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lthough Indonesia has seen no major terrorist attacks since the bombing of the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009, a barrage of failed terrorism attempts indicates that terrorist networks are exploring various new strategies. The Jakarta Post’s Rendi A. Witular recently met with National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) operation director Brig. Gen. Petrus Reinhard Golose over the new patterns of terrorism in the country. Here are excerpts of the interview:

Question: What do you see as future recruitment and attack patterns of terrorists?

Answer: As you can see, terrorists here have changed their patterns. First, we should look at the quality of their bombs. They used to be able to assemble bombs with huge explosive power, but that level has been drastically reduced because it has become difficult for them to find the needed raw materials. Second, it is getting difficult for them to recruit suicide bombers. Third, they changed their modus operandi from bombing to assassination.

The new breed of terrorists also tend to attack immediately and target government officials – the police, particularly, as representatives of the government.

Aside from that, they are also preparing a new method of using poison to kill. This is another interesting point, and again the police are marked as the target.

Are the new terrorist cells still related to the old players?

By ideology they are all connected. All of them. Their objectives are similar. Based on our experience, even though they have changed names to, for example, the NII (Islamic State of Indonesia), JI (Jemah Islamiyah), MMI (Indonesian Mujahideen Council), JAT (Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid) and so on, they are still within similar ideologies.

And they are still recruiting a young generation and trying to penetrate into boarding schools, with the recent example in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, [where a home-made bomb allegedly assembled by clerics exploded inside Umar bin Khattab Islamic boarding school].

The terrorists are still setting up a string of training camps too. Despite our major arrests of terrorist hotshots in 2010 over their training camp in Aceh, they are still aggressive in setting up more training camps, particularly in Central Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. They equipped the camp with smuggled guns and other facilities.

In several crackdowns, we have even found the terrorists in possession of [gun] silencers. This is even more dangerous than a bomb because they can kill anyone easily without anyone noticing.

The terrorists are also targeting embassies, with the latest one being a plan to attack the Singaporean Embassy in Jakarta. This is our concern, as it is within our territory and it is our responsibility to ensure the safety of all our foreign emissaries.

So the recent failed attacks were not carried out by lone wolf actors inspired by previous attacks?

They’re not lone wolves. There’s only one such case, which was in Bekasi, West Java. Other cases were launched by wolf packs. We are still looking for other networks, which are bound together by ideology and the different interpretation of jihad. They are still expanding to form new groups.

But all of them are connected [with the old players affiliated with JI and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir].

They include Pepi Fernando [a middle-class university graduate plotting to bomb a church in Serpong, Banten, earlier this year]. Pepi is connected to the Apui cell that is linked with Aman Abdurrahman [terrorist recruiter now in custody for his role in setting up a terrorist training camp in Aceh earlier last year].

Is there a change in the funding of terrorism?

The first Bali bombing, the first J.W. Marriott bombing and the second Bali bombing were all financed by people linked with al Qaeda. But after that, they tried to get their money from Indonesians. As you can see, the terrorist training camp in Aceh was funded by upper-class Indonesians who consisted of businessmen and physicians. And the terrorists also still commit robberies such as the one in North Sumatra to garner resources.

As the terrorists form smaller groups that tend to attack immediately and by any means, how do you stop them?

That’s why during the recent coordination meeting [attended by chiefs of regional police and military bases], our focus is now on prevention and preemptive measures. We try to include all institutions, not only law enforcement agencies, but also non-governmental organization in this fight. We’ve now arrested more than 689 terrorists.

Many are questioning the role of the BNPT, which does not yet seem to be up and running as expected, with counterterrorism measures still being carried out entirely by the police. How do you respond to this?

The BNPT has a very comprehensive counterterrorism function, not only law enforcement but also de-radicalization measures, capacity building and international cooperation. We’re trying to get to the root of terrorism. The agency is still young and is still trying to coordinate and bring in other stakeholders in the fight to reduce terrorism.

The obstacle that we face is in penetrating and infiltrating radical groups. But it’s impossible to get into such groups because they have their own mind-sets, thus they will easily detect unwanted outsiders. That’s why we need more coordination.