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How many Germanies should Europe have?
The collapse of the Soviet Union â which started in Berlin on Nov
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The collapse of the Soviet Union ' which started in Berlin on Nov. 9, 1989 ' marked a loss of the historical empire for Russia, but also a loss of geopolitical importance of nonaligned, worldwide-respected Yugoslavia, which shortly after burned itself in a series of brutal genocidal, civil war-like ethnic cleansings.
The idea of different nations living together and communicating in different languages in a co-federal structure was (though imperfect) a reality in Yugoslavia, but also a declared dream of Maastricht Europe.
In fact, the federalism of Yugoslavia was one of the most original, advanced and sophisticated models worldwide.
Moreover, this country was the only truly emancipated and independent political entity of Eastern Europe and one of the very few in the entirety of the old continent.
Yugoslavia was by many facets a unique European country: no history of aggression towards its neighbors and a high toleration of otherness both at home and abroad.
Yugoslav peoples were one of the rare Europeans who resolutely stood up against fascism, fighting it in full-scale combat and losing 12 percent of its population in the four-year war ' a heavy burden shouldered by the tiny nation to restore an irresponsible Europe to balance.
Apart from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was the single European country that solely liberated itself from Nazism and fascism.
Yugoslavs also firmly opposed Stalinism right after World War II. The Bismarck of southern Slavs, Tito, introduced the so-called active peaceful coexistence after the 1955 Bandung south-south conference and assembled the non-aligned movement (NAM) at the Belgrade conference of 1961.
Steadily for decades, the NAM and Yugoslavia have been directly tranquilizing the mega-confrontation of two superpowers and satellites grouped around them (and balancing their irresponsible calamities all over the globe).
Despite the post-Cold War, often prepaid, rhetoric that Eastern Europe rebelled against Soviet domination in order to associate itself with the West, the reality was very different. Nagy's Hungary of 1956, Dubcek's Czechoslovakia of 1968 and pre-Jeruzelski Poland of 1981 dreamt and fought to join a liberal Yugoslavia and its worldwide recognized third way.
It responded to the Soviet collapse in the best fashion of a classic, historical nation-state, with the cold calculi of geopolitical consideration deprived of any ideological constrains. It easily abandoned altruism of its own idea by withdrawing its support to the reformist government of Yugoslavia and basically sealed off its fate.
Intentionally or not, indecisive and contradictory political messages of Maastricht era EU'from the Genscher/Mock explicit encouragement of separatism and then back to the full reconfirmation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia'were bringing this multinational Slavic state into a schizophrenic situation.
Consequently, these mixed or buried European political voices, as most observers would agree, directly fed and accelerated inner confrontations of the (elites claiming to represent) Yugoslav peoples.
Soon after, the Atlantic-Central Europe axis contained the western Balkans, letting the slaughterhouse last, essentially unchecked, for years. At the same time, it busily mobilized all resources needed to extend its own strategic depth eastwards.
As said, the latest loss of Russophone Europe in its geopolitical and ideological confrontation with the West meant colossal changes in Eastern Europe. One may look at the geopolitical surroundings of the (at the time) largest eastern European state, Poland, as an illustration of how dramatic it was. All three land neighbors of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, had disappeared overnight.
Further on, if we wish to compare the number of dissolved states worldwide over the last 50 years, the old continent suffered as many as all other continents combined: American continents'none, Asia'one (Indonesia/Timor Leste), Africa'two (Sudan/South Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea), and Europe'three.
Our last 25 years concluded that self-fragmented, deindustrialized, rapidly-aged, rarified and depopulated (and de-Slavicized) Eastern Europe is probably the least influential region of the world'one of the very few underachievers.
Obediently submissive and therefore rigid in the dynamic environment of the promising 21st century, Eastern Europeans are among the last remaining passive downloaders and slow receivers on the otherwise blossoming stage of the world's creativity, politics and economy. It seems as though Europe still despises its own victims.
Interestingly, the physical conquest of the European east, usually referred to as the EU eastern enlargement, was deceivingly presented more as a high virtue than what that really was'a cold realpolitik instrument.
Clearly, it was primarily the US-led NATO extension and only then the EU (stalking) enterprise.
Simply put, not a single eastern European country entered the EU before joining the NATO first. It was well understood on both sides of the Atlantic that the contracting power of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin Russia in the post-Cold War period remained confused, disoriented, reactive and defensive.
Therefore, the North Atlantic Military Alliance kept expanding despite explicit assurances given to the Kremlin by the George HW Bush administration.
A century after the outbreak of WWI and 25 years after the Berlin wall fell, young generations of Europeans are being taught in schools about a singularity of an entity called the EU. However, as soon as serious external or inner security challenges emerge, the compounding parts of the true, historic Europe are resurfacing again.
Formerly in Iraq (with the exception of France) and now with Libya, Mali, Syria and Ukraine, Central
Europe is hesitant to act, Atlantic Europe is eager, Scandinavian Europe is absent and while Eastern Europe is obediently joining the bandwagon, Russophone Europe is opposing.
The 1986 Reagan-led Anglo-American bombing of Libya was a one-time, headhunting punitive action. This time, both Libya and Syria (with Iraq, Mali and Ukraine as well) have been given a different attachment. The factors are multiple and interpolated.
Let us start with a considerable presence of China in Africa. Then, there are successful pipeline deals between Russia and Germany, which, while circumventing Eastern Europe, will deprive the East from any transit-related bargaining premium and will tacitly pose an effective joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states: Poland and Ukraine.
Finally, there is a relative decline of US interests and capabilities and a related recalibration of their European commitments.
All of that combined, must have triggered alarm bells across, primarily Atlantic, Europe.
This is to understand that although seemingly unified, Europe is essentially composed of several segments, each of them with its own dynamics, legacies and its own political culture (considerations, priorities and anxieties). Atlantic and Central Europe are confident and secure on the one end, while (the EU and non-EU) Eastern Europe as well as Russia on the other end, are insecure and neuralgic, therefore, in a permanent quest for additional security guaranties.
'America did not change on Sept. 11. It only became more itself', Robert Kagan famously claimed. Paraphrasing it, we may say: from 9/11 (Nov. 9, 1989 in Berlin) and shortly after, followed by the genocidal wars all over Yugoslavia, up to the Eurozone drama, MENA or ongoing Ukrainian crisis, Europe didn't change. It only became more itself ' a conglomerate of five different Europes.
Therefore, 9/11 this year will be just another said reminder: How have the winners repeatedly missed to take mankind into a completely different direction: toward the non-confrontational, decarbonized, de-monetized/de-financialized and de-psychologized, the self-realizing and greener humankind.
Where is the better life that all of us have craved and hoped for, that we all deserve?
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The writer is professor in international law and global political studies, based in Vienna, Austria. His recent book Geopolitics of Technology ' Is There Life after Facebook? is published by the New York's Addleton Academic Publishers.
