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ddressing the virtual Group of 20 Summit on March 27, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo called for international cooperation to fight COVID-19. On the same day, Indonesia and five other countries drafted a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for global solidarity in the fight against the pandemic.

On March 20, the International Chamber of Commerce co signed a letter with the International Trade Union Confederation, calling on leaders to commit to bold coordinated action that leaves no one behind in response to the pandemic.

The World Trade Organization noted that the crisis calls for an unprecedented level of international cooperation. Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has decried a lack of global cooperation to beat the pandemic.

In a chaotic situation where every country seems to outdo the next in being the worst responder to the pandemic, what do countries still have to offer for international cooperation? What is still at their disposal to make such an effort, when all resources are supposed to be exhausted domestically?

Schwartz and Yen (2017), in analyzing the “whole-of society approach” to pandemic preparedness, argue that “Although international cooperation remains fundamental to pandemic preparedness and response efforts, […] an outbreak within […] a country requires that states prepare domestic plans to manage these outbreaks. At the point the outbreak becomes a domestic affair, the burden of control falls to the pandemic preparedness and response infrastructure and institutions established by the country.”

Experiences with pandemics (such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Ebola, Zika) show that no country facing an outbreak has proven itself to possess a fully effective response system.

“Working together” should mean everyone has something to offer. But when all countries are scraping for resources to deal with the issue, what can be offered is very limited. This is the biggest reason why we are yet to see significant movement.

An agreement on what must be done is one issue; doing it is another. The G20 leaders promised to inject US$5 trillion into the global economy to counteract the impact of the pandemic, while measures in public health, technology, global supply chains, and assistance to developing countries have been outlined; nonetheless, without leadership in directing these efforts, an agreement can only do so much.

I’m a keen supporter of multilateralism. Yet such declarations and agreements that are not being followed up will create unrealistic hope and a false picture of the global situation.

Worse, states feel pressured into joining such calls without the intention of implementing the commitments, to avoid being the odd one out. In Southeast Asia, we’re too familiar with such regional commitments, aren’t we?

Data sharing and transparency are part of working together, things that Indonesia indeed has to offer.

Nonetheless, for pandemics like COVID-19, the biggest part of “working together” is ensuring that the crisis is well-handled domestically to contribute to stopping further spreading.

For this, a country’s pandemic preparedness and response infrastructure and institutions are the top priority, not creating a resolution for global solidarity.

In The Straits Times (March 28), C. Raja Mohan likens the decision-making during crises to war, which can disturb multiple equations within and across borders.

He suggests leaders must make difficult decisions in the fog of crises, with limited information and the inability to predict, let alone control, all the variables involved and the consequences of one’s actions.

The main obligation of governments is to their own people. In crises, it is natural for governments to maintain that internal considerations must prevail over the international. Taking care of one’s self comes before assisting others. In pandemics like COVID-19 where being healthy is the main ammunition, this approach prevails even more.

As with all global crises, the poorer countries are hit the most. Their health centers cannot manage basic infection control, while financial obstacles affect the ability to pay health workers. What the developing world needs is assistance.

The summary of the Workshop on Financing Pandemic Preparedness and Response (part of the Global Health Risk Framework initiative) in 2016 acknowledges these issues, plus the problems with assistance from developed countries.

Listed problems include the delay between pledges of assistance and funding received, resulting in inefficiency into development, obliging businesses in aid-recipient countries to use credit to meet operating expenses.

International cooperation in a time of crisis is the norm, but can only be done if the major powers are keen to take leadership.

Experience shows international assistance to developing countries is also the norm in a pandemic, but can only happen when there are countries with more resources at their disposal to provide assistance. Yet when the major powers are busy with their own problems due to the pandemic, there is less on offer for the rest of the world.

For countries like Indonesia, the best (or only?) thing we can offer is to manage the outbreak and keep it under control. If we manage to slow down the outbreak within Indonesia, we are contributing immensely to the international fight against COVID-19. For this, we need all the assistance available, from within and outside the country.

So, regarding Jokowi’s call for cooperation at the G20 virtual summit, Indonesia’s efforts through the UNGA, and even pieces by Indonesian scholars stressing international cooperation — were those really a call for international cooperation, or a cry for help?

Let’s differentiate between the two, and get our terminology correct.