Insight: The PKS and its hardball politics

Prosperous Justice Party deputy secretary-general Mahfudz Siddiq (right) and secretary general Anis Matta (left) speak with the press in a file photo. (JP/R. Berto Wedhatama) It may not be of much interest to many Indonesians, but in the midst of a possible Cabinet shake-up marking the end of the 22 months of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second term (2009-2014), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) issued a rather shocking statement. Perhaps unofficially (through its secretary-general Anis Matta), the party promised to reveal the contents of an alleged pact between President Yudhoyono and the party’s highest chief, Hilmi Aminuddin, that the pair made when the two figures agreed to form a governing coalition two years ago.

With the exception of Yudhoyono and Hilmi’s closest circles of associates, not many people would have known about this pact or its ramifications. Since Yudhoyono also made pacts with the Golkar Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), one could assume that there is nothing special about his pact with the PKS, other than the fact that Yudhoyono agreed to appoint four PKS figures in his administration in return for their support in his government.

But, how are we to understand such a statement — that the PKS would reveal the nature and substance of the pact? Why would Anis Matta raise this issue in public? Is there anything special about the pact that significantly differs from pacts Yudhoyono formed with much larger parties such as Golkar? Or was it simply a preemptive move that was hoped may protect the four PKS members in the Cabinet?

Yudhoyono’s decision to reshuffle his Cabinet is influenced by a number of factors. One of the most important of these includes the need to accelerate what Yudhoyono promised during his campaigning. It has been widely reported that the past two years of his administration have not been entirely satisfactory. In fact, Yudhoyono even admitted that almost half of what he wanted his ministers to do has not been done. Against this background, it is only logical to assume that a Cabinet reshuffle is really intended to get his administration performing again.

For obvious reasons, this is not necessarily the way coalition members see things. On the contrary, they view the Cabinet reshuffle as a move by the President that may effect the current balance of power. It is not that they may no longer be part of the governing coalition, or that the level and breadth of power they are holding would suddenly disappear, but it has certainly meant they are keen to take necessary measures to prevent such outcomes. More than anything else, these measures are intended to influence Yudhoyono in reforming his Cabinet.

It is in the light of the above reasoning that the PKS’ preemptive moves can be understood. The fact that PKS chose to follow a less-Javanese-style of politics, threatening to disclose the content of a pact, only indicates how its leaders see themselves on the one hand, and Yudhoyono’s administration on the other.

In the past, PKS has always been characterized as Islamic, young and educated. Coupled with the way the leadership has organized and administered the party, this combination represents a powerful arsenal in politics. In early 2000, for instance, the public in Jakarta often witnessed the ability of PKS leadership to stage demonstrations that involved thousands of participants – peaceful but no less threatening.

Likewise, we are often amazed with the way their legislators in the House of Representatives articulate their interests – not necessarily those of the people. Issues and more issues were able to be capitalized upon in such a way as to gain maximum benefits. These included the Bank Century fiasco and Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) debacle.

On the one hand, this has led the PKS to be perceived as a political force to be reckoned with by virtually all of its rivals. On the other, the PKS would take advantage of any political circumstances presented to its members.

This was one reason why president Abdurrahman Wahid gave the PKS a Cabinet post in his administration despite of the fact that this party gained only 1.3 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections.

Under Yudhoyono, the windows of opportunity presented to the PKS became even bigger and wider. All of their qualities mentioned above have been utilized in such a way as to allow the party to play, including hardball politics, launching threats: to withdraw from the coalition, to expose its pact and to campaign for the dismantling of the KPK.

In addition, to these examples of its approach, the windows of opportunity presented to the party have enabled the PKS to gain more Cabinet posts than Golkar.

The question now is whether all the PKS qualities presented above are true. In a period where “image is everything” one could not be so certain of anything. Over the years, as history unfolds, the perceived characterization that PKS is Islamic, young and educated can no longer be said to be entirely true. In the last seven years or so, the party has transformed itself into a regular party, plagued with a common nemesis, and not entirely immune to liabilities.

Because of that, one should not take the PKS’ hardball political game so seriously. Such a challenge could always be met and confronted with a comparable or different challenge.

The writer is dean of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the State Islamic University in Jakarta.