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ontemporary geopolitical developments have been shaped primarily by two powerful forces. First, the rise of economically successful, illiberal democratic Russia and soft-authoritarian China, with their muscle-flexing in Eastern Europe and the Middle East as well as the South China Sea, has challenged prevailing global narratives on the primacy of liberal democratic ideals.

In offering global values that compete directly with the liberal democratic world order, China even poses actively as a champion of “Asian values” on the premises of state responsibility, social stability, trade and growth. As the world’s economic center of gravity shifts to the East, these values could replace United States-driven Western values, economist Danny Quah maintains.

Distrust in the West is also increasing toward globalization and regional integration. A 2016 survey by The Economist and YouGov demonstrates that less than half of respondents in America, Britain and France believe globalization as a “force for good” and generally abhor immigration. Donald Trump’s victory in the US, Brexit and the unprecedented popularity of neo-nationalist parties across Europe further suggest how many in the West are turning their back on globalism.

Another yet potent geopolitical game changer in the 21st century is the advent of a “network society,” as Manuel Castells argues, in which global financial and multimedia networks become ever more interlinked with major networks of politics, cultural production, defense and security, even global crime. These networks hold extraordinary power in shaping state capacity, as they cooperate and compete with each other to set rules and norms that accommodate their interests and values.

Multimedia and political networks were attributed to being the primary facilitator of the Arab Spring that left much of the Middle East and North Africa in political turmoil. Moreover, researchers, including Andrew Foxall, cite how these networks have aided “soft power” offensives for newly emerging powers such as Russia, whose state-backed media channels successfully penetrate Western audiences and challenge Western-dominated information outlets.

What implications do all these developments hold for Indonesia? Located in the Asia-Pacific, Indonesia was dubbed das totenkreuz (the death cross) as early as the 1940s to symbolize the ever-present dangers — and opportunities — in an area where numerous geopolitical interests meet and clash, as AR Soehoed once argued. Indonesia cannot thus stand idle while global powers and interests maneuver around us.

One strategic imperative for Indonesia is to strengthen resilience by institutionalizing geopolitical awareness among its policymakers and the public. Mastery of geopolitical knowledge and history is crucial for understanding and setting the broader political narratives of postmodern conflicts, as a recent work by Gao Hongwei and Tao Chun suggests.

A recent important initiative was the “scenario planning” that the National Resilience Institute carried out in 2016 to anticipate future global and domestic strategic trends facing the country. Among the first to be developed by an Indonesian state agency, the scenario planning resulted in four scenarios that reflected the four driving forces of socio-politics, culture, economy and geopolitics, and the environment that will shape Indonesia’s future.

These scenarios provide invaluable resources for long-term policymaking in Indonesia and to instill a sense of geopolitical vigilance among policymakers and the public. Such best practices need to be institutionalized in Indonesia’s governance, according to Peter Ho, in the way Singapore has successfully instituted scenario planning to anticipate future trends and complexities.

Second, Indonesia needs to go beyond its traditional exercise of power at international platforms. As Joseph Nye famously reminded us, we need to exploit more of our “soft power.” The key role Indonesia took in establishing and leading joint initiatives on sustainable management of Pacific marine resources under the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security is one good example. The Initiative provides a platform for Indonesia to influence and shape the attitudes of member states whose diplomatic interests sometimes contrast Indonesia’s, such as that of the Solomon Islands regarding the issue of Papua.

Beyond campaigning on democracy, moderate Islam and activism at multilateral forums, we need more promotion of our food, films and other cultural products. Despite many private efforts, what is still lacking is innovative and concerted efforts among state agencies and private actors to effectively use these instruments to project our influence. Harnessing Indonesia’s soft power potential should thus be the next national priority.

Third, we need systematic efforts to boost Indonesia’s relevancy among global networks of knowledge, capital and cultural production, with our diaspora as catalyst. Let’s learn from India on how that nation engages its diaspora through a high-level committee that specifically deals with their worldwide diaspora communities, or from China’s formal and informal strategies to engage its 50-odd million diaspora, which is said to have helped facilitate the country’s meteoric rise.

With an appropriate engagement strategy, Indonesia’s diaspora could play active roles beyond, as they lament, “merely being expected to send money home.” As members of our diaspora have argued in recent diaspora conferences, they could better connect Indonesia with opportunities in science, industry, business and culture.

Apart from the Foreign Ministry, engaging our estimated diaspora of 8 million nationals and foreign nationals requires domestic synergic efforts with private players and other public agencies to translate opportunities into concrete policies.
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Fakhridho SBP Susilo is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. Kris Wijoyo Soepandji is a junior lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, obtaining his master in public policy from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Kris’ most recent book is The Theory of The State: Contemporary Geopolitical Perspectives. Both were involved in the “Indonesia 2045” scenario planning hosted by the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas).