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A maritime center of gravity
Throughout history, there has always been a close correlation between a nationsâ economy and warfare
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hroughout history, there has always been a close correlation between a nations' economy and warfare. In the agrarian era, in which land cultivation was the predominant economic activity, warfare behaved correspondingly. The victors were awarded with land, while their enemy's agriculture became the main target of destruction.
Like farmer groupings, the combat units were irregular in numbers, skills and leadership. The tools also mirrored the weapons, which were not standardized. Moreover, the battles were fought person to person, just like in farm work.
In the industrial era, an economy was built on the basis of mass production. Factories ran assembly lines that standardized the products. Likewise, wars in this era were waged in the same sense.
Mass destruction and the complete annihilation of enemies were the main ideas. Soldiers and officers were 'created and standardized' through military schools, as if in the factories of the industrial era. Hence, Alvin and Heidi Toffler assert that 'The way we make war reflects the way we make wealth [...].'
In the military it has a particular terminology. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined it as the 'center of gravity' (CoG) ' the focal point at which all efforts must be directed to turn the balance of war.
When struck, the effect will be paralyzing to the enemy, hence a quick decisive win is achieved. Along with the Tofflers' assertion, therefore, the domain of a nation in creating its wealth will also become its military CoG.
When President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo assumed the presidency on Oct. 20, 2014, his vision of the center was a maritime-based development for Indonesia, popularly known as 'Indonesia as the world's maritime axis'. He asserted several ideas, such as securing maritime resources and empowering foreign politics that reflect national identity as a maritime nation. He even detailed the national goal of becoming a self-sufficient, modern and strong maritime nation.
The vision is so practical since Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world. Therefore, it is also not a new idea that Indonesia has to empower what it has the most ' the seas and the islands. On the other hand, Indonesia needs to consider that it cannot lose any component of its maritime domain.
This is because Indonesia relies greatly on its maritime zones, not only for the resources they contain, but also for the secure and safe lanes enclosed within, in order to stay intact as an economy and a polity. For example, Indonesian oil and gas production accounts for more than 10 percent of the national income and that comes mostly from offshore extraction.
The number gets bigger when tens of billions of US dollars coming from the fisheries is included. Furthermore, sea-dependence becomes greater as the seaborne trades and seaborne communications still dominate other methods in the world, including in Indonesia.
As the highest commander-in-chief, President Jokowi's statement has an imperative impact on the Indonesian Military (TNI) ' they need to make the maritimes their CoG.
Indeed, the previous government had also identified such a maritime dependency. Some programs were in place and some efforts had been undertaken.
Nevertheless, what Jokowi said is the reiteration of the long-forgotten goal of Indonesian defense in more plain words. Thus, what had already been put in place regarding maritime defense policy should be revised, expanded and intensified. This also means the revitalization of Indonesia's maritime zones in the military CoG.
Treating the maritimes as the military CoG requires it become the focus of the utmost force. This is not as easy as it looks because Indonesia's defense was mainly built to be land-centric. Moreover, as the land force grew to become the main defense and political instrument in Indonesia, it became the most feasibly acquired force for Indonesia's developing economy.
Therefore, it is complex work shifting the focus to another aim, yet it is not impossible. Focusing all forces on a certain domain, such as the maritime domain, is based on the interoperability between services. This is not a new concept for the Indonesian military. Nonetheless, it is limited to a battle at an operational and a tactical level and not of war at a strategic level.
Furthermore, it is always shaded by the service's innate egocentricity, especially in time of crisis. At higher levels, there is still an empty space regarding the general concept of Indonesia's national defense versus its maritimes as the CoG.
The effect-based approach required at the strategic level often blurs with the platform-based approaches that are used at lower levels. Mostly, top-level micromanagement comes into play.
The most common case is that each service races to procure weapon systems that can operate in the maritime theater. For instance, the Army requests a long-range missile system that can attack a ship at sea. The Air Force acquires amphibious aircraft. The Navy is most likely to add some more battleships.
Yet, such will not save the day. They can operate in the same domain, but not necessarily for the same goal. This can lead to a major failure in war strategy.
Another pitfall is the extractive defense model. Although the maritimes is declared as the CoG, it is not identical with the Navy. Analogous to the extractive economy model, which has a very narrow orientation, the resources are easily exhausted and are isolated from the contributions of other resources.
In the extractive defense model, if the Navy becomes the single orientation, the defense structure becomes exhausted. There are some blank spaces left by the absence of the other two services' inherent capabilities.
In fact, Indonesia had once experienced such when the Army became the sole-oriented defense structure. The key is the strategic interoperability between services. One practical example is to have a joint procurement body that is directly under supervision of the TNI chief. The body would consist of expert representatives from all three services.
Through the body, any weapon system procurement could be analyzed and assessed in terms of not only its service's characteristic capability, but also its interoperability in the shared environment.
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The writer has a master's degree in maritime policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a postgraduate diploma in strategic studies from Massey University, New Zealand.
