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em>Apart from a military tribunal for police personnel over the fatal shooting of students on May 12, 1998, those responsible for arson, rape and deaths during the May 1998 riots have never been held accountable.

Only a handful of the recommendations from the government-appointed joint fact-finding team have been followed, such as the 2011 Intelligence Law and the establishment of the Witness and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK). Former member of the joint fact-finding team and former national police chief Gen. (ret) Da'€™i Bachtiar spoke recently with The Jakarta Post'€™s Dicky Christanto ahead of the 16th commemoration of the riots. Below are excerpts of the interview.

Question: How would you describe the joint fact-finding team'€™s work?

Answer: The government-initiated team comprised government and human rights representatives to ensure objectivity. We provided our activist colleagues with access so they would understand the situation. We interviewed dozens of witnesses, gathered evidence and wrote a comprehensive report [submitted to the government in October 1998].

What about the results?

We were able to compile a comprehensive analysis from facts, testimonies and other evidence. Some findings were followed up with investigations, like the shootings of four Trisakti University students: Elang Mulya Lesmana, Hafidin Royan, Hendriawan Sie and Heri Hartanto. Nine police personnel were deemed responsible for the shootings and were put on trial [in 2001].

However, some of the recommendations were ignored. The recommendation to form a military tribunal for those deemed responsible for the abductions [mostly of activists in 1997-1998] and the allegations that they had triggered the riots was never fulfilled.

What were the challenges the team faced?

It was difficult to find those that had engineered the looting, riots and fires, which gutted several shopping malls and burned people alive. In times of great chaos like May 1998, the police would have been focused on trying to localize the rioting, to stop it from spreading to other regions.

We also faced difficulties when seeking evidence of the gang raping of women of Chinese descent [...] We acknowledged the sensitivity and complexity of the situation, therefore, we insisted on writing up the [reports] even though we failed to gather evidence. [Based on interviews with victims, counselors and physicians, the Volunteers'€™ Team in the TGFP reported 1,217 deaths in Jakarta alone, with 152 women raped. Among the dead, 26 died from injuries relating to rape and torture and 9 of those raped died in fires.]

How do you see how the government has handled this issue?

We have barely moved. A group of victims'€™ families stand across from the State Palace every Thursday [with other survivors and families affected by various human rights abuse cases], demanding the government pay serious attention to this issue, but to no avail.

Why was there no direct follow up from the team'€™s recommendations?

We faced so many problems. As National Police detective chief [at the time], for example, we were able to follow up on legal violations implicating civilians. But to identify the masterminds behind the riots, believed to be military members, we should have formed another joint team but we just couldn'€™t afford the time and energy back then.

Why has there been no military tribunal, as recommended by the team?

That remains a mystery. I don'€™t know why the Indonesian Military [TNI] decided against a military tribunal, we missed the opportunity to set the record straight.

[A military tribunal was only held for a group of Army Special Forces (Kopassus) soldiers, held responsible for the abduction of nine activists. Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo Subianto, then Kopassus chief, was dismissed from military service but never put on trial].

Does this unfinished business affect Indonesia in the international community?

During my tenure as ambassador for Malaysia [installed in 2008], I was often questioned by fellow diplomats about why the Indonesian Military never enacted a military court.

Where should we go from here?

The National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) should break down our list of recommendations. The commission should identify the achievements and challenges and, of course, what is needed for the task to be completed. It would then be the government'€™s duty to determine what to do. If, for example, the government decided to go with reconciliation, meaning it wanted to close the door on any attempt to seek pro-justice settlements, then it should deliberate the idea with the legislature.

Or, if the government decided to continue with [prosecution], as expected by the families of the victims, who are organizing another team to seek evidence and bring those implicated in the tragedy to justice, then we must prepare ourselves as it will be a long journey. The whole process should be transparent.

What are the challenges right now for us?

Bringing up this case right now [...] could be easily misunderstood as a political move, brought about to bring down political competitors during the presidential race.

What do you suggest the government should do?

Conducting a pro-justice settlement is not a good idea since we lack evidence. A white paper about the May 1998 tragedy is the most achievable target. The white paper would unveil the whole fact-finding process and put the event in context. We would also include why some of the recommendations were left unanswered. The captive target would be the younger generations [who] should be made aware about what happened with their country at that time. We should [avoid making] the same mistakes.

This should be the work of this government and the next. It is obliged to seek clarification on what happened during one of this country'€™s gloomiest episodes.

Since you have joined the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), have you talked about this case with them?

I have never spoken about this case with any PDI-P officials. But I hope they will push this case settlement in the right direction if the PDI-P wins the presidency.