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What makes the 212 movement still significant?

JP/Donny FernandoAlthough it is still capable of attracting tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of attendees, the 212 movement, born out of the anti-Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama rally on Dec

Azis Anwar Fachrudin and Afifur Rochman Syarani (The Jakarta Post)
Yogyakarta
Fri, December 6, 2019

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What makes the 212 movement still significant?

JP/Donny Fernando

Although it is still capable of attracting tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of attendees, the 212 movement, born out of the anti-Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama rally on Dec. 2, 2016, is shrinking in terms of organizations and parties that make it up, and its significance depends on issues it can use to its advantage for consolidation. The movement’s latest reunion early this week reflects this.

This year’s reunion was smaller than last year’s due to the retreat of some influential figures and organizations (some have now joined the government’s coalition) and the less powerful issues available for them to mobilize what they call ummah (Islamic society).

Last year’s reunion was during the electoral campaign period and the theme was “defending tawhid”, referring to the burning of a flag carrying the symbol of oneness of tawhid (the Divine) by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) youth paramilitary wing Banser in the previous month. While typically the explicit goal of the reunion’s committee was maintaining Islamic brotherhood, many among the reunion participants in the crowd last year were heavily political by shouting “ganti presiden” (replace the president) and signaling support for the then-incumbent’s challenger Prabowo Subianto. The reunion was in reality a form of political campaign for Prabowo, who attended the event at that time.

Last year, the reunion’s organizers were dominated by the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), and such is the case even more so this year. Some key Salafi-inclined organizations whose representatives spoke on the main stage last year didn’t enjoy the same opportunity this time. Moreover, Prabowo has joined the government; the 212 Alumni Brotherhood (the institutional representative of the 212 movement) felt betrayed because of this and, in place of him, they seem to want the current Jakarta governor, Anies Baswedan, who spoke on the stage, to run as a presidential candidate in 2024.

To consolidate the ummah, they therefore need a kind of new enemy. This year’s theme, “addressing blasphemy”, exploited, as apparent among the crowd, the case of both Sukmawati Soekarnoputri, Sukarno’s daughter, and Gus Muwafiq, a rising NU preacher, whose remarks on Prophet Muhammad they consider blasphemous.

The spiritual leader of the FPI, Rizieq Shihab, who the 212 movement declared to be the “great imam of Indonesia's Muslim ummah”, addressed the event through video from Saudi Arabia, that those “blasphemous” cases must be addressed by successive rallies until they are brought to “justice”. After all, previously available issues for mobilization have lost, so perhaps only blasphemy remains for them, at least for today, to test how significant the movement still is.

Seen from the perspective of democracy, that is exactly what’s still problematic about the movement: Blasphemy provides an easily exploited issue for them to orchestrate what scholar Cherian George calls “hate spin”, an offense-taking mechanism by political entrepreneurs to mobilize supporters and marginalize opponents. Hate spin undermines the democratic principle of the rule of law, changing it to a rule by mob, by utilizing vague regulations such as the Blasphemy Law.

In fact, reports on alleged blasphemy have arisen over the past few years since the 212 movement was born in 2016. It has been increasingly and effectively used against Muslims and non-Muslims alike whose statements are considered to have wounded their religious feelings. It has gone so far to the extent that a Buddhist woman’s remark on the azan (call to prayer) volume from a mosque’s speaker can be spun and narrated as criticizing the azan itself and therefore insulting sharia, and the Buddhist woman was jailed.

To be consistent, Rizieq’s own remarks about the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the past, for example, were no less “blasphemous” than Sukmawati’s or Muwafiq’s by the 212 movement’s own standards. Their vehement reaction against the latter while forgetting the former — and moreover by demanding the government to guarantee a safe return to the FPI spiritual leader from his self-imposed exile — is a vulgar display of inconsistency.

Ironically, the response from some of the government’s fanatic supporters have been similar. At times they also use the hate spin mechanism to target Islamist opposition, sometimes driven by a retaliation motive.

As a result, what we see today is a cycle of revenge of prosecuting alleged blasphemy and hate speech by both sides.

While those government supporters oppose the 212 movement, this kind of environment is paradoxically what makes the 212 movement find its significance. The FPI has reported the cases of Sukmawati and Muwafiq to the police.

Ideally, this environment of mobocracy should be dealt with in a fair, firm and consistent upholding of the rule of (clearly and strictly defined) law, especially now with greater power in the hands of the government with most political parties on its side.

Unfortunately, the actual response from the government to reduce Islamist sway over society has been similarly using vaguely defined terms such as “radicalism”, with the national ideology Pancasila as a kind of panacea.

After banning Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia two years ago, the government is now weighing whether to extend the FPI’s license as a mass organization.

It’s not hard to predict that if the FPI’s permit is terminated, they’ll see it as a further show of “criminalization of ulema” and “repression of the Islamic ummah” from the part of the government, fueling the typical Islamist narrative of self-victimization.

The ideal we should pursue should’ve been pretty clear: The problem lies not in whether an organization like the FPI or a movement such as the 212 exists, but in the weak and inconsistent enforcement of the law that enables the FPI’s vigilante acts to go unpunished and in the vague laws that enable the groups to exploit what they see as
blasphemous.

With appreciation to the peaceful rally in general and in the genuine participation among many of the attendees, once again, it’s the environment of mobocracy born out of those two problems that provides a fertile ground for movements like the 212 to grow, develop and orchestrate hate spins, which in turn undermine the fabric of our currently fragile democracy.

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Both writers are researchers for the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University. Azis attended last year’s 212 reunion, and Afif this year’s.

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