The debate over Islamic sharia in Indonesia seems to be tracing a path with no end, as Constitutional Court chief Mohammad Mahfud MD recently took up the issue once again.

In a speech before military officials at Sultan Hotel, Jakarta, Mahfud stated that sharia-based bylaws were unconstitutional in nature. He said Sharia-based bylaws could threaten national integration, and would inspire other groups to form from their own religious teachings.

Regardless of his position as a judge who supposedly should restrain himself from announcing opinions outside the court, the issue he raised is nonetheless interesting.

Historically, sharia became a sensitive issue when the blueprint for a country named Indonesia had only just been discussed. During the 1930s, long before our independence, the nationalist Sukarno and National-Islamist Moh. Natsir hotly debated the relationship between Islam and politics.

These debates were then undertaken by more plural actors within BPUPKI and PPKI sessions in 1945. The topic then was more specific: Philosophical ground of the state (staatgrondslag).

The Islamist group almost triumphed by inserting the words "syariat Islam" (Islamic sharia) into the preamble of the Constitution, until Mohammad Hatta delivered a message on the threat of national disintegration from the non-Muslim majority in eastern Indonesia.

The Islamists were then forced to acquiesce "syariat Islam" as well as the other five words which were then erased from the preamble.

For the Islamists, the case was unequivocally harsh. Nevertheless, history recalls that the threat of disintegration came from -- among others -- the Islamist faction.

The Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) separatist movements erupted less than five years after the 1945 proclamation of independence. These movements spread throughout pivotal regions of the archipelago; West Java, Central Java, East Sumatra and South Sulawesi.

Though some historical evidence shows these movements were merely expressions of dissatisfaction with the military rationalization policy Hatta's administration embraced, it was obvious that Islam had officially become their ideological struggle. They even issued their own constitution in which Islamic sharia was the foundation.

Yet, rebellion was not the only effort to establish sharia in Indonesia. The struggle was also undertaken constitutionally by Islamic political parties such as Masyumi, NU, PSII and Perti.

The Konstituante sessions became a field where they cogently attempted to adopt a constitution based on sharia. Once again the nationalists succeeded to stem the efforts.

I have two points. First, any attempt to pronounce ideas through a constitutional and democratic mechanism is to be respected.

History has confirmed that the best way to counter radical solutions as made by, say, DI/TII in the past and, therefore, to stem national disintegration, is through democratic mechanisms which create a sphere of fair debate and compromise.

Second, the apparent glow of sharia-based regional ordinances is evidence of the weakness and unpopularity of nationalist and democratic discourses in the eyes of the community.

The nationalists failed to make their's the people's discourse due to its elitist manner and their poor strategy.

Needless to say, sharia-based ordinances are always preceded by the demands a particular group in civil society makes, whether through mass mobilization or recommendations issued by organized working groups.

In South Sulawesi, for instance, it was in early 2002 that an organization named the Committee for the Preparation of Enforced Islamic Sharia (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam/KKPSI) was established.

The organization was headed by Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, son of the late DI/TII commander Abdul Kahar Muzakkar. Dozens of sharia-based ordinances were established by its efforts.

In one of the province's districts, Bulukumba, a new official institution named the Sharia Council (Dewan Syariat) was launched. This council is responsible for giving an opinion to the regent on whether a policy violates sharia or not. The council consists of almost all the existing Muslim organizations, including the more moderate, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

The birth of sharia-based ordinances has not usually been instigated by a commitment to sharia itself. What has always been raised have been questions of moral decline and traditional crisis. Such discourses have successfully gained local Muslim people's support. This support became greater as the fairly prominent religious scholars (ulama) give their endorsement.

In Banjar, a district of South Kalimantan, this type of ordinance has been supported by the most influential local NU-oriented boarding school, Pesantren Darussalam. The current district vice regent was one of the leaders of this pesantren.

Within predominantly Muslim regions such as South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara, the presence of these ordinances is regarded as respecting Islamic religious aspirations.

Through these ordinances, their ulemas are involved in the process of public policy formulation. Needless to say, these ulemas also gain political-economic benefits from their new roles.

The discourses on moral decline and traditional crises have been evoked and manufactured vividly by Islamist politicians in parallel with the discourse on the disintegration of nationalism. The nationalists and democratic activists are still ensnared around ideological debates such as whether someone or something is Islamist or nationalist; intolerant or pluralist; and democratic or authoritarian?

These questions are quite necessary but not sufficient.

The writer is a researcher at the Center of Asian Studies (CENAS), Jakarta, and co-author of Prakarsa Perdamaian, Pengalaman dari Berbagai Konflik Sosial (Peace Initiative, An Experience from Various Social Conflicts), 2008. He can be reached at zamjani@yahoo.com

— JP