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fter more than two years of deliberation, the verdict is finally out: “The Tribunal considers the Philippines’ request for a declaration that, going forward, China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines and comply with its duties under the Convention.”

For the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration, the root of the dispute is “in fundamentally different understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters of the South China Sea”. As such, the court, under Article 11 of Annex VII, provides that the “award […] shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute”.

Immediately after the ruling, the Chinese Foreign Ministry “solemnly declare[d] that the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it,” saying it denied “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea”.

The Philippines’ initiation of arbitration “violates the bilateral agreement reached between China and the Philippines, and repeatedly reaffirmed over the years, to resolve relevant disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations”, it added. It also “violates the commitment made by China and ASEAN member states, including the Philippines, in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to resolve the relevant disputes through negotiations by states directly concerned”.

The statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry indicates that there will be no change in the current status of the dispute in the South China Sea. This brings us directly to the Indonesian position on the sea and the game China is most probably playing: “the power of maps”, a reference to Rene Pattiradjawane’s analysis of detailed maps of alleged Chinese fishing grounds up to and around the Natuna Islands (Kompas, June 16).

The various maps indicating Chinese fishing grounds deep inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and territorial waters, which were found on Chinese fishing vessels, create additional problems for Indonesia in the waters around Natuna.

The discovery of those maps indicates that China is no longer unsure of its position toward Indonesia. As a consequence, Natuna could, in the process of Chinese assertiveness, and if Indonesia is not abundantly self-confident, be considered a part of the Nansha Islands.

The confrontations in the Natuna area, the recent unannounced Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s naval fleet key maneuvers through Indonesian territorial waters and the explicit Chinese renunciation of the court’s ruling on the sea should all prompt Indonesia to take a firm stance on the issue and take the initiative in consolidating ASEAN to emphasize the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation — which China has signed — as the instrument of managing the recurring disputes in the South China Sea.

This means redefining a code of conduct for the South China Sea. This should be initiated before China takes the initiative by emphasizing its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea among ASEAN members and as such dominate ASEAN.

Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi must formulate Indonesia’s position in tandem with Indonesia’s primary emphasis on political economic foreign policy, acknowledging China as Indonesia’s main engine for economic growth, in particular the financing of Indonesia’s infrastructure needs.

National sovereignty should not be compromised by economic prerequisites.
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