N

ever has the procurement of Indonesia’s primary weaponry system been subject to such heated debate as the process of deciding on to purchase the Leopard tanks.

The debate has involved nearly all circles in the country, from the President, the Defense Ministry, the military top brass, retired servicemen, academics, NGOs and the media, as the pros and cons of the issue have been hashed over. Each of party has an argument worth considering.

The pros, represented by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Pramono Edhie Prabowo, for instance, said the plan to purchase Leopard tanks had been preceded by profound research and study in the Indonesian Army’s Cavalry Weaponry Center. This study, among others, selected Leopard tanks for purchase.

According to him, apart from tanks, the Army will also buy assault helicopters, field artillery and antiaircraft artillery to replace all such armaments that are now an average of 20 years old. Weaponry modernization is therefore needed, with a budget allocation totaling Rp 14 trillion (US$1.55 billion) until 2014.

The cons, represented by deputy chairman of the House’s defense commission Tubagus Hasanuddin and several retired Army officers, said in fact Indonesia had maintained a defensive stance while Leopard tanks were built for an offensive function, making them incompatible with Indonesia’s defense needs.

Some academics and NGOs have also mentioned the following factors to consider in weaponry purchases: compatibility with the strategy of state defense, adherence to the blueprint of weaponry modernization, suitability for geographic conditions, and guarantees of spare-part availability. And these factors were deemed unsuited for Leopard main battle tanks (MBT).

If we examine the debate, several important aspects can be noted. First, it is common knowledge that the Indonesian Military (TNI) operates with a budget lower than its minimum demand, and this unsurprisingly results in the use of critical armaments to meet normal operational requirements, particularly logistical support.

The Army chief’s statement has indicated an acknowledgement that the main weaponry system is already aged. If the posture of the TNI is now measured by three parameters, which are (i) dominant maneuvers, (ii) precision engagement, (iii) focused logistics, at a glance we can easily tell that the situation is far from adequate.

A further look at the controversy shows that the debate has not just concerned the demand for weaponry modernization alone, but also how its funding is to be supported. The minimal budget available thus gives rise to further claims involving priority rating, types of armaments, and strategic planning.

We need to understand the budget for the Defense Ministry and the TNI, and how it has thus far been allocated. So far, what is known has involved nominal figures, with less consideration toward budget descriptions, its allocation and the flow of funds. As most of the defense budget is allotted to personnel costs such as salaries and expenses, food and other allowances, allocations for primary weaponry maintenance is very small.

Indeed, as long as we are budget oriented, the minimum essential force (MEF) will not be sufficient, as there are more essential things in Defense Ministry/TNI budget management, which are target priorities indirectly related to the welfare of soldiers and the development and maintenance of the main weaponry system.

If we study the budget plan for the procurement of the TNI’s main weaponry system through foreign debt financing/export credits for the fiscal period of 2010-2014, the budget for Leopard purchase is in fact absent. The allocation for the Army is designated for the purchase of 44 combat vehicles. The procurement is planned to take place in the 2012 fiscal year, costing $220 million.

Just compare that figure with the cost of 100 used Dutch Leopard tanks, comprising 50 type 2A4 units and 50 type 2A6 units, worth $280 million.

The question is: Does the plan to buy the Army’s combat vehicles actually refer to Leopard tanks or not? If not, is the purchase of the Leopard tanks considered to be in opposition to the existing strategic plan or the accelerated fulfillment of the MEF? Then, how far is strict compliance with strategic planning/MEF required?

These questions need to be adequately answered. The controversial purchase of used weaponry is contrary to the logic of modernization and the acquisition of new and sophisticated weaponry frequently discussed by TNI leaders. This is what many circles have called into question.

The problem is not a mere rejection of Leopard tanks and F-16 grants, but the argument in support of the purchases doesn’t match what the public has questioned. The public has agreed that the TNI needs modernization and sophisticated weaponry, but the choice of armaments should meet the criteria already described above.

Second, the purchase of main weaponry is often connected with the defense strategy. If we refer to the defense strategy’s basic components: (i) the targets to be achieved, (ii) the facilities or instruments to be used, and (iii) the methods to be applied, the question remains as to whether the development of the TNI’s defense posture designed by the Defense Ministry in 2007 actually responded to its intended targets?

Is any shift in priority rating in the current year possible? It is reasonable to review the targets or goals with a clear mind and intelligently determine priorities.

There’s room for a recalculation of risks to be faced this year as well as next year, and any changes need to be understood by all parties including civil authorities. Many methods can be developed, and they may not be the same as the established concept so far.

With an increasingly limited budget, (logically) it is impossible to develop the same operational activity as otherwise would be with a sufficient allocation.

Third, in the above context, it’s necessary to reconsider the design of the state defense posture, which among others is based on the development of the defense industry. In the framework of augmenting the state’s defense capacity to reduce threats, the government has carried out a defense industrial revitalization, which has been enhanced by the establishment of the Committee for Defense Industrial Policy (KKIP) based on Presidential Regulation No.42/2010 regarding defense industrial and technological research and development.

In other words, the promotion of defense industrial development is intended to boost and heighten the growth of the defense industry, by encouraging and assisting domestic industries producing defense-
related equipment, through their promotion as well as their scientific and technological development.

The great gap between the demand for and procurement of the TNI’s primary weaponry system may thus partly be covered through production capacity of the domestic defense industry.

The writer is a researcher at the Social and Cultural Research Center, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and an advisory board member at The Indonesian Institute.