Quite a large number of books and accounts have been published about the events surrounding the 1965 tragedy '€” widely considered as the darkest chapter in Indonesian history.

Among the frequent contributors to study this specific chapter of the past is Salim Said, a political and military analyst who was a journalist at the time of the tragedy. The author recently launched his Dari Gestapu ke Reformasi: Serangkaian kesaksian (From Gestapu to Reform: A series of testimonies).

Publishing one'€™s personal account of events surrounding such an already well-known tragedy is indeed a challenge for the author as he is largely expected to jot down quotations and the testimony of prominent actors, or reveal facts during the course of events that have never been vividly described in previously published papers. On those specific criteria, Salim successfully provides many accounts that have never been released before.

The author, however, does admit in the foreword to his book that all such '€œnew revelations'€ were made possible only upon the downfall of the repressive New Order government under then president Soeharto and the blossoming era of reformasi. In his own words, the author suggested that the book'€™s title could also read: '€œNow it can be told'€.

One of the new facts provided by Salim is the revelation by then Czechoslovakian secret agent Vladislav Bittman, who worked for the Soviet Union'€™s KGB. In previously published work on the 1965 tragedy, including by Salim himself, there has been no mention of Bittman'€™s testimony.

Bittman, who defected in 1968, claimed that it was his agency that forged the '€œGilchrist Document'€, a much-cited letter from 1965 often used to support arguments for Western involvement in the overthrow of Indonesia'€™s founding president Sukarno. The document purports to be a letter from the British ambassador to Jakarta, Andrew Gilchrist, addressed to the British Foreign Office and referring to a joint US-UK plan for military intervention in Indonesia. Speculation about a possible British role in the overthrow of Sukarno continues, although the British defense secretary in 1965, Denis Healey, stated in 2000 that Britain was not involved.

In another part of the 587-page book, Salim reveals events revolving around and accounts by then Army commander Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani in the months leading up to the 1965 tragedy, many of which were not included in the previous books on the tragedy. Gen. Yani was one of those killed in the Sept. 30, 1965 failed coup attempt, blamed on the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Also cited in the book is one of the root causes of the conflict between Sukarno and the Army. The conflict, as narrated by Salim, originated from, among other issues, the disappointment by the Army, particularly its young officers, in Sukarno'€™s decision to surrender to the Dutch on Dec. 19, 1948. Sukarno had earlier expressed his intention to lead the guerilla war against the Dutch whenever Yogyakarta, then the capital of Indonesia, fell to the Dutch military forces. This disappointment led the Army officers, under Gen. Soedirman, to continue the fight against the Dutch.

Another significant chapter of the book is the 83-page account of Gen. Leonardus Benyamin Moerdani, a general who rose to prominence as chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) '€” the former name of the Indonesian Military (TNI) '€” and minister of defense.

What is interesting among the historical facts related in his book, however, is one of its chapters that exclusively but comprehensively explains the logic behind the decision of Salim himself to propose the granting of five-star general status to Soedirman, AH Nasution and Soeharto in 1997. Soedirman was granted the status for his services as the father of the war of independence; Nasution for introducing the TNI'€™s dual-function (Dwi Fungsi) concept; and Soeharto as the person '€œwho saved the state and the nation from the threat of the Sept. 30, 1965 Coup by the PKI [G30S/PKI]'€.

Some parts of the book by Salim might be biased in the sense that he got all his information, or witnessed the events that he witnessed, in the period before, during and after the 1965 tragedy due to his capacity as a journalist working for the Army-run Angkatan Bersenjata daily, before he later joined Tempo magazine. Still, his accounts do enrich and help knit together the still scrappy picture of the 1965 tragedy. Although the new facts revealed in his latest book might not be able to completely describe the entire picture of the tragedy, they have at least provided readers '€” and Indonesians in general '€” with a better understanding of what really happened at that time.

Therefore, others who have their own accounts or versions of the tragedy are welcome to put them on paper as they will automatically enrich the already available facts and help narrow the information and factual gaps in that tragic period.

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