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lmost every year each May I am reminded of that day, the most terrifying and infuriating day of my life, usually followed by disappointment over the receding energy for finding justice in the past decade.

The year 2016 is different, not just because a path toward reconciliation has been opened, but also because the obstacles are manifold.

Most troubling is the resurrection of the ghosts of the “triangular threat”. In this case it’s the misconception that unfairly labels three elements — Chinese Indonesians, the Chinese Communist Party and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) — as a combination of dangerous threats to Indonesia.

It was one of the bases for the New Order political legitimacy that, despite the passing of the smiling general, remains undead. It is the fuel for unbridled racism, ultra-nationalism, irrational fears and hatred.

There seem to have been a notable drop in anti-Chinese discourse since 1998. During the earlier stage of the reformasi movement, most politicians wanted to be politically correct, especially around Chinese New Year or the presidential elections.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Indonesian problem (masalah Cina) has not been fully resolved. Past efforts to dismantle discriminatory policies have, of course, been crucial. Deeper reforms with a more comprehensive, inclusive and institutionalized agenda should have followed our first direct presidential elections in 2004.

But they did not. The antidiscrimination agenda continued to be about political correctness. Fundamental agendas, which should have had more to do with fairer and more humane governance of Indonesian pluralism, have not effectively permeated regulatory reform.

Even though ethnic conflicts declined, the increase of religious conflict is indicative of the continued mismanagement of Indonesian pluralism.

Things have also been exacerbated by rampant corruption and the inability of the security apparatus to be firmly (not cruelly) impartial in dealing with crimes induced by identity politics.

A rather obvious uptick of anti-Chinese discourse was seen during the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial campaign of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo paired with Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, today’s incumbent. The trend is up again as Ahok, Jakarta’s first Chinese-Indonesian governor, prepares to run for the capital’s 2017 election.

Several figures, including politician Yusron I. Mahendra, have even used “Beware another May 1998 anti-Chinese riot” as a scare-tool to target Ahok’s notorious “loud mouth”. Apparently, there is no need to be politically correct any longer, or to be civil and compassionate for that matter.

The famed Chinese-Indonesian figure Jaya Suprana has also expressed fears of Ahok triggering another “May 1998”.

The recent racist discourse is unfortunately matched by an equally fervent cult of personality. These flawed forces have reinforced each other and undermined rational criticism of controversial policies by herding and reducing the debates to identity politics surrounding Ahok.

Once you make it about this Cina, as in Chinese-Indonesian, it would almost immediately also be about that Cina, as in that communist country up north.

Recently the Islamic organization Hizbut Tahrir said it was hosting a seminar on Jakarta’s reclamation, titled “Reclamation for China?” It’s not clear whether the seminar will be about the racial, state, or ideological factors. It also does not seem to matter whether China’s government is really involved in the reclamation.

Numerous observers have tied the improvement of Chinese-Indonesians’ political participation to the rise of China.
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The recent racist discourse is unfortunately matched by an equally fervent cult of personality.

It would be absurd to say there is absolutely no connection between Chinese-Indonesians and China, but it is also fallacious to assume that the rise of China is the main impetus of Chinese-Indonesians’ political rise.

First, rapid growth in trade involves the entire Indonesian market, not just the Chinese-Indonesian community. Serious studies on ethnicity as a determining factor in business engagements with China have yet to be conclusive.

Investments have not been significant. Compared to Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia’s investment in China is meager and China has not become our top investor.

From various business exhibitions or policy dialogues, Chinese investors have admitted that sharing an ethnic identity does not mean automatic success.

Second, the New Order regime’s three decades of discriminatory policies and diplomatic freeze have effectively detached Chinese-Indonesians from political discourse with the mainland.

Past restrictions against Chinese schools, associations, printed materials and related socio-cultural activities have also substantially reduced Chinese-Indonesians’ capacity (and the rest of the people’s) to sustain reciprocal communications with China.

This has consequently also increased levels of distrust. Indonesia has actually been left behind by the multilingual Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in reaping mutual benefits from China’s meteoric rise.

A recent irrational fear of “the rise of communism” is ironic. Communism in China has been losing its appeal since the Open Door Policy.

Domestic debates for new national ideology in China circle around the revival of Confucianism or legalist views or others.

This year’s 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution went on timidly and a state media outlet, the Global Times, even asserted that, “There is no place for it in today’s China.”

The New Order may have succeeded in institutionalizing this “triangle threat”, but we are a different nation now than we were in 1998.

Racism, Sino-phobia and anticommunism are hurting the reform process that we started 18 years ago. We must work together to find more humane ways to bridge all these different views and ideals, to graciously uncover the truth so justice — not cold prejudice, nor cruel judgment — can be upheld, so the reconciliation process that can heal our nation can truly begin.
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The author is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, and a postgraduate student at Peking University, Beijing.