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n 2008 the Malaysian media called it a 'political tsunami'. In 2013 the ruling coalition National Front (BN) called it the 'Chinese tsunami'. Five years ago, the shockwave was evident. BN lost the important states of Penang and Selangor to the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the People's Justice Party (PKR) respectively. This time, they have retained those states while BN failed to secure two thirds of parliamentary seats.

Not only did more people vote for members of the People's Alliance, but it was evident that Chinese Malaysians have completely abandoned the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a BN member and the 'default' political party for Chinese-Malaysians from 1974 to 2004.

The Malaysian government's reactions to the tsunamis, however, have been different. In 2008, then prime minister Abdullah Badawi lamented 'We lost, we lost,' and patriarch Mahatir Mohamad said he regretted his choice of Badawi as successor. This year, however, Prime Minister Najib Razak expressed displeasure with Malaysians who did not vote for BN.

After coining the term 'Chinese tsunami', Najib said the result showed an unhealthy trend. 'This worries the government, because'¦it could spark tension.' Mahatir grumbled about the 'ungrateful Chinese'. The newspaper of UMNO (BN's chief party) asked 'What else do the Chinese want?'

Chinese Malaysians are all too familiar with such statements. For decades the MCA has presented itself as the protector of the Chinese from discontent. Throughout the campaign period, however, the prime minister did not show clear evidence of trying to attract Chinese Malaysians' sympathy.

Chinese Malaysians, or the Malaysian Chinese as they call themselves, comprise about a quarter of Malaysian citizens. Over the decades, there has been a steady flow of emigration, a brain drain, of Chinese Malaysians to Singapore, Australia and the United Kingdom. Along with Indian Malaysians, they are the public face of 'Malaysians' for ordinary Australians and Hong Kongers. Unusually for ethnic Chinese worldwide, they are politically active.

Chinese culture discourages political participation and advocates obedience to the state. Taiwan is the only Chinese-majority state to practice democracy. While Singapore practices multiparty elections and parliamentary government, it admits that it cannot accept democracy since it goes against 'The Asian Values'. Malaysia echoes this sentiment and believes that democracy can be dangerous.

By the late 1960s many Chinese Malaysians preferred liberalism and social democracy over more radical politics, but they faced a more assertive and insecure Malay population. In the May 1969 election, Chinese-dominated Gerakan and DAP gained a considerable number of seats, and their victory rallies resulted in anti-Chinese riots.

The aftermath defined modern Malaysian history, as the government enacted positive discrimination/affirmative action. Mahatir Mohamad published The Malay Dilemma, arguing that the survival of the Malay race was the definition of Malaysian nationhood. His blueprint of exclusive treatment for the Malays and their language ' as they had been wronged by British colonialism and Chinese economic hegemony ' came into full force even before he became prime minister.

Critics of the New Economic Policy (NEP) say that it does not level the playing field and that only privileged Malays ' children of royals and government elites ' enjoy the benefits. On the other hand, Malaysian economics are driven by Chinese and Indian tycoons who work closely with the government while working class minorities do not get access to universities and workplaces.

Nevertheless, many Malays see it as a safeguard against Chinese dominance in employment, education, business opportunities and politics. Even Malays who are against corruption and authoritarianism are reluctant to support DAP's long-term agenda of abolishing both the NEP and the twin Malay supremacies; Bahasa Melayu and Islam. In fact the DAP has been painted by both pro-government media and by fellow members of the opposition (including Indian Malaysians) as a Chinese supremacist party.

In Malaysia or Singapore, a sense of community and nationhood is hindered by the interlinked racial and religious segregations.

A similar situation happened in Indonesia, which was solved by forcibly erasing the Chinese identity and culture. It helps that Indonesia does not have a significant Indian population and the ethnic majority Javanese are not exclusively Muslims. While Indonesians differentiate themselves in terms of religion, Malaysians and Singaporeans see themselves in terms of race.

Chinese Malaysians are politically active because of their significant number and status as minorities and, despite the discrimination, the political institution still gives them a chance. Chinese Indonesians do not go into politics, media, or even showbiz in great numbers because of their population size relative to the non-Chinese and the institutions give them no chance. Those who do often downplay their Chinese heritage and emphasize their Indonesian identity. In recent years Chinese Singaporeans have called for changes, but are aware of their status as an uneasy majority.

Most Chinese and Indian Malaysians genuinely love their country and want a Malaysia where race and religion do not matter. The lasting effects of British education and government systems, and the fact that many Chinese Malaysian parents permit their children to become journalists and politicians, have created a culture of proud resistance to the system.

The government has tried to deny that it has lost the respect of Malays and implies that only the Chinese voted against it.

In doing so, it admits that participation in politics works, and that the Chinese Malaysians know what they want.

The writer teaches English and Australian cultural studies at Uni-Bridge, St. Aloysius High School, Bandung.