Insight: Domestic performance and international prestige

Forty years ago, America’s Zbigniew Brzezinski visited the University of Indonesia to assess the impact of the historic February 1972 Shanghai Communique redefining US-China relations on the foreign policies of Indonesia and ASEAN. Brzezinski spoke of the role of China as part of the growing importance of the Eurasian landmass stretching from the Western Pacific to Central Asia, then still part of the Soviet Union; the dynamism of the “technotronic revolution” even before the word “globalization” became part of popular lexicon in the news media and academic discourse; and the importance of domestic performance as a crucial element in bolstering America’s
international prestige.

Although Brzezinski spoke mainly in a boastful tone of American political, economic, technological and military primacy, he referred to aspects of the “China model” of development that might pose a counterpoint to the Soviet Union’s state-centered industrialization and to the American-led trajectory of “free market modernization”.

Reading through Brzezinski’s latest tome, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power together with media coverage of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States and Russian Prime Minister Putin’s announcement that Russia would add US$127 billion to its defense budget over the next 10 years, one could be forgiven for underestimating the sweeping changes affecting the future political-economic configuration of the world order.

Brzezinski deftly transports us through time and space, reminding us of the endless debates and realities about what constitutes “national power” in a hyper-connected world. National power ultimately resides not so much in the battleground between liberal-democratic democracies and single-party authoritarianism as in the societal system that underpins a particular arrangement.

In essence, Brzezinski argues now that however one defines a nation’s foreign policy, the lexicon of “strategic posture” (military), “strategic guidance” (diplomatic) or even “strategic patience” (the matching of present to future capability) much will depend on a country’s leadership delivering on the promise of both economic competitiveness and overall societal resilience. Brzezinski remains convinced that the US has six “residual strengths” to meet the challenges of a globalized competitive world in which nations such as China, India and a host of other emerging powers seek to rebalance the world’s power configurations into a more multi-polar world, reducing America’s inclination to be the world’s only power with “full-spectrum dominance”.

America’s economic strength is reflected in the reality that for the foreseeable future it remains the single national economy with more than 25 percent of global output, with China and India each less than 10 percent of world GDP per capita income. Relative to its size and economic strength the US is far ahead of any other rising power — and that includes Russia, China and India.

The second important element is America’s entrepreneurial vibrancy and the power of its superior quality higher education, reflecting the nation’s vitality and global influence. Chinese and Indian students continue to flock to America to test their mettle in its dynamic graduate-school and research-laboratory environments.

America’s third advantage is its demographic base, strengthened by its ability to attract, absorb and enrich individuals from across the world, replenishing its attraction as a destination where bold innovation and creative industriousness are far more rewarding than any other growth economies.

The fourth asset is America’s ability to be able to rely on “reactive mobilization”. When a common danger is transformed into a spiritual drive, Americans are quickly mobilized to face the clear and present danger of international pressure: Pearl Harbor, the Sputnik moment and September 11 are benchmarks of this galvanizing drive.

Fifth, America’s geopolitical location as a resource-rich continent flanked by two of the world’s most important oceans creates a sense of purpose that the US does not face imminent danger of invasion or occupation. Finally, the timeless values of individual liberty and respect for human rights need to be reasserted in a new form as a matter of urgency, given the inequality and the hollowing of the American middle class, to recapture and revitalize the American dream.

Reflecting on the importance of a nation’s commitment to create and maintain a vibrant, competitive but also fairer society, Brzezinski emphasizes at the beginning of the book: “Only by demonstrating the capacity for a superior societal system can America restore its historical momentum, especially in the face of a China that is increasingly attractive to the developing world.” Doubtless, he was in part reflecting on the decline of the “Washington Consensus” of the early 1990s compared to the rise in prominence of the Beijing Consensus a decade later.

As with other American writers who emphasize the importance of domestic performance (Tom Friedman’s/Michael Mandelbaum’s That Used to Be Us or Jeffrey Sachs’ The Price of Civilization) to effectively and credibly underpin international prestige, the final prognosis for the next 20 years is a relative decline in American primacy. But America in the interim will remain the only anchor to stabilize international order and pre-empt international anarchy.

The writer is professor emeritus of International Relations and Geopolitics, University of Indonesia. He was defense minister in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first Cabinet.