I

f he was still alive, the smiling Gen. Soeharto might have greeted Indonesian voters, who on Wednesday cast their ballots in the fourth legislative election since the end of his New Order regime, in his native Javanese, '€œPiye kabare? Enak jamanku to?'€ (How are you? It was better in my time, wasn'€™t it?).

The cynical remarks, which are part of a picture of the former dictator that has been circulating around the country since last year, will pose a challenge to Indonesian democracy as the legislative election on Wednesday is very likely to plunge the nation into yet another coalition trap. The noisy, prolonged, energy-sapping and, in fact, unnecessary war of words among politicians will highlight decision-making at the House of Representatives in news media for the coming five years.

Instead of focusing on their legislative roles, in which they have never excelled, the politicians will allocate much of their work hours to political moves, intrigue and plots to indulge their narcissistic instincts '€” only to show they are doing something, even if it is not really what their constituents need. There could be another Centurygate '€” Part 1 and Part 2 '€” interpellation motions or even an impeachment petition for the public to watch with fatigue.

The maneuverings will take a break at certain times, with one or two politicians being caught red-handed accepting bribes, found guilty in court and dismissed without feeling humiliated, let alone guilty, because they embezzled state money to help their party cover its operational costs.

Following the 2014 election, if nothing changes in the orchestra of Indonesian politics except for the conductor, it will have been the choice of the voters who on April 9 cast their ballots at 550,000 polling stations across the country. With only 12 parties contesting, down from 38 parties five years ago, the next House will see 10 parties fill its 560 legislative seats, up from nine following the 2009 election.

As no single party will play a dominant role, the House looks set to emulate the existing pattern that splits the legislative body into pro-government and opposition camps '€” no matter who wins the presidency '€” for the 2014-2019 term. For another five years, protracted bickering over unpopular government policies will distract the House from its legislative agenda and other pressing issues facing the country such as infrastructure, energy insecurity, climate change-related disasters and the impending ASEAN free market.

That is the price this nation has to pay for forcing Soeharto to step down in May 1998 and choosing democracy as the new vehicle to reach the common goals of prosperity and justice laid out by the founding fathers.

The New Order under Soeharto was a period when political stability was non-negotiable and hence translated into a multi-party system that was singlehandedly controlled by the ruling party, the Golkar Party. Golkar won the elections held between 1971 and 1997 by landslides '€” often with a margin that was double the votes of the two opposition parties combined '€” to ensure Soeharto'€™s reelection and an effective government.

For more than three decades, Indonesian politics was relatively quiet or, borrowing the political elite'€™s overused term, '€œconducive'€, thanks to the might of Golkar, the majority faction in the House. The stability of the legislative body was further kept intact due to constant support from the armed forces faction.

But Soeharto wanted more, as he coined the term '€œround democracy'€, which referred to unanimous decisions, compared to '€œoval democracy'€, in strategic issues like the selection of the vice president.

It was democracy sans opposition that allowed the government to win the House'€™s approval of any policy, unhindered. On the other hand, it was the absence of the checks-and-balances mechanism that left corruption rife, particularly in the executive branch of power.

For better or worse, such an effective government fit the presidential system as mandated by the Constitution. A series of constitutional amendments that followed the fall of Soeharto in 1998 swung the pendulum of power from the executive to the legislative branch.

While political reforms put an end to authoritarianism by preventing the president from accumulating power and empowering the legislative body through a checks-and-balances mechanism, the overhaul itself was perhaps the rotten apple of Indonesian democracy. For over 15 years, Indonesia has been practicing a legislative system of government, reminiscent of the chaotic constitutional democracy back in 1955-1959.

A grand coalition comprising all of the parties that secured House seats was formed in 1999 to help the government of Abdurrahman Wahid work effectively, but it did not guarantee a stable government. The powerful House impeached the president in 2001, allowing then vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri to take over.

Another grand coalition was established in 2004, given the fact that the ruling party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Democratic Party, was inferior in the House. Yudhoyono should thank his former vice president Jusuf Kalla, who was also Golkar chairman, for managing the coalition to fend off the opposition'€™s challenge.

Despite the fact that Yudhoyono'€™s Democratic Party won the 2009 legislative election, and he himself was reelected president and secured support from a coalition that controlled the House, he was stretched to the limit to govern effectively. His weakened coalition failed to stop a House investigation into the suspicious Bank Century bailout, foiled a House probe into tax mafia practices and won the House'€™s approval to raise fuel prices, all in nerve-wracking votes that demonstrated the vulnerability of the government to political ploys.

Nevertheless, the political dynamics that marked the three administrations after the New Order, and particularly the second term of Yudhoyono, are worth learning '€” albeit not because they set a good example but because they show the flaws of our democracy. For decades, the old regime hid the virtue of democracy.

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.