The Sept. 11, 2001 attacks a decade ago triggered a fast, extensive and firm reaction from the administration of former US president Bush. The attitude was related to the responsibility upon the US government, given its failure to prevent the attacks by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, leading to a subsequent announcement on a change in policy from deterrence to preemption, called the “Bush Doctrine”.
This new policy was based on the fact that the logical consequence of the terrorist war was the possibility of attacks by means of weapons of mass destruction. Although seen as an overreaction, decision-makers felt that the US could no longer be careless and only wait for further assaults before responding. Later, the US mobilized its war on terrorism, and paralyzing al-Qaeda became a national priority.
Based on the effect produced earlier, the use of military force against the infrastructure and groups of foreign terrorists secured greater acceptance within the Bush administration’s policy circles.
This also won the “support” of the American public. A large-scale campaign was launched, by utilizing all national elements and international strengths, to fight the terrorism of al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the organization’s support structures that unleashed the Sept. 11 attacks.
Moreover, this campaign involved and rallied international communities to “close” al-Qaeda and its
financial networks. Ultimately, this resulted in the death of Bin Laden.
The above description indicates the intricacy of managing terrorism in today’s world, when its technology, strategy and patterns of struggle have changed in line with the latest developments. It requires not only firmness and extreme professionalism on the part of law enforcers and other security personnel to face terrorism, but also policy regulations capable of accommodating the intricacies of field operations in clear and measured state policies.
The same thing has now happened in Indonesia. In the wake of the Bali bombings and, more recently, the Marriott Hotel blast, there have in fact been no similar, large-scale terrorist threats. Although bombs have still been detonated in several locations like Cirebon and Surakarta, the emergency escalation was actually different to that of Bali in 2002.
However, counterterrorism efforts involve a wide range of operational tasks, including strikes against armed terrorists, de-radicalization and rehabilitation. Yet so far, there has been no clear-cut consensus to define terrorism, radicalism, de-radicalization and rehabilitation as an undeniable threat and challenge.
According to Bilveer Singh (The Jakarta Post, March 26, 2011), since 2002, the more than 600 arrests and 50 deaths of members of Jamaah Islamiyah and affiliated members in Indonesia testify to its ability to generate insecurity. The rejuvenation of Islamist terrorism was again demonstrated when more than 120 armed militants “appeared” in North Sumatra in February 2010, targeting the police, whom they labeled as thoghut (enemies that could be killed).
Indonesia has responded with counterterrorism measures to meet the threat. The establishment of
a new counterterrorist body, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), reflects the government’s resolve to address this national priority.
One of its programs is de-radicalization, which aims to persuade radicals to first abandon the use of violence, which is then followed by changing the radicals’ mindset. Another important measure, however, is the introduction of policy regulations supporting the tasks of field security personnel so as to avoid hesitation in responding to incidents.
The respective revisions of the Counterterrorism Law, the National Security Bill, the State Intelligence Bill, the State Secrets Bill and the Indonesian Military — National Police Support Bill need to be discussed collectively in order to avoid rules overlapping, incoherence, and inconsistency in the respective policies, which are interrelated.
The likelihood, however, of such a joint discussion is unclear, as coordination between the relevant institutions remains an impediment, and the priority rating within the House of Representatives regarding the bills is not so high.
To escape the excessive fear of the threat of terrorism, which will merely result in repressive policies against innocent citizens, it is necessary to consider the issue in sound public debate.
So far, what has been discussed only concerns the stipulation of Article 7 of the Indonesian Military (TNI) Law that in executing its main duties, the TNI carries out military operations and non-war military operations, including the control of terrorism.
Further elucidation is needed to ascertain its meaning. For instance, is it correct to use military force to settle cases of terrorism? When is the TNI allowed to get involved? What rules are supposed to be adhered to by the police and military?
The discussions on military involvement in dealing with terrorism have often only gone as far as considering military entry is possible if and when the police are unable to handle an emergency situation. The Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, held in March 2011, also touched on this question. A TNI officer inquired as to the moment when the TNI could become involved in handling terrorism, in view of the potential threat of terrorism at present. A police officer replied that as long as a situation could still be handled by police, military backup would not be needed.
In the end, such dialogues have only further confirmed that there is TNI-police tension in relation to their respective Rules of Engagement (RoE), and this just gives the impression that the problem of terrorism control merely concerns the sharing of business areas between the two players.
This is an important issue to thrash out by considering all the relevant strengths and weaknesses. The gaps between the existing regulations and field implementation should be profoundly discussed. In this way, the pros and cons can be pondered and their respective concepts examined through available input.
With the TNI Law and Counterterrorism Law, such opportunities are indeed opening but they have not yet been translated into detailed and measured rules. This is a crucial problem to address, as terrorists have enhanced their sophistication and capability in nearly all their operational and supporting aspects. The aggressive use of modern technology for information, communication management and intelligence has increased the efficiency of this activity.
The weaponry technology and purchasing power of terrorist organizations are believed to have also improved, although some discussions have noted that overall terrorist strength is declining, particularly in terms of funding.
The availability of ready-made technology and trained personnel to operate on behalf of whatever type of clients with adequate budgets should prompt the government to be cautious and prepare policy regulations that reflect the actual kind of “threat” being faced.
The security of the state actually depends not only on security personnel, but also on a government that is responsive and firm in decision-making; a House that understands and has a command of state security matters as formulated in legislation; fair and impartial law enforcement; and an awareness of prevailing developments in global threats.
All these elements should act in synergy under strong national leadership.
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Social and Cultural Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and the Indonesian Institute.
