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lthough the Islamic State (IS) group has recently lost territory and an estimated 80 percent of its revenue base, the 30 official and semiofficial IS channels and chat rooms still emphasize its longevity and strength.

So far, its sharp territorial decline has also destroyed its ability to collect revenue from oil production and smuggling, taxation, confiscation and other similar activities. Its average monthly income has reportedly dropped from US$81 million in the second quarter of 2015 to only $16 million in the second quarter of 2017.

However, IS still strong in its role and existence on social media and the internet. They broadcast IS’ development efforts to domestic and international audiences, from dam construction, digging wells, building infrastructure, to electrification of villages under IS control, and inoculating children in hospitals.

The scholars Mia Bloom and Chelsea Daymon cautioned in their book last year that the general use of peer-to-peer encrypted messages by IS shows no signs of declining despite early predictions. So far, the IS online platforms mix high-definition graphic audiovisual content with religious-ideological writings to justify violent terrorist tactics.

In recent years, IS jihadist groups have grown and developed propaganda to open application programming interface platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Tumblr.

But IS elites and leaders are aware that platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are being increasingly monitored, along with aggressive elimination of accounts, so that Telegram has been selected as IS’ priority platform for spreading propaganda and recruiting new members.

Researchers have shown how Telegram is used by IS and its worldwide supporters, and have assessed the kind of threat using Telegram toward IS’ vision of its “virtual caliphate”.

The encrypted platform remains the virtual weapon for radicalization, recruitment and planning. As Lucas Kello from Oxford University said, in the virtual domain, vital strategic operations can be “shrouded in secrecy”, causing difficulties for scientific research, security forces, defense operators and policymakers to track them down.

 IS elites and leaders understand that individuals shape perceptions of themselves based on identification with groups, core group values and their emotions. As a result, their continued presence in the cyber environment can encourage extreme political and religious views, excessive violence and competition outside the group. In fact, IS also creates a spatial echo for radicalization.

Among social media and internet sites, Telegram applications are increasingly in demand as a platform of choice for clandestine activities of IS and its supporters. The uniqueness of Telegram in terms of privacy and security made it succeed in attracting 100 million users in 2016.

  Telegram is commonly used by IS terrorists to recruit and coordinate attacks, including in Brussels in 2017. Telegram, among others, was also used to communicate among perpetrators of attacks in Paris in 2015, attacks on 2017 New Year’s Eve in Turkey, and attacks in St Petersburg, Russia in April 2017. In Indonesia, a number of terrorism suspects arrested in December 2016 claimed to have learned to make bombs by following directions via Telegram. IS elites and leaders understand that Telegram cannot be traced after an attack.

Initially, most of its propaganda focused on IS development both physically and figuratively, offering an online “supra-national brand” of an Islamic super state. This virtual caliphate is framed as legitimizing and becoming the moral reasons for their actions and existence. Projections of state building is intended to create attractive options for prospective immigrants, but also for the IS transition from the rebel movement to a distinctive “Islamic State”, and “virtual caliphate”.

Even as a “virtual caliphate”, IS would be able to continue to use various information regarding areas of operation. This ability includes doctrinal military, strategic communication, civil-military relations, engagement of key leaders, supporting operations and military fraud, according to the analyst Harleen Gambhir. IS also markets jihad, information warfare and cyber propaganda in various parts of the world.

Thus, it is clear that even though IS has been defeated and cornered due to losing a lot of territory, its “virtual caliphate” can still disseminate its agenda, vision and mission to the domestic and international communities. Indonesia must not be complacent, and must continue to be vigilant in anticipating the development of terrorism, particularly by IS’ “virtual caliphate”, its networks and cells in various parts of the world, including in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, it is very possible that IS members and sympathizers are in the area around us and are targeting us to be part of their virtual territory.

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Herdi Sahrasad is associate director at the Center for Islam and State Studies, University of Paramadina, and the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Indonesia. Al Chaidar is head of the Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Malikussaleh State University, Aceh, and a PhD candidate at the Department of Anthropology, University of Indonesia.