of the suicide bombers. The second generation is making Ba’asyir an idol.
Second is the flow of funds from al-Qaeda to JI. Pereira said JI received Rp 1.35 billion from Bin Laden’s pockets over the last five years
According to Zahary Abuza, JI received substantial funding from al-Qaeda. Through Hambali (now under FBI arrest), JI received $130,000 for the first Bali bombing. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (captured in Pakistan) allegedly gave $100,000 after the success of the first Bali bombing.
Apparently, since high-ranking officials of JI have passed away (either convicted of terrorism or shot dead), the second generation, such as Muhammad Sharif and Ahmad Yosepa Hayat have had difficulties in finding funds.
However they are endangering our lives. The government must remain vigilant because bombs made from TNT or spikes are equally dangerous. Both bring terror to our lives.
The writer was graduated from the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, and is a lecturer at Bogor-based Djuanda University’s law school.
