J

une is Sukarno'€™s month. It was the month when he was born (June 6, 1901) and died (June 21, 1970). More importantly, it was the month when he showed his love of and dedication to his homeland when he introduced his pearl of wisdom of the five key principles that later became the basis of the Indonesian state '€” Pancasila.

Sixty-eight years ago, on the first day of June, Sukarno electrified members of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of the Independence of Indonesia (BPUPKI) when he spoke about what would be the ideological foundation of the state. In one of its sessions, he eloquently articulated five basic principles of nationalism, humanity, democracy, social justice and the belief in God.

Though not without heated debates among the committee members, especially between those who were ideologically categorized as the '€œreligious'€ and the '€œnationalist'€ groups, it was finally accepted as the basis of the nation state. But it was debated again in the mid-1950s by the same groups when the Constituent Assembly, whose task was to formulate the state ideology as well as to write the constitution, was in session.

Not necessarily with the same ideological nuance, passion, or memory perhaps, but the issue of Pancasila as the basis of state was again raised. In 1968, when the New Order government was just about to begin, there was a discussion between the newly appointed president Soeharto and some Muslim leaders regarding the once negotiated settlement of the Jakarta Charter, where the principle of '€œBelief in God'€ was conjoined with a clause '€œwith the obligation to carry out Islamic teachings for its adherents'€.

On that occasion, Soeharto asked his Muslim countrymen about what the Jakarta Charter really meant and what would be the possible consequences should the country adopt it. The talk ceased to continue, as the latter '€” according to the late Lukman Harun, a notable Muhammadiyah figure '€” was unable to give a unified and definite answer.

Since then, Pancasila seemed to emerge as an uncontested subject '€” as if the question of ideology had been settled once and for all. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

When Indonesia was experiencing transition to democracy in the late 1990s, where one of its biggest challenges was to amend the 1945 Constitution, the Jakarta Charter issue resurfaced. Two Islamic parties the United Development Party (PPP) and Crescent and Star Party (PBB) plus an amalgamation of smaller Islamic parties called Persatuan Daulah Ummat brought back the idea of the Jakarta Charter to the table of negotiation.

To no avail, as support for the cause in the House of Representatives was only about 17 percent, and Pancasila remained the ideological foundation of Indonesia'€™s nation state. These repeated triumphs strengthened the fact that any endeavors to reassess or reformulate the construct of the state ideology would be met with severe opposition from the vast majority of the existing political community.

Does this mean that issues surrounding Pancasila have finally come to a halt? Far from it, many continue to talk about Pancasila. The trajectory, however, is not to question Pancasila as the state ideology proper, but its substantive applicability in the social, economic and political realities '€” whether or not the direction we are taking in steering the course of our social, economic or political development is in line with the values and principles embedded in the Pancasila ideology.

This was the case even during the Old Order and the New Order governments. When both Sukarno and Soeharto were influencing and shaping the course of Indonesia'€™s social, economic and political development, doubts about the willingness to put Pancasila into practice in our day-to-day realities were already high.

At that time, critics generally believed that the road those policy-makers traveled as a '€œpathway from the periphery'€ fundamentally deviated from the value system outlined in Pancasila. Others expressed their discontent because they also believed that Pancasila had not been practiced '€œpurely'€.

Interestingly, no particular policy was singled out as deviating from Pancasila. Those who were in fundamental disagreement with Sukarno and Soeharto considered that almost every policy they made was a deviation from the core values of Pancasila. Cases in point would have included a non-competitive political system and the practice of governance and development that only benefited the few.

Now that Indonesia has undergone a dramatic change from authoritarianism to democracy, there are those who genuinely believe that the government has fallen short of making Pancasila the anchor of their policy choices. The choice to adopt a market-driven economy, which has been haphazardly labeled as a neoliberal strategy of development, has often been seen as a paramount example.

The growing perception that our society is becoming more pragmatic, losing its compassion and gearing toward a zero-sum-game community only serves as further evidence of the declining role of Pancasila. It could not be more devastating other than to know the fact that even memorizing Pancasila in its chronological order can be very problematical for many of us '€” let alone understanding it correctly and applying it accordingly.

Perhaps this is what prompted Taufiq Kiemas, chairman of the People'€™s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and Sukarno'€™s son in law, to embark on an ideological venture to once again call on the importance of Pancasila, as one of Indonesia'€™s core pillars beside the 1945 Constitution, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and state motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in diversity).

Like many, he hoped that '€” given the fundamental position of Pancasila as the state ideology '€” it would function as our worldview, reference point and anchor of our social, economic and political lives.

Otherwise, Pancasila would only function as a historical artifact and serve as a symbol '€” perhaps an important one, but one that has lost its meaning and significance.

The writer is the dean of the school of social and political sciences at the State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta.