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fter the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (Declaration of Conduct) in Bali in July last year, ASEAN member states and China held follow-up deliberations in Beijing last month.

Apart from reiterating run-of-the-mill statements underscoring the noteworthiness of the DOC’s role in sustaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, both parties agreed to hold a set of workshops aimed at enhancing collaboration on marine research and activities this year, which marks the 10th anniversary of the signing of the DOC.

Holding workshops on marine issues would serve, at least for the time being, to allay tensions in the South China Sea, especially between the four ASEAN claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam) and China.

However, it, alas, would not address core problems in the area that must be resolved to bring about durable stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conducting effective joint marine research and activities would require that disputed and undisputed areas of the sea be defined.

Though it failed to gain support at the last ASEAN Summit in Bali, the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZoPFFC) proposed by the Philippines would in fact be an effective way to address the core problems in the sea.

The proposal would segregate disputed from the undisputed areas, and it would not rule out bringing the dispute before the International Court.

Some ASEAN countries, especially those with close ties with China, have been wary of espousing the proposal, for they are disinclined to vex an increasingly powerful China, which is flexing its muscles in the South China Sea.

While the principles of the DOC, such as a commitment to resolve territorial disputes by peaceful means and to exercise self-restraint, need to be continuously upheld by ASEAN and China, it has been evident that the agreement cannot prevent clashes in the Sea.

Last March, the Philippines reported that two Chinese patrols boats threatened to ram a survey ship near its claimed territory, the Reed Bank. A few months later in May, Vietnam accused Beijing of violating its marine sovereignty after Chinese ships damaged a PetroVietnam exploration boat in the Sea.

Although such escalating tensions could have been eased through last year’s ASEAN meetings, not all claimants were satisfied with the guidelines, progress on which has progressed at a snail’s pace.

To the Philippines, a failure to secure support for the ZoPFFC from ASEAN would allow it to drum up more support from its close ally, the United States.

Top Filipino and American top defense and foreign affairs officials recently held intensive talks to significantly enhance maritime cooperation between the countries, resulting in an increased US military presence and joint military exercises in the Philippine archipelago.

Though the US said that it was not seeking a military base in the Philippines, its strategic stance reflects Washington’s shift in focus from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Asia-Pacific region.

Such a change was envisioned in the US Defense Strategic Review 2012 approved by US President Barack Obama last month, suggesting that China’s reemergence as a regional power has the potential to affect
the US’ economy and security in a variety of ways.

When ASEAN’s claimants are thwarted by a rising China in their attempt to exploit natural resources within their maritime sovereignty, mainly due to lingering uncertainty over disputed and undisputed areas of the South China Sea, increasing military cooperation between the claimants and the US is an inevitable and a realistic defense approach to strategically balance against China and to safeguard their political security and economic interests.

Although intensifying military cooperation between the claimants and the US is unavoidable, it is nevertheless not expected to last long, as it could exacerbate tensions between the US and China in the sea, posing a threat to political security of ASEAN member countries.

It is therefore critical for ASEAN to make a decisive breakthrough by spelling out guidelines oriented toward avoiding armed conflict in the sea.

To this end, defining disputed and undisputed areas is an overriding precondition for creating durable stability in the sea.

Lacking such precondition, joint marine development, which includes joint natural resources exploration, in disputed areas looks to be doomed to fail as it will likely face opposition from the public in the ASEAN claimant nations.

As chairman of ASEAN last year, Indonesia was lauded for its effort to ensure the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, deliberations on which started in 2005.

As the largest democracy in ASEAN and a non-claimant state to the dispute, Indonesia has a moral responsibility to ensure the guidelines are as feasible and effective as possible for the forseeable future.

Drafting the guidelines has become one of the country’s top priorities according to the annual address of Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.

Taking into account the idea of determining the disputed and undisputed areas of the South China Sea will be worthwhile, without having to offend our ASEAN partners and to deviate from the ASEAN way of mutual respect, non-interference, and mutual cooperation.

The writer is a lecturer at the International Relations Department of the University of Budi Luhur, Jakarta.