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he UN Security Council through Resolution 2178, condemns violent extremism and says member states shall, consistent with international law, prevent the '€œrecruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts'€.

Expressing concern over the establishment of international terrorist networks, the UN underscored the '€œparticular and urgent need'€ to prevent the travel and support for foreign fighters associated with the Islamic State (IS) organization, the Al-Nusra Front (ANL) and other affiliates or splinter groups of al-Qaeda.

Since fighting began in 2012, the Syrian conflict has attracted a stream of Indonesians to Syria where they have joined Islamist groups such as the ANL and IS that are bidding to oust President Bashar al-Assad'€™s regime alongside around 20,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries.

How were Indonesians recruited to fight in that foreign war? What should we do to deal with them?

To explicate those questions, one needs to explore the complex interconnections between three entities. First, there is the emergence of transnational and national networks; second, the global structure; and third, the social, political and economic dynamics of the state forged through social relations that enabled the recruitment of foreign fighters.

Over the last few years, one of the major policy concerns about the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Russia'€™s North Caucus region, Somalia and Syria has been that these states may both attract and breed transnational insurgents, threatening domestic, regional and international security.

Dave Bakke argues that from the perspective of the international community, the worry about transnational insurgents is fourfold.

First, transnational insurgents, non-state actors who voluntarily join rebels in an armed struggle outside their own home country, might prolong a civil war by introducing more actors to the theater and complicating efforts to end the war through intervention or negotiation.

Second, many of today'€™s transnational insurgents are Islamists and these actors are transforming the struggles they are supporting.

Third, if transnational insurgents strengthen rebels or prolong wars, they may help turn a conflict-ridden state into a failed one and thus a training ground for terrorists.

Lastly, they will gain skills and they can utilize them when they return home.

Calling this the '€œveteran effect'€, Thomas Hegghammer posits two processes that may explain why a foreign fighter acquires the motivation for an attack at home even if he left with no such intention. First, enlistment, in which a foreign fighter is drawn into domestic fighting by a calculating second party; and second, socialization, in which a foreign fighter'€™s preferences change through the experience of military life '€“ for example he comes to see theological arguments constraining violence as impractical or naïve and domestic terrorism as legitimate.

To understand the emergence of IS, one also must understand the socio and global dynamic after the US invaded Iraq in 2003. In its early form, IS was just a number of Sunni extremist groups fighting the US forces and attacking Shiite civilians in an attempt to foment a sectarian civil war led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Mary Kaldor simply termed the US 2003 invasion of Iraq an '€œoil war'€. She quoted then US deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who said: '€œThe most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically we just have no choice in Iraq. The country swims in a sea of oil'€.

This ill-planned military intervention helped to create IS and thousands of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria.

Given such complexities, there are practical ideas that I think we can collectively take forward for countering violence extremism (CVE) projects.

First, we must empower disenchanted returned fighters and exploit the '€œfault lines'€ between them. To achieve maximum results, one needs to execute this endeavor through creative methods such as documentary films or social media campaigns.

Second, we must empower the role of mothers.

For my documentary film, I recently interviewed a 16-year-old Indonesian student in Turkey who was all ready to go to Syria. But although he thought fighting in Syria was '€œcool'€, he doubted carrying out jihad without his parents'€™ permission. He feared that God would not bless him if he went to Syria without parental approval, especially that of his mother.

We need to have women-led, university facilitated, CVE programs. This project aims to build confidence, knowledge and skills in women to counter violent extremism in locations where radicalization is occurring.

It recognizes that many women in these areas want to work to prevent radicalization and promote rehabilitation, having been directly impacted by extremism themselves, and that the potential of women to contribute in this field has barely been tapped.
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The writer, who is pursuing a PhD in politics and international relations at Monash University, Melbourne, is producing a documentary film on Indonesian foreign fighters.