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n the classic Il Principe (The Prince), Machiavelli describes that they who arrive at the princedom with the aid of others and by good fortune will have much trouble maintaining their position, as opposed to the prince who acquires the power by his own arms and by merit. Aid is a political liability and therefore the prince is forced to pay back support, or to apply his power in favor of the aid provider.

Matters will be much more difficult for the prince when aid comes from different, and even conflicting, groups and interests.

If the prince resists the debt, he has to develop his own arms and political machine when in power '€” in turn causing more resistance from earlier supporters.

For a prince of good fortune, when seizing power, he might not have enough skill and capability to run complex affairs and therefore he has to prove to be a quick learner and/or to assemble around him intellectuals and technocrats with strong capability and knowledge.

This group of intellectuals and technocrats is unfortunately not always from the same boat, and even this group may have sharp contrasts of interest and vision compared to the political patrons of the prince.

The contrast could end with conflicting power relations between the office of the prince and the camp of his political creditor.

We are all aware that President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo acquired political princedom in an unusual form of Indonesian president-making.

He didn'€™t have political arms, as he is not a patron and does not control a political party.

He was not part of Jakarta'€™s political circle and dynasty '€” just a new kid on the block.

But he was a figure starting his political career from the local level, who became popular due to his way of effective government by managing some very basic public needs in his non-elitist style.

But in spite of his populist muscle, he preferred to place himself under a cloth of established political power rather than proving political capacity by organizing his own political arms, as many populist leaders have done.

In this sense, Jokowi is a pragmatic politician.

At the same time, he enjoyed unprecedented political voluntarism from various segments of society. The political voluntarism is the source of his moral debt to the public. A dilemma is surrounding Jokowi who, in Machiavellian logic, acquired princedom with the aid of others and by good fortune.

He runs his authority under political debt to his patron and parties, while he has to prove that the public reasons for voluntarism are earnestly converted into a moral ground for his political decisions. Unfortunately, his political debt, the conditions of supporting parties and the moral debt to the public, are colliding.

The saga of the sole candidacy of Comr. Gen. Budi Gunawan for National Police chief, even after he was declared a graft suspect, is a crystal-clear reflection of this collision between cruel patron interest and pure public reason.

Previously, collisions between the interests of the parties and public morality also showed during his appointment of ministers, wherein Jokowi could veer between the parties'€™ recommendations, the involvement of the national anti-graft body and public opinion.

The selection method was eventually appreciated by diverse political segments as it reflected Jokowi'€™s commitment to public morality, in spite of disappointment from party elites who expected more Cabinet positions.

The case of officer Budi Gunawan shows how the parties'€™ (or patrons'€™) agenda is being imposed on the prince they brought to power, but Jokowi'€™s decision to postpone the inauguration only happened after the public forced him to consider his moral debt.

Jokowi'€™s flip-flop decision to appoint and then to postpone Budi'€™s appointment may be politically smart, but it also clearly reveals difficulties in defending his authority as President to political parties, patrons and the public when making strategic political decisions. One thing that is unclear, however, is which political morality has been chosen by Jokowi.

For the prince who came to power with aid from diverse political segments and also with the skills and capability to manage dilemmas prompted by conflicting visions and interests, it is necessary to struggle to stay in power.

And in doing so, the prince may be pragmatic and inconsistent in his political beliefs and morality.

But a great leader is not often known for his skills in managing dilemmas, as he is usually prone to political pragmatism. A great leader is the prince who holds on to tight political beliefs and public morality, though the cost is sometimes bitter to others, including the patron.

Let us be witness to which way Jokowi chooses to forge forward.