T

he law community was recently rocked by the arrest of former Constitutional Court chief justice Akil Mochtar and his subsequent resignation. As such, the image of the court as an institution renowned for its integrity was smeared by these allegations of graft at such a high level.

Judges should be impartial. Like the iconic blindfolded Lady Justice, a judge must have a high sense of justice and lead without discrimination. But in practice, this utopian view is at odds with the rampant corruption embedded within the judiciary, where law enforcers are often party to corrupt practices.

The lack of integrity and morals of judges lies in the recruitment system, which is based on Article 24 C paragraphs (3) and (4) of the 1945 Constitution:

(3) The Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine persons who shall be constitutional justices and who shall be confirmed in office by the President, three of whom shall be nominated by the Supreme Court, three nominated by the Parliament, and three nominated by the President.

(4) The chair and vice-chair of the Constitutional Court are elected by and from the constitutional justices.

Some of the President and the House of Representatives'€™ nominees are politicians. Herein lies the problem, judges from political parties will lean to the interests of his party, as was seen with Akil, a former Golkar legislator. The 2009 Law on judicial authority also bans '€œintervention in judicial matters by other parties outside the judicial power except in matters as referred to in the 1945 Constitution'€.

Moreover, the Constitution states that the judicial power shall be independent and shall possess the power to organize the judicature to enforce law and justice.

Thus, every judge shares the responsibility to guarantee and maintain the dignity of the judiciary and to prevent intervention, especially during cases.

Promises of promotion, facilities, offers of power, conspiracies with lawyers are commonly found to influence the examination of cases, especially sensitive ones involving officials, parliament members, ministers, governors, mayors or regents.

To guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judges and courts, first, existing constitutional justices should be subjected to
another fit-and-proper test, which would not only determine their academic skills but focus especially on their integrity and morality.

Further, supervision of the constitutional bastion for those seeking justice is also imperative. This supervision must be undertaken internally by the Constitutional Court or externally by the Judicial Commission.

Second, the rights of the judges, such as security, sufficient remuneration, court conditions and retirement age must be protected and guaranteed by the state through law. Judges'€™ welfare, when compared to other countries, is relatively low, so it is not surprising that many intelligent law graduates are reluctant to pursue in the judiciary and those that do turn to corrupt practices to supplement their meager allowance.

As a result, the elimination of this mind-set is a challenging attitude to address.

As a UN member, Indonesia must respect and carry out the global provisions of the independence of the judiciary, which were justified by the UN Assembly. The remuneration of judges, the court management system and supervision of judges remain insufficient and the improvement and reorganization of case structure and management is critical.

The author is a member of the governing board of the National Law Commission (KHN) and chairman of the Indonesian Advocates Association (PERADIN).