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ixteen years ago, civil society groups struggled and succeeded in separating the police from the military command and structure, so that the role of internal security would be police responsibility. The military was to be set up as a professional army to focus on external threats. The distinction between domestic security and external defense became much clearer than under the past regime. For the first time, the National Police (Polri) moved out of the shadow of the Indonesian Military (TNI).

International donor agencies also supported the police, ranging from capacity-building to revision of internal regulations. There were many common interests with Indonesians '€” war against terrorism, combating transnational crimes to human rights protection.

Combined with counterterrorism efforts, especially following the 2002 Bali bombings, the US State Department identified Indonesia as a front line in the global war on terror. Funds under the Anti-Terror Assistance Program helped to establish Densus 88, the police'€™s counterterrorism unit. The budget included start-up costs of US$130 million in the second half of 2003, which increased to more than $40 million in 2006.

In February 2004, bilateral and international support for the police led to the establishment of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation within the police academy in Semarang, Central Java. Australia had committed A$36.8 million for five years with support extended until now. Hundreds of officers have been trained by national and international experts.

In 2009 the police, in cooperation with an NGO alliance, incorporated all standard human rights principles into its internal regulations, as seen in its police regulation No. 8/2009 on implementation of human rights in police work.

Then, from 2010 until now, some NGOs worked with the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 to produce a guideline and a curriculum for training new staff to respect human rights and avoid excessive use of force.

And for the period of 2010-2015, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has provided Indonesia with over $27 million, mostly for the police, to combat illicit trafficking, terrorism prevention, anti-drug efforts, etc.

Following strong criticism of the police in handling religious violence and intolerance, recently the police worked with human rights NGOs to train commanders and other personnel, to better understand guidelines in dealing with violations of the right to freedom of religion.

Yet despite so much investment and valuable support to the police, the public has felt little benefits.

We do not expect expressions of gratefulness from the police. We merely need them to act professionally in their commitment '€œto protect and to serve'€.

But what'€™s the difference between today'€™s police and the New Order'€™s military? We succeeded in sending the soldiers to their barracks, but we are left with the police of an unchanged corrupt mindset, terrorizing civil liberties.

Compared to, for example, the Supreme Court and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which have received similar local and global support, the last decade has not seen higher public trust in the police due to widespread torture, mistreatment, malicious prosecution and corruption.

The National Commission on Human Rights stated in 2011 that the police were involved in 40 cases of torture throughout the country that year, up from 30 in 2010.

In Papua, the performance of the police has been even worse. Restrictions to freedom of expression, criminalizing of peaceful demonstrations, torture and other mistreatment have been common.

The recent attitude and arrogance displayed by the police by criminalizing the KPK'€™s leaders and its supporters, many of them who had supported police reform efforts, have increasingly led civil society groups to review their critical engagement with the police.

Among international donors, stronger measures, including ending funding for police reform or a moratorium of support must be considered. Previously, this model of '€œpunishment'€ effectively pushed the TNI into change.

Some analysts have called for stronger external supervision of the police '€” as the National Police Commission lacks authority to punish police misconduct. Several basic questions should include how we define a '€œclean'€ police force and where Polri should be placed in the government and legal structure.

An urgent step includes reviewing the position of the police, which some say depends on specific functions. For example, to maintain public order, the police might be placed under the Defense or Home Ministry so they are in an equal position to the TNI, which often feels '€œjealous'€ toward Polri, which is under the President.

A second step is strengthening checks and balances in the criminal justice system. Focus, for instance, on the poorest performing division within Polri, the Criminal Investigation Division (Bareskrim).

Both the Global Corruption Barometer and Transparency International Survey trumped the police as the nation'€™s most corrupt institution. This negative public perception of police investigators was caused by strong impressions that the police often abuse their discretionary powers.

Today, our laws including the code of criminal procedures indeed give huge powers to the police, specifically Bareskrim, without adequate checks and balances. As a result, approximately 51,000 detainees became victim of unnecessary detention, mostly without legal assistance. These were not individual acts, but systematic ones due to an absence of the habeas corpus mechanism and adequate pretrial examination procedures.

The current wave of fabricated criminal cases shows a weakness of pretrial examination procedures within the police, as well as in the pretrial hearings at the court. Without checks and balances in the criminal justice system, the police easily trade their interest with those of other parties '€” corrupt politicians and private sectors.

Accountability of law enforcement is a public demand. So to create a professional police, we need to speed up revision of the Criminal Law Procedures Code (KUHAP) '€” yet the police have rejected a new draft of the KUHAP.

Although a former Polri chief, Gen. Timur Pradopo, signed a new draft in 2009, the development shows that, overall, the police, despite so much earlier support, do not welcome democracy and the rule of law. Our police have instead become a grave threat to democracy.
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The writer is a human rights lawyer.