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ost of the 2014 election pollsters were right in three things.

First, in predicting that the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party, would get the largest share of the vote, in that order. Second, the National Awakening Party (PKB) would increase its electoral gain quite considerably. And third, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) were likely to fail, unable to pass the 3.5 percent requirement to secure legislative representation.

However, they were wrong, particularly in weighing the actual strength of Muslim-based parties, again with the exception of the PKB. The election surveys suggested that they were doomed to perform poorly. Some even predicted that the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), United Development Party (PPP) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) would lose at least one third of the support they marshaled in the 2009 elections, collecting at best 5 percent each.

These were not baseless statistical figures. Apart from the fact that Muslim-based parties had not functioned decently in aggregating and articulating public interest, they were also plagued by corruption, the inability to connect to constituents and a lack of leadership, among others. With the exception of Gerindra, virtually all parties had become subject to persecution and trial by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

Yet, voters did not punish the Muslim-based parties. Quick counts have indicated that the PKB will have more than 9 percent, the PKS is likely to gain almost 7 percent, PAN, surprisingly, looks likely to collect more than 7 percent and the PPP would gain more than 6 percent. Put together, these four parties enjoy support close to or a little bit over 30 percent.

If these numbers stand in the official, final counts, they reflect a much better electoral strength of Islamic/Muslim-based parties compared to what they had in 2009, only slightly above 24 percent.

But why did the Muslim-based parties perform relatively better? And what would they do with this 30 percent? As predicted, the elections did not produce a single party with enough votes to nominate its presidential candidate '€” no single party would occupy 20 percent of seats in the legislature, or gain 25 percent of the popular vote. Even the PDI-P fell short.

Middle-sized parties have, thus, gained considerable leverage to form a coalition or join the bigger parties to meet the requirements to nominate a presidential/vice presidential candidate. The strategic choice for Muslim-based parties is to create a joint force of their own.

The first reason is that when Muslim-based parties were formed, they were not intended to be an auxiliary to other parties. All their founders and leaders struggled to seize every single moment of history to be in power. Since 1945, despite power sharing, none of them occupied the helm of national leadership. And when opportunity presented itself in 1999, their leaders such as Hamzah Haz, Amien Rais, Abdurrahman '€œGus Dur'€ Wahid and Akbar Tandjung formed the so-called '€œmiddle axis.'€ This maneuvering successfully put Gus Dur, Amien and Akbar in the highest positions of the executive and legislative bodies.

Second, some of their leaders had left a valuable lesson that working individually would not take them far enough to be where they wanted. When both Hamzah and Amien ran for president in the 2004 elections, and Hasyim Muzadi and Sholahudin Wahid chose to become the running mates of PDI-P chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri and former military commander Wiranto, these Islamic political leaders failed. Their decision to be in different camps had dispersed votes.

A coalition of Muslim-based parties would make a consolidation of Islamic voters less difficult to realize '€” assuming that Islamic social organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and many others, would also join the bandwagon.

Third, even if a coalition of Muslim-based parties fail to place their candidate as president, individually or collectively they can always work together with the winning party afterward. Indonesian politics does not seem to adhere to a zero-sum-game. A coalition does not have to be created right from the beginning. Learning from experiences, a coalition can be developed before or after the legislative or the presidential election. Ministerial or Cabinet concessions can still be made even after a government has been formed. All things considered, why bother surrendering destiny, giving up hope and opportunity at the earliest possible time?

Finally, perhaps the most important factor to consider is the issue of responsibility. All Muslim-based parties need to start taking into account the voters'€™ wishes. They did not cast their vote simply to have these parties'€™ represented in legislative bodies or in government. They also want to see those parties work hard to have a president from the Islamic groups. What would be the Islamic politicians'€™ answer '€” knowing they only transformed Muslim-based parties into an auxiliary of others?

History has taught us that coalitions of Muslim-based parties are prone to conflict and disunity. It is also difficult for them to find a unifying, acceptable figure to all. These realities should be perceived as challenges to the fact that a coalition among them is possible. Who would become president among them is something that can be also searched beyond parties.

The most important thing is that the leaders of Muslim-based parties decide who will be Indonesia'€™s leaders. This is why a coalition of Muslim-based parties needs to involve greater parties; the country'€™s Islamic organizations.