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Foreign policy vs Indonesia Inc.: Time to reap diplomatic dividends

In a recent discussion on Indonesia’s foreign policy, I was introduced to the term “diplomatic blind spot”, which entails the idea of neglected strategic issues in diplomacy

Tantowi Yahya (The Jakarta Post)
Jakarta
Mon, July 27, 2015

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Foreign policy vs Indonesia Inc.: Time to reap diplomatic dividends

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n a recent discussion on Indonesia'€™s foreign policy, I was introduced to the term '€œdiplomatic blind spot'€, which entails the idea of neglected strategic issues in diplomacy. The term could also refer to diplomatic achievements on which we have failed to capitalize in the national interest.

I argued that Indonesia had missed multiple chances to take advantage of its '€œpolitical dividends'€.

Our inability to get the most out of our political investment in other countries has been exploited by other nations. Let me give some examples of Indonesia appearing content to relinquish its diplomatic achievements. First is Myanmar'€™s democratic transition. Since 2007, Indonesia'€™s role in democracy-building in Myanmar, either bilaterally or through ASEAN, has been significant.

However, after Myanmar began its democratic transition, Indonesia appeared to forget to follow up its diplomatic success with deeper economic engagement.

Instead we are witnessing a flood of economic activity from China, Malaysia and other countries into Myanmar'€™s potentially lucrative market. Indonesia was supposed to be among the first countries to take economic advantage of Myanmar'€™s potential. We were there to open the gate, yet we did not step in once the path was cleared.

Our diplomatic engagement as a trustworthy friend who consistently supported Myanmar'€™s democratization appears to have been wasted.

Second, Indonesia'€™s role in peacekeeping in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1995, then president Soeharto visited Sarajevo and met his counterpart Alija Izetbegovic.

As chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia'€™s contribution to ending the conflict in Balkan that killed thousands was greatly expected.

Though the visit was nearly cancelled due to a lack of security assurances, Soeharto courageously pressed ahead, given his strong commitment to assisting efforts to end the Balkan conflict.

Hard work in diplomacy contributed to the peace agreement in the former Yugoslavian states. Furthermore, the UN mandated Indonesia to lead the peacekeeping mission there, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, later to become president, appointed chief military observer to the UN protection force in Bosnia. Indonesia became even closer to the Bosnians with the construction of the Istiqlal Mosque in Sarajevo.

The mosque, named after the largest mosque in Jakarta, was funded by Indonesia. But once again, we appeared to be too readily satisfied with the achievement, with no further noticeable effort to engage with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the economy or other sectors.

Third, our outstanding support for Palestinian independence. Indonesia provides without reservation aid for the Palestinian government and people. The Indonesian Hospital in Gaza was inaugurated on June 15, built using donations from the people of Indonesia.

Furthermore, our Foreign Ministry has provided capacity-building training to Palestinian bureaucrats expected to serve as civil servants in their country. Can we really afford to let such support become a '€œfree lunch'€? It certainly depends on how we would like to value and determine our good intentions. But we should be able to utilize each of our diplomatic successes to further our national interest.

Besides the above examples of Indonesia failing to follow up on its diplomatic successes, one diplomatic endeavor of interest has occurred in Senegal, reflecting China'€™s visionary soft power in Africa.

Unimaginable to most of us, in the dusty town of Dakar, Senegal'€™s capital, a majestic opera house stands in sharp contrast to its surroundings. Do the residents really need such a glamorous entertainment facility? It turned out that it was a donation from the Chinese government. Beijing clearly bears in mind the potential possessed by a future stable Senegal and how China could benefit from it.

Beijing has performed cultural infiltration '€” the building will one day host numerous cultural performances from China. True, our economic investment is not as strong as China or South Korea, which have a greater chance of reaping '€œpolitical dividends'€.

But we certainly have our political assets. Our valuable experience of democratic transition and managing bureaucratic transformation could be shared with other countries '€” this is no less significant than economic investment. The above examples show the success of our many diplomats in projecting Indonesia'€™s role to assist our partners in finding solutions to some of their internal, regional and global challenges.

However, lack of coordination between the ministries and other institutions, especially in the economic sector, seems to have resulted in poor follow-up.

Hence the economic benefits of our diplomatic achievements have not been fully exploited, apparently as a result of sectoral ego '€” the '€œvirus'€ across our bureaucracy. In the 1990s, a prescription to treat and cure sectoral ego was offered by the New Order government, with the idea of creating '€œIndonesia Incorporated'€.

Impressed by Japan'€™s successful transformation into an economic giant in Asia and the world, president Soeharto initiated the idea. Witnessing Japan'€™s quick recovery after its defeat in World War II, many Western countries were curious to understand Japan'€™s strategy of revival.

They discovered the '€œsecret'€ was Japan Incorporated, the term introduced by the American scholar Ezra Vogel in his book, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America.

Japanese bureaucrats seemed to behave as parts of one massive company, posing a huge challenge to compete with Japan in the automotive industry, formerly dominated by US industries, and other sectors.

 To quote military thinker Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, the strength of Japan'€™s competitiveness lies in the way they conduct their bureaucracy, which is run in a similar war to a corporation. Meanwhile, in the US, government and business sectors are two different, distinct and separate entities.

The core of Indonesia Incorporated as suggested by Soeharto was a synergy among governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society in managing and realizing integrated economic development.

This concept remains a challenge; subdued during the Reform era, it briefly resurfaced in 2011 under then president Yudhoyono.

It'€™s not too late to reconsider the spirit of '€œincorporated'€ as a possible answer to Indonesia'€™s contemporary global challenges. It has often been demonstrated that an efficient country is quicker in attaining progress and welfare.

Yet unwillingness to walk together as a solid and productive economic unit involving all government agencies, as demonstrated by solitary actions taken by ministries, even by defaming the President, will hamper the ideals of creating a just and welfare society as mandated by our Constitution.
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The writer is deputy chair of House of Representatives Commission I overseeing foreign affairs and lawmaker representing the Golkar Party.

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